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Abstract
While there are many factors that contribute to the high cost of developing spacecraft systems,
one of the most often cited culprits is the launch vehicle. The explicit, first order impact of
lowering space transportation costs is obvious. The cost of the launch vehicle system can
consume anywhere from 10 to 75 percent of the space program budget depending on mission
type. What is less understood are the implicit, second order impacts that launch capabilities have
on the design of space systems. Limitations in launch capability, or constraints, can drive
spacecraft design decisions and significantly alter subsystem and architectural choices. In many
cases, the resulting decisions can lead to unnecessary hardware and software, increased system
complexity, longer development and deployment times, continuous subsystem optimization, and
multiple redesigns to comply with launch vehicle restrictions. The possibility that many of these
design decisions be might be radically different under relaxed launch vehicle constraints is
highly probable.
This research presents an analysis of the complex launch vehicle-spacecraft relationship focusing
on how launch vehicle constraints influence the design and development of space systems. A
myriad of launch constraints spanning across technical, operational, budgetary, and policy
themes were identified and explained. The impact of each constraint on space system design and
development, both by itself and coupled with other constraints, was substantiated and supported
by historical examples from military, commercial, and civil space missions. Both architecture
and subsystem level design changes were explored as well as prevailing design philosophies that
have created a high cost of failure mentality and limited the ability to make inter-enterprise
design trades. Finally, a simple model considers the potential changes to spacecraft system
design and development in the wake of launch system improvements.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Joyce Warmkessel
Policy Reader: Dr. Daniel Hastings
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Forward
The Stanford Daily, November 18, 1994
"The principal deterrent to the expanded use of space, both for NASA
and industry, is high cost." US National Research Council [1
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
In the last four decades, space has become an integral part of the world's scientific, military, and
commercial endeavors. In the defense industry, space represents the ultimate high ground,
providing irreplaceable reconnaissance, communications, tracking, navigation, and potentially
ultra-rapid weapons deployment. Similarly, space delivers key products for the commercial
world including mobile and fixed communications, direct broadcast, multi-spectral imaging, and
resource mapping. For science, space offers the opportunity to look outward to answer questions
about the nature of the universe and look inward to monitor the Earth's fragile biosphere. While
the value of these tasks is unquestionable, the cost of performing them is excessive.
1.1 Overview of the Research
The development of space systems is extremely expensive. This is a fact that is as true today as
it was at the birth of the space industry in the late 1950's. Since the launch of the first artificial
satellite in 1957 through the present, commercial aerospace and government organizations have
successfully ventured into space by overcoming many technological challenges. Yet, realizing
the true potential of space remains out of reach. Whether it is launch vehicles or spacecraft, the
last barrier to the successful exploitation of space continues to be the high cost of designing,
producing, deploying, and operating space systems. The end of the Cold War has eliminated the
national security-based justification for enormous space expenditures. In the current
environment of budget cuts and bottom-line performance pressures, it is crucial to drive down
costs to sustain current missions and enable new projects to be initiated.
While there are many factors that contribute to the high cost of developing spacecraft systems,
one of the most often cited culprits is the launch vehicle. The explicit, first order impact of
lowering space transportation costs is obvious. The cost of the launch system can consume
anywhere from 15 to 70 percent of a space program's budget depending on mission type and
objectives. What is less understood are the implicit, second order impacts that launch capabilities
have on the design of spacecraft systems. Many times limitations in launch capabilities, or
constraints, can drive spacecraft design decisions and significantly alter subsystem and
architectural choices. Any factor that drives the design and program decisions will ultimately
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 17
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have a significant impact on life-cycle costs. In many cases, the resulting launch-constraint-
based decisions can lead to unnecessary hardware and software, increased system complexity,
longer development and deployment times, and multiple subsystem redesigns to comply with
launch vehicle restrictions. The possibility that many of these design decisions might be radically
different under relaxed launch vehicle restrictions is highly probable.
This research presents an analysis of the complex launch vehicle - spacecraft relationship
focusing on how launch vehicle constraints influence the design and development of spacecraft
systems. Launch system constraints can be divided into four categories depicted in Figure 1-1.
Physical Cost
Constraints Constraints
Policy Operational
Constraints Constraints
FIGURE 1-1 LAUNCH SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS
Physical constraints deal primarily with limitations based on physics and the laws of nature.
Physical constraints include lift capabilities (mass), volume boundaries, dynamic and static
loads, environmental conditions, and system-to-system interfaces. Operational constraints
consider the functionality of the launch vehicle performing its primary task of delivering
payloads to orbit. Operational constraints consist of vehicle reliability, availability, schedule
dependability, and contract timelines. Cost constraints involve all fiscal matters including
standard vehicle procurement, insurance, range fees, and vehicle mission-specific modifications.
Finally, policy constraints entail the role and influence of government and commercial decision-
makers. Policy constraints cover government enacted space transportation regulations,
management practices and procedures, politics and international relations, and future launch
MIT LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE JUNE 2001l
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vehicle development strategies. The focus of this research is to understand how these constraints
affect current spacecraft systems as well as how changes to these constraints might affect the
development of future spacecraft systems.
1.2 Motivation
Improved launch vehicle capabilities and more affordable access to space have become high
priorities in the United States. In the last decade, nine government sponsored programs have
been initiated to reduce space-access costs and develop launch systems with "aircraft-like"
operations. Aircraft-like operations encompass quick vehicle turn-around times, ability to
function in adverse weather conditions, and multi-order of magnitude improvements in safety,
reliability, and flight rates. Demand for such capabilities has been forecasted by numerous
commercial companies and government agency studies. Recent publications enumerate a myriad
of new market opportunities that will flourish with improved space access from microgravity
materials and pharmaceuticals processing, to space solar power and transport of cargo and
passengers. However, very few studies discuss the complex, technical relationship between
spacecraft systems and launch capabilities. Few consider how radical changes in the launch
system will not only open up new markets but also alter spacecraft design, development, and
deployment philosophies. To understand how spacecraft systems might change in this new
"liberated-state," it is vital to understand how they exist in the current "constrained-state."
The complex relationship between launch vehicles and spacecraft is a result of their symbiotic
link and is characteristics of products considered to be 'complimentary.' According to economic
theory, the connection between complimentary products produces a positive coupling effect
whereby the success, or failure, of one system determines the outcome of the other, and vice
versa. Such a coupling can lead to explosive market growth when improvements in both
products reinforce each other such as the introduction of the IBM PC and the Windows operating
system. However, the reverse is also true. Stagnation of one product can hamper the growth of
the other. Unfortunately, this negative feedback loop has plagued the space industry for several
decades. High launch costs limit the number and the scope of spacecraft missions. However, the
vehicle flight rate, or the number of missions launched in a specified period of time, is a major
driver for launch costs. Thus, the space industry is caught in a vicious cycle scenario where
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 19CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 19
spacecraft missions need low transportation costs in order to be viable and more numerous, yet
launch systems need more missions (higher flight rates) to reduce per flight costs. A better
understanding of the complex interfaces and relationship between spacecraft and launch vehicles
is necessary to break this cycle.
High Launch
Costs
Low Demand High Cost of Failure
- Few Missions - High Reliability
- Reduced Scope - Long Design Life
FIGURE 1-2 THE SPACECRAFT - LAUNCH VEHICLE VICIOUS CIRCLE [2]
An added feature of this vicious cycle or "symbiotic paradox," shown in Figure 1-2, is the
creation of a "high cost of failure" mentality. In a typical commercial application, ensuring that
customers have reliable service is driven by the corporate profit motive. Likewise, in military
operations assurance of reliable information and communication is crucial to the warfighter's
success in the field. Mission requirements drive spacecraft engineers to pursue high reliability
strategies and design systems with excessive redundancy to ensure that failure does not occur.
Launch constraints such as high costs and lengthy procurement timelines typically exceeding 30
months also play a significant role in driving high spacecraft system reliability. 1 The loss of a
spacecraft is financially difficult to replace. Launch vehicle procurement timelines averaging 30
months combined with the lack of "launch-on-demand" capability indicates that even if the funds
and a replacement spacecraft are available, there is still a high probability of a two and a half
year delay before the spacecraft could be delivered to orbit. High space access costs and other
technical barriers also make maintenance or fixing spacecraft on-orbit prohibitive. All of these
factors further reinforce the mindset that the spacecraft must not fail and that it also should last
as long as possible to produce revenue or other value metrics to cover its development and
20 CHAPTER 
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deployment costs. Thus, mission requirements combined with launch constraints contribute to
the "high cost of failure" mentality, driving reliability and long system lifetimes.
While many studies have looked at the explicit impacts of launch systems or focused on how to
reduce the cost of either the launch vehicle or the spacecraft in isolation, relatively little work has
looked across architecture segments to evaluate the coupled relationship and how changes in one
segment might impact another. The primary motivation for the research focuses on trying to fill
a portion of this gap and to gain a better understanding of the role that transportation systems
play in the design and development of in-orbit space systems.
1.3 Key Questions
Based on the motivation outlined above, this thesis research was framed around answering two
critical questions:
" How do launch vehicle system constraints impact the design and development of
spacecraft systems?
* What aspects of spacecraft design and space system architecting might change with
relaxed launch vehicle constraints?
Figure 1-3 illustrates the connection between the two central questions showing how the first
question defines the present state while the second question seeks to explore the potential
ramifications of altering the present state.
Launch Relaxed
Constraints Constraints
S/C -. ?/
Design I Design
Today Tomorrow
FIGURE 1-3 RELATIONSHIP OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
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1.4 Objectives and Contributions
The relationship between launch vehicles and spacecraft is both complex and dynamic. Changes
in spacecraft design strategies in the early 1990's from large, individual geostationary
communications spacecraft to distributed, small, multi-satellite constellations in Low Earth Orbit
(LEO) had a dramatic impact on the launch community. The sudden surge in new commercial
launch companies attempting to build both expendable and reusable vehicles in the mid 1990's in
response to increased demand and the change in space system architecture provides direct
evidence.
The development of a low cost, reliable, and flexible launch system will represent a disruptive
technology in the space arena. Firms that understand how to best adapt and utilize the new
capabilities will thrive while those that do not will loose market share and their competitive
advantage. The development of affordable air transport in the 1930's had an incredible impact on
the affairs of the world. Prior to 1935, aircraft primarily carried out military purposes and mail
transport, both essentially subsidized by the US government. However, the advent of the Douglas
DC-3 in 1936 changed everything. "The DC-3 freed the airlines from complete dependence on
mail pay. It was the first aircraft that could make money just by hauling passengers."[4 1 Air
transportation and the aviation industry quickly converted from a government subsidy program
to a $200 billion market; aviation products and services are now the US's top export.
Whether the space transportation industry will witness a similar "DC-3-like" event and what its
ultimate impact will be is unknown. Clearly the emergent benefits of improved launch
capabilities cannot be completely fathomed. However, there are significant benefits to
identifying and characterizing current constraints and how they effect spacecraft systems.
Identification of the most detrimental constraints and quantitative assessment of their cost and
schedule impacts provides the rationale and substantiation for approaching launch providers to
request system improvements. It provides a listing of which changes will have the most
significant benefits and what magnitude of change is required. Additionally, familiarization with
the mode that constraints influence system design is the first step in formulating a strategy for
mitigating these impacts and making more informed design decisions. Looking forward,
knowledge of constraint impacts forms the basis of technology roadmaps that outline which
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capabilities are required to effectively utilize new launch systems quickly. Finally, focusing on
the interface between the launch vehicle and spacecraft stimulates a system-level view of the
design process. Approaching the design and development of complex systems from a system-of-
systems framework is necessary to avoid the pitfall of local, subsystem optimization and enables
a focus on creating the best life-cycle value for the end user.
Objectives and contributions of this work include:
1) Identification and characterization of thirteen launch vehicle constraints that influence
the design of current spacecraft systems
2) Industry examples across military, civil, and commercial sectors providing scope and
quantitative data
3) An analysis of the influence current space transportation policy has on spacecraft
systems and the potential impact of policy decisions related to the development of the
next generation of launch systems
4) An example quantitative model demonstrating the sensitivity of spacecraft design
parameters to relaxed launch constraints
1.5 Research Design
The methodology employed to answer the research questions and meet the research objectives
focused on the collection and analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data. A multiple-
method approach was selected to collect a wider range of evidence to substantiate the possible
impacts and their magnitudes and to strengthen the validity of the quantitative modeling results.
The multi-method approach combines qualitative data gathered from expert industry interviews
with quantitative analysis based on mathematical modeling. Research activities can be separated
into four distinct phases: 1) background investigation and data collection, 2) expert interviews, 3)
model formulation, and 4) analysis and discussion.[5]
The goals of the background investigation included familiarization with the design of spacecraft
and launch systems, surveying the current literature for previous or related studies, and
determining the suitable companies, programs, engineers, and managers to consult. The
background investigation formed the basis for the interview questionnaire and the appropriate
parameters for the mathematical model.
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To better understand the nature of spacecraft design decisions, an interview questionnaire was
developed to obtain relevant opinions and data from design engineers and managers at multiple
levels of the design spectrum. Individuals from both the spacecraft and launch sectors across
military, civil, and commercial programs were surveyed in order to:
* Investigate and document the rationale and motivation behind historical design
decisions
* Obtain relevant design guidelines currently used by industry
* Gain an understanding how the spacecraft industry might react to significant
improvements in space transportation capabilities
e Identify what sub-system and system elements might change with improved
launch capabilities and by how much
The interview process concentrated on companies involved with the Lean Aerospace Initiative at
MIT (See Appendix A: Lean Thinking). Site visits were conducted at 10 different organizations
across military, civil, commercial, and academia sectors. Approximately 43 individuals were
interviewed during a three months period from January through March 2001. The majority of the
interviews were conducted on site at the host organization facilities and usually lasted between 1
to 2 hours per interview. The interview questionnaire is included in Appendix C. All data and
examples form resulting from these interviews is presented in a general and non-attributable
manner in order to protect company proprietary information.
The goal of the quantitative analysis was to support the qualitative assessment with hard numbers
indicating the magnitude of potential impacts and the required change in launch capabilities.
The primary goal was not to establish the exact levels of change, but to generate first order
approximations. The quantitative model developed and presented in Chapter 8 considers the
impact of lower launch costs on the replenishment rate (design lifetime) of spacecraft for
geostationary communication missions. Additional architecture options enabled by improved
launch capabilities are also presented.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The general layout of the thesis is cast around addressing the two primary research questions. To
answer these questions, the thesis is composed of four themes. The first theme (Chapters 1
through 3) provides perspective and background information. After initially summarizing the
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thesis topic, key questions, and research methodology, Chapters 2 and 3 provide the
fundamentals of spacecraft systems, launch systems, and the involvement of constraints in the
spacecraft systems engineering design process. The second theme (Chapters 4 through 7) covers
an in-depth discussion of the major launch vehicle constraints and how they impact spacecraft
design. Each chapter first introduces and defines the launch constraints, discusses how they
impact spacecraft design, provides examples from industry, and concludes with a summary of
impacts. The third theme (Chapter 8) explores the implications of relaxing several of these
launch constraints on spacecraft design. A simple mathematical model is presented
demonstrating how current spacecraft design philosophies might change in an environment of
improved launch capability. The final theme (Chapter 9) serves to pull everything together
summarizes key findings, conclusions, and future work. Figure 1-4 displays a "map" illustrating
the flow of the thesis.
iJ
FIGURE 1-4 MAP OF THE THESIS
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CHAPTER 2 SPACE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
2.1 History of Spacecraft Development
Prior to the early 1900's, the unknowns of spaceflight were unknown. While mankind
demonstrated an fascination for studying the meaning and significance of the stars and other
celestial bodies for thousands of years, the thought of physically venturing out into the heavens
existed in the realm of dreamers and was captured in the writings of Jules Verne. A Russian
teacher, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, was the first to accurately describe the physics of rockets and
spaceflight in a 1903 journal article that derived the now famous rocket equation. However,
while Tsiolkovsky's work provided the engineering analysis, the technology and hardware was
not developed until Robert Goddard from the United States and Werner von Braun from
Germany attempted the first rocket launches in the early 1930's.
The launch of Sputnik I, the first artificial satellite, by the Russians on October 4, 1957
commenced the space era. This feat was quickly followed by the United States' first successful
launch of Explorer I on January 31, 1958. The pace of progress from 1903 through 1957 quickly
ramped up in the 1960's, fueled by the Cold War space race between the US and the USSR,
which culminated in landing a man on the Moon in 1969. Space missions evolved from simple,
single channel radio transmitters weighing only a few kilograms to gigantic 5,000 kilogram
spacecraft offering sophisticated communications and data collection capabilities.[61 The next 30
years witnessed remarkable achievements in space including landing robotic craft on two
planets, constructing several inhabited orbital space stations, and sending spacecraft to explore
many other planets, moons, asteroids, and comets. After the 1960's, the pace of progress slowed
considerably as one to two-year projects became 10 to 20-year programs.
In the past, space was the realm of scientific research and government activities. In fact, most
activities in space were limited to three large governments: the USSR, the EU, and the US. Over
the years, commercial activities started to flourish and governments encouraged the private
sector to develop space capabilities. Up through the mid 1980's, private companies mainly
produced space hardware as suppliers to national governments.E7 1 In 1997, commercial spending
on space exceeded government space spending for the first time, a trend that will most likely
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never reverse course. In contrast to the three major players in the 1960's and 1970's, today's
space industry is much more diversified with government and commercial organizations in more
than ten countries capable of developing and launching spacecraft. Spacecraft systems have
become a vital part of the military, commercial, and scientific sectors. The growth in capability
combined with the diffusion of spacecraft technology have firmly entrenched space systems in
today's society.
2.2 Space Enterprise: Space System
Space systems are complex entities composed of diverse, specialized units each with unique
functionality that work in tandem to perform a particular task. A more formal definition
specifies that a system is "a collection of interrelated elements with functionality greater than the
sum of the independent element functions."81 This definition clarifies the purpose of a system, to
perform functions that individual entities, or subsystems, cannot. While the sub-unit performs a
particular task, it also contributes to the much larger mission. Figure 2-1 shows the hierarchy of
systems that can exist where one system can be both a supersystem (composed of many systems)
and a subsystem of another larger system simultaneously. This hierarchy has been labeled
"system-of-systems." The highest level supersystem is labeled the enterprise. The enterprise
represents the summation of the all relevant systems and subsystems.
Supersystem
"Enterprise"
System Supersystem
Subsystem
System
Subsystem
FIGURE 2-1 SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEMS DIAGRAM[81
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In order to carry out its mission, a spacecraft must also be integrated with other complex
systems. In this manner, the spacecraft itself is only a single element or subsystem of the larger
space enterprise. The space enterprise includes all spacecraft, launch vehicles, launch ranges,
ground stations, radar stations, control centers, and land-, air-, and sea-based receivers (end
users). Figure 2-2 shows the space enterprise and the relationships between the complex
systems.
Space
Enterprise
Ground Space Launch
Segment Segment Segment
Operations End Ground
& Control Users Station
Center
FIGURE 2-2 SPACE ENTERPRISE
A complete characterization of the entire space enterprise would also include all elements that
design, supply components, manufacture parts, and provide financing and sales. All of these
elements are necessary to complete the primary mission objectives. While there are many
elements in the space enterprise, the focus of the thesis is on the interactions between the space
and the launch segments highlighted in the shaded box in Figure 2-2. The following two
sections will briefly outline the fundamental elements of the launch and space segments.
2.3 Launch Fundamentals
2.3.1 Elements of the Launch Segment
Following the system-of-system paradigm, the launch segment is itself a compilation of smaller
systems. The launch segment is composed of two major systems, the launch vehicle and the
launch range. Each of these systems can be further broken down into their subsystems and their
subsystems' subsystems. Figure 2-3 displays a breakdown of the launch segment.
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FIGURE 2-3 ELEMENTS OF THE LAUNCH SEGMENT
The launch range comprises all facilities and infrastructure to support the processing and
integration of the launch vehicle and the spacecraft. Key elements include the:
Launch Pad and Tower System: Structural elements that physically support the launch
vehicle during stage integration, testing, and lift-off. Umbilicals from the tower provide
electrical power to the vehicle and payload and propellant loading shortly before lift-off.
Control Center System: Facilities, computers, and communications equipment that
manage launch procedures from arrival at the pad through countdown, lift-off, and orbital
insertion of the payload
Transport System: Equipment used in the movement of vehicle stages, spacecraft,
propellant, and other vehicle consumables
Consumables System: Storage facilities for vehicle propellant and fluids for the vehicle
hydraulic and pneumatic systems
Payload Processing System: Facilities and equipment used to store and prepare the
spacecraft for integration with the launch vehicle upper stage
Communications System: Ground, air, and sea-based facilities and equipment that
communicate with and track the launch vehicle from lift-off through ascent and orbital
insertion [91
Recovery System: Structural elements such as landing strips and equipment utilized in
the ground and sea recovery of vehicles, vehicle components, spacecraft, or debris
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The launch vehicle typically consists of multiple stages that are utilized at various points in the
launch ascent cycle. Key elements include:
Payload Fairing: Structural element providing protection for the spacecraft during
ascent. Also regulates the environmental conditions for the spacecraft during pad
integration, ascent, and prior to orbital deployment.
Payload Adapter: Structural element providing electrical and physical connections
between the spacecraft and the final launch vehicle stage. Also provides damping of
launch vehicle loads.
Main Stage: Provides initial thrust for lift-off and initial ascent in the atmosphere.
Includes the main engine, fuel tanks, and oxidizer tanks as well as structural elements and
avionics.
Secondary Stages: Provide vehicle thrust following main stage/main engine cut-off.
Responsible for delivering the spacecraft to the appropriate orbital altitude and
inclination.
Solid Rockets: Provide additional thrust to the main stage at lift-off
Figure 2-4 shows the major elements of and expendable launch vehicle.
Payload
Fairing
Main
Stage
Spacecraft
Second
Stage
Solids Rockets/
Strap-ons
Main
Engines
FIGURE 2-4 MAJOR ELEMENTS OF AN EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE [171
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2.3.2 The Cost of Launch Vehicles
Compared to any other mode of transportation, launching objects into space is by far the most
expensive. The costs associated with space access and payload delivery varies significantly
depending primarily on the payload size and the orbital destination. It is also important to note
that the exact launch costs for a particular vehicle will vary slightly from launch to launch
depending on mission-specific equipment. These costs, also known as "drive-away" costs,
include add-ons and extra features that are not included in the base vehicle price and cover
equipment and operations such as special payload adapters, thrust augmentation, unique
separation mechanisms, or telemetry equipment.
Launch costs are typically measured by two methods, vehicle procurement price and price per
unit mass. The vehicle procurement price is the absolute cost of purchasing the launch vehicle
for a single payload. For current vehicles, costs are roughly a function of the lift capacity of the
launch vehicle with cost increasing at a fairly linear rate. Launch vehicle costs range from the
least expensive Orbital Sciences Pegasus' vehicle at $15 million per flight up to the most
expensive Lockheed Martin Titan IV vehicle at $400 million. Another cost measurement that is
often quoted is the price per kilogram. For low Earth orbit launches, the average price is $9,800
per kilogram while the average price to geostationary orbit is $26,500 per kilogram. 161
Typically, the launch segment will consume roughly 30 to 40 percent of the program costs but
can range anywhere from 15 to 70 percent in extreme cases. On average, when launch insurance
is included, the launch segment consumes 50 percent of the total program budget. A more
thorough discussion of launch costs and drivers is included in Chapter 6: Cost Constraints.
2.4 Spacecraft Fundamentals
2.4.1 Elements of the Space Segment
The spacecraft system is composed of two major subsystems, the payload and the spacecraft bus.
The payload usually consists of various instruments, sensors, or antennas which are responsible
for carrying out the primary mission objectives. The spacecraft bus consists of multiple
subsystems that support the payload in carrying out its mission by providing power generation
and storage, structural support, heat dissipation, data processing, and signal transmission. Each
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of the subsystems illustrated in Figure 2-5 are also collections of smaller and more focused
subsystems and components.
Space
System
Payload pacecra
Bus
Structural Communication
System System
Thermal Propulsion
System System
Command and Data Guidance Navigation
Handling System & Control System
Power &
Electrical System
FIGURE 2-5 SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEMS
Functions and typical components of spacecraft bus elements:
Structural System
Function: To physically support the payload and all spacecraft subsystems during ground
integration, launch, and on-orbit operation in addition to providing an attachment fixture
for securing the spacecraft to the launch vehicle. Typical Components: launch adapters,
shielding, skin panels, fixtures, tanks, plates, trusses, frames, pressure vessels, brackets,
and equipment boxes.
Thermal System
Function: To insure that the spacecraft and its subsystems remain within the desired
temperature range through heat generation and heat dissipation. Typical Components:
electrical heaters, temperature controllers, heat exchangers and heat pipes, sensors,
cryogenic systems, solar reflectors, insulation, and coatings.
Command and Data Handling System
Function: To receive, validate, decode, process, and distribute mission data between
spacecraft subsystems. Typical Components: central computer, data storage mechanism,
software, database, command decoder, and A/D converters.
Power and Electrical System
Function: To generate, store, and distribute power between all spacecraft subsystems.
Typical Components: solar arrays, primary battery, secondary battery, distribution
system, regulators, converters, cabling, and switches.
Guidance, Navigation, and Control System
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Function: To determine and control the spacecraft's position and velocity as well as
maintain an appropriate orbital altitude and orientation. Typical Components: star
sensors, actuators, ephemeris data, software, and GPS receivers.
Propulsion System
Function: To deliver the spacecraft to higher orbital altitudes and different inclinations
following separation from the launch vehicle, to adjust the spacecraft's attitude and
altitude during normal mission operations, and to de-orbit the spacecraft following end-
of-life. Typical Components: fuel tanks, nozzle, ignition system, combustion chamber,
filters, regulators, valves, pumps, propellant, and meters.
Communication System
Function: To provide an interface between the spacecraft and ground systems or other
spacecraft through receiving and transmitting data. Typical Components: antenna,
transmitters, receivers, filters, and switch diplexers.
2.4.2 The Cost of Spacecraft
The life-cycle cost of most space systems is normally measured in hundreds of millions to
billions of dollars. The space segment life-cycle cost spans all aspects of the space program
from conception to destruction and typically includes research and development, production,
transportation, operations, management, and overhead costs. On a per unit basis, space system
costs dwarf most other industries ranging from $50,000 per kilogram to well over $500,000 per
kilogram. [2]
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FIGURE 2-6 COST COMPARISON OF SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS TO OTHER INDUSTRIES [2]
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The cost of space systems is typically broken down by three methods. One method involves
separating costs as a function of time and phase in the mission life-cycle. In this scenario, costs
are spread across the three main phases of: 1) research and development, 2) production and
acquisition, and 3) operations and support. The percentage of life-cycle costs is roughly equal to
10%, 30%, and 60%, respectively. [10] A second method of breaking down costs is by
architecture segment. Architecture segments include the space segment, the launch segment, the
ground segment, and the human segment. Percentages for this breakdown vary considerably
depending on the mission. Finally, spacecraft system cost can be broken down by subsystem.
The payload typically consumes the largest portion of the budget averaging roughly 35 percent
of the total spacecraft segment cost. [2] The spacecraft bus subsystems make up the remaining 65
percent with power, attitude determination and control (AD&C), communications, and structures
comprising 20, 15, 10, and 10 percent, respectively. The computer, thermal, and propulsion
consume the remaining 20 percent. It should be noted that these are average values and that each
spacecraft system is very unique. Percentages can possibly vary by more than 10 percent
depending on the mission. [11]
Computer/C&DH
Structure 3%
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FIGURE 2-7 SPACECRAFT COST BREAKDOWN BY SUBSYSTEM
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2.4.3 Spacecraft Design Drivers
Many factors influence the design and development of the spacecraft systems. Mission
requirements, program type (military, civil, or commercial), orbital mechanics, the space
environment, payload instruments, ground systems, and launch systems have the greatest
influence on the final space system architecture and spacecraft design. These factors not only
impact the architecture and design, but also determine the program costs and reinforce the high
cost of failure described in Chapter 1. It is important to recognize that while launch systems can
be a significant design and cost driver, they also represent one of many drivers. Figure 2-8 shows
the primary factors that influence spacecraft design.
FIGURE 2-8 SPACECRAFT DESIGN DRIVERS
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FIGURE 2-9 IMPACT OF LAUNCH ON SPACE SYSTEMS DESIGN
Figure 2-9 focuses in on the launch constraints box from the previous figure. As mentioned
previously, launch constraints can be divided into four areas: physical, operational, cost, and
policy. These four areas are further broken down and discussed in Chapters 4 through 7.
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CHAPTER 3 FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTRAINTS
According to Webster's Dictionary, the word constraint is defined as "a limitation, restriction, or
something that constrains." The verb "to constrain" takes on the following meanings: 1) to
force, compel, pressure, or oblige, 2) to confine forcibly, as by bonds, and 3) to repress or
restrain. The most common antonym is "to be free."1121 Based on these definitions, constraints
hold a very negative connotation. While there are instances where this is not the case, (i.e. a
constraint or limitation on the amount of money one could lose by using a put option in finance),
the majority of constraints evoke negative sentiments. Applying these definitions to spacecraft
design yields:
Constraint: Anything that limits the trade space for a design (eliminates design choices)
In the realm of product development, designing under constraints is the norm. Throughout
history, engineers and scientists have been challenged by constraints such as budgets, time, and
the laws of physics. Moving from the design of simple machines (systems, devices) to the design
of complex systems has made it increasingly more difficult to manage constraints arising from
the complicated interaction between multiple systems. Moving forward, it will be necessary to
renovate traditional engineering solutions and develop innovative methods for understanding
how to design complex systems under complex constraints. One novel methodology, systems
analysis, integrates economic resource utilization theory into traditional engineering environment
that enables designing complex systems under constraints.
The purpose of this section is to present some fundamental background information on
constraints and their interaction with the spacecraft design environment. This information sets
the stage for a more technical discussion of how constraints impact spacecraft design covered in
Chapters 4 through 8.
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3.1 Types of Constraints
3.1.1 Constraint Ranges
There are several approaches to characterizing constraints. The most common way to classify
constraints is according to their physical nature. At one extreme exist the technical constraints
which are associated with physics and the laws of nature. Physical limitations based on masses,
volumes, and forces fall at the far left of the spectrum under technical constraints. Policy-based
constraints such as government regulations, business practices, and international agreements fall
at the opposite side of the spectrum. In between these two extremes exist the "fuzzy" constraints
which blend technical with political characteristics. These include such things as schedules and
availability. For example, a schedule constraint could exist because it is physically impossible to
process a launch vehicle in a given time period versus political obstacles that force the schedule
to be extended.
Technical -------------------- Fuzzy -------------------- Political
FIGURE 3-1 RANGE OF CONSTRAINT TYPES
3.1.2 Constraint Rigidity
Another means for classifying constraints is according to constraint rigidity. Constraint rigidity
deals with how easy it is to stretch or push-back on the constraint. While some constraints
represent definitive physical barriers, such as the speed of light, others are artificially set and can
be altered. This is very common in sensitivity analysis when one tries to determine what benefits
would be gained for each increment that a constraint is relaxed. The degree of constraint rigidity
is the primary determinant of how a constraint is handled in a design. The more flexible a
constraint is, the easier it is to make trades between the individual constraint and other design
factors. While all design environments will have constraints, design problems with high degrees
of constraint flexibility and a large fraction of flexible constraints expand the design trade space
that can be evaluated and increases the probability of achieving a better, more optimum design.
Flexible ------------------- Fuzzy -------------------- Fixed
FIGURE 3-2 RANGE OF CONSTRAINT RIGIDITY
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3.1.3 Constraint Relevancy
An alternative approach for viewing constraints considers constraint relevancy. In many cases,
even though a constraint exists, its limit may be so far removed from the design problem that it is
either labeled as irrelevant or instead considered an enabling capability. For example, a launch
vehicle that can lift 1,000 kilograms into low Earth orbit places definite weight constraints on a
spacecraft whose weight starts to approach 1,000 kilograms or more. However, for a smaller
spacecraft that only requires 200 kilograms of hardware, the 1,000 kilogram limit is irrelevant.
In fact, to this spacecraft designer, the 1,000 kilogram limit appears as an enabling capability.
The large margin allows the designer to consider adding features or using components that would
otherwise be prohibited if the launcher could only lift 200 kilograms. (Note: other constraints
such as cost, volume, etc. must also be considered)
Constraint --------------------- Irrelevant -------------------- Capability
FIGURE 3-3 RANGE OF CONSTRAINT RELEVANCY
Clearly whether a spacecraft designer considers a launch characteristic a constraint or an
enabling capability depends entirely on the mission and the designer's frame-of-reference. Since
launch characteristics can be either capabilities or constraints, it is interesting to examine the
threshold at which a constraint becomes a capability or vice versa. It is unlikely that a single
point or number can define where this change takes place. It is more likely that a constraint
gradually becomes irrelevant (and eventually an enabling capability) when it is no longer
considered one of the top design drivers. At this point, the characteristic has such a minor
impact that the designer does not even consider trades between the characteristic and others
parameters. For example, if the launch vehicle consumes 50 percent of the total program costs, it
is definitely a design driver. However, as this percentage slides, there is a point where other
factors, such as material costs, testing, or operations begin to drive and constrain the design.
An example from the computer industry: The first personal computer file storage devices
(5 'A floppy disks) introduced in the early 1980's had storage capacity of 360K and
eventually reached the standard of 1.4 MB in 1988. While files during this period were
often quite small and composed of mostly text, people where careful about the size of
their files because they knew that the only way to physically transfer files was using a
floppy disk with a 1.4 MB capacity. In this situation, even though floppy disks allowed
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people to store and transport information, they were also viewed as severely constraining
the potential storage and transport file size. The introduction of zip disks with capacities
in the 100 to 200 MB range greatly alleviated this constraint while high capacity CD's
and DVD's continued the trend. People became less concerned with file size and
limitations on storage capacity became irrelevant for many applications. Additionally, as
a physical entity, floppy disks, zip disks, CD's and DVD's had the potential for damage
or misplacement, leading to complete loss of data. However, the development of the
internet, e-mail, and file-transfer protocol (FTP) exchanges made transferring even the
largest files not only possible, but also limited the potential for loss of data through
damage or misplacement. While the internet also has capacity and data loss limitations,
rather than being viewed as constraint, the internet is viewed as an enabling capability
mainly because for individuals, data storage and transport are no longer primary drivers.
In today's space system environment, spacecraft designers tend to highlight launch system
limitations instead of their amazing capabilities. Typical comments from the spacecraft
community include "launch systems...
... cost too much"
... have excessive cycle times"
... have poor reliabilities"
... never lift-off on time"
... require too many people to operate"
... cannot lift enough weight"
These limitations or constraints restrict the design trade space and force designers to make sub-
optimal design choices.
3.2 Constraints in Spacecraft Design
The ability to effectively deal with constraints in a complex system design environment depends
to a large extent on properly identifying and tracking constraints as well as the methodology
employed to manage them. The following two sections briefly address the theory behind
managing constraints and where constraints enter the design process.
3.2.1 Managing Constraints: Resource Allocation Theory
While the existence of complex systems such as spacecraft and launch vehicles only date back to
the 1950's, applicable theory dealing with managing constraints has been around for over a
hundred years. This theory, outlined in the field of economics forms the basis for how spacecraft
designs now deal with complex constraints. Microeconomics is the quintessential science of
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decision making under scarcity. In theory, microeconomics focuses on how individuals make
choices involving the efficient utilization of limited resources. How individuals choose to
allocate these resources, whether the resources are money, time, material, energy or space, has a
direct impact on the individuals' lives. For example, given a set annual income, should a person
choose to spend all of his money on buying a house, taking a trip, paying off debt, or
contributing it to savings? Or should the individual spend a fraction of the total income on each?
And what fraction is appropriate for each? The choice depends on both the short and long-term
objectives of the individual and the results of the decision can either lead to a positive or
negative future. The basic message behind the example is that money, as well as time, energy,
space and material, are limited quantities and the decision of how to allocate these quantities
among a range of options can have a strong influence on future events and situations. [3 1
The decision making process in the design of a complex space systems shares many similarities
to the individual microeconomics decision making process described above. The notion of
making difficult choices on allocation, trade-offs, and dealing with limitations and constraints is
very consistent with the task of the spacecraft designers. Designing a complex spacecraft system
requires a series of decisions about how limited resources should be transformed to achieve some
objective. In many situations launch characteristics become limited resources available to
spacecraft designers (lift capability, available volume, etc.). Integrating economic theory into
engineering design, while difficult, has many advantages including the large body of theory and
analysis methods already developed. Concepts such as mathematical programming optimization
and sensitivity analysis are examples of some of the economic theory and tools used by
spacecraft system designers that have been incorporated into engineering systems analysis.
3.2.2 Identjying and Tracking Constraints
One of the most difficult aspects to managing constraints is properly identifying and tracking
them. Because spacecraft system design is an iterative process, as the design changes, the type
and magnitude of launch vehicle constraints also changes. This is further complicated by the fact
that launch vehicle constraints impact spacecraft throughout the design, development, and
deployment phases. Figure 3-4 shows a map illustrating how different launch constraints impact
spacecraft systems at various points along the development process.
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3.3 Discussion of Launch Vehicle Constraints
In the process of performing 43 interviews across 10 organizations, several common themes
emerged dealing with the complex interaction of launch and spacecraft systems.
3.3.1 Constraint Priority Differences
All of the spacecraft designers interviewed agreed that launch constraints played a role in
spacecraft design. Besides cost and weight, most differed on what they believed were the most
important constraints from adapters, access panel locations, and integration software to
propellant slosh during ascent, fairing shape complaints, and separation mechanisms. Not
surprising is the fact that constraint priorities mirrored spacecraft designer functionality.
Structural engineers cited loads as the most significant constraint while electrical engineers cited
communications and adapter interfaces. Many designers also discussed a disconnect between the
top attributes for selection of the launch vehicle and the most significant design drivers. In many
cases, the fact that these were not the same constraints led to a situation where management's
views of launch constraints differed significantly from the design engineer's. This observation
was one the driving forces behind trying to devise a strategy for dividing launch constraints.
3.3.2 Tier Structure of Launch Constraints
Many designers spoke of an "inequality" of launch constraints, with some holding much more
weight than others. This led to the notion of a tiered structure for identifying launch constraints.
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Launch constraints can be loosely separated into three tiers depending on their degree of
influence on launch vehicle selection and level of rigidity. First tier constraints, such as political
restrictions or physical limitations such as lift capacity or volume, have substantial design
impacts and are either impossible or extremely difficult to trade-off. Second tier constraints also
have significant design impacts, usually can be traded, and are the most influential in making the
final choice from the suitable vehicles. The third tier factors usually do not have a large
influence in the selection decision but can be traded and do impact the spacecraft design
following selection.
These two observations, along with several additional observations outlined in Appendix B,
helped create the framework used in the thesis for discussing launch vehicle constraints. Each of
the following four chapters discusses one of four launch constraint themes: physical, operational,
cost, and policy. Each chapter looks at several individual launch constraints under a specific
theme and provides a constraint definition, an analysis of how the constraint impacts spacecraft
design, several actual examples of the impact from industry, and a summary of these impacts.
Chapter 4: Physical
Constraints
Chapter 7: Policy Chapter 5: Operational
Constraints S/ Constraints
Design
Chapter 6: Cost
Constraints
FIGURE 3-5 OUTLINE OF CONSTRAINT THEMES
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CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION OF PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS
4.1 Overview of Physical Constraints
Physical constraints deal primarily with limitations based on physics and the laws of nature. The
following technical constraints were identified to have a major impact on spacecraft design:
Lift Capacity: A limit on the maximum available spacecraft mass that can be placed into
the desired orbit
Fairing Volume: A limit on the maximum available spacecraft size based on height and
Diameter measurements
System Interfaces: Characteristics of the umbilicals and structures that connect the
spacecraft and the launch vehicle to handle communication and stabilization of the two
systems
Launch Loads & Environments: Characteristics of the physical forces and
environments experienced by the spacecraft during lift-off, ascent, and orbital insertion
The following sections introduce each of the four major physical constraints that must be
considered in the design of spacecraft systems. It is important to note that while they are
discussed on an individual basis, many of the constraints are highly coupled, further
complicating the design process. This coupling forces more complex trade analysis and is further
evidence of the need to fully understand how launch constraints impact the spacecraft system.
4.2 Lift Capacity
4.2.1 Constraint Definition
Each launch vehicle system has a specific limit to the amount of mass it can deliver to a
particular orbit. This limit, or the lift capacity of a launch vehicle, is linked to the desired orbital
destination and the amount of thrust that the launch vehicle propulsion system can create. In the
simplest terms, the launch vehicle must provide the payload a particular velocity to reach its
desired orbit. The rocket equation defines this velocity change as:
AV= gI, ln "J = gI ln fj [3-1]
mI-m _ ) m,
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where m, is the initial mass of the system (launch vehicle plus payload), m, is the mass of
propellant consumed to reach the desired orbital altitude and inclination, mf is the final system
mass at burnout, g is the force of gravity, and Isp the specific impulse. The specific impulse, Isp,
essentially measures the energy content of the propellants used. In this instance, m is the mass
flow rate of the propellants out of the exhaust nozzle and Isp is defined by:
Thrust F
IS= , 0 [3-2]
mg mg
Integrating these two equations reveals that, the final mass that can be delivered to the specified
orbit (based on AV) and for a given thrust F is determined by:
M m0  ____
m -AV - [3-3]in AV [3
e i" eF
In a typical launch vehicle system, the largest fraction of the initial mass, roughly 85 percent, is
consumed by the propellant. The remainder is divided between the launch vehicle structure and
supporting systems (- 13 %) and the payload (~2 %).[141
Spacecraft systems can be divided into five weight classes shown in Table 4-1.
TABLE 4-1 SPACECRAFT WEIGHT CLASSES [15]
Weight Class Range
Nano < 20 kg
Micro 20 - 100 kg
Small 100 - 500 kg
Medium 500 - 3,500 kg
Heavy 3,500 + kg
Accordingly, the launch industry has developed a range of launch vehicles to service each of the
major satellite weight class markets. Lift capabilities vary depending on the orbital altitude that
the payload must be delivered to. For Low Earth Orbits (LEO) with altitudes between 180 and
250 kilometers and inclinations between 04 and 28.50, lift capacities range from 443 kilograms
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(Orbital Sciences' Pegasus Booster) to 25,800 kilograms (Boeing's Delta IV Heavy).[16] Other
common orbits such as Polar LEO and the elliptical Sun Synchronous have ranges of 332 to
20,800 kilograms and 203 to 14,300 kilograms, respectively.[ 16] The most sought after orbit,
geostationary, exists at roughly 35,786 kilometers above the Earth surface, where spacecraft
have velocities equal to the Earth's rotational speed and thus are able to stay fixed over one
unique spot above the equator. Most launch vehicles do not deliver spacecraft directly to
geostationary orbit. Instead, they place the spacecraft in Geo-Transfer Orbits (GTO) with the
spacecraft providing the final stage to propel the satellite to its final destination. Figure 4-1,
shows the lift capacities for the world's major launch vehicles to geostationary transfer orbit
which range from 448 kilograms to 12,018 kilograms.
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,o000
4,000
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FIGURE 4-1 LIFT CAPACITIES To GTO [161
Over the past 40 years, the launch-spacecraft relationship has been defined by a continuous game
of catch-up. Figure 4-2 shows the time-based increases in lift capacity for Boeing's Delta launch
vehicle family. While the percentage growth in lift capacity on an annual basis has remained
quite steady, the last 10 years have witnessed fairly substantial absolute gains.
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FIGURE 4-2 TIME-BASED LIFT CAPACITY INCREASES FOR THE DELTA FAMILY [16]
In comparison, Figure 4-3 shows the increase in weight of commercial geostationary
communications spacecraft over the last 25 years. The growth in spacecraft weight mirrors the
growth in lift capacity and it is difficult to determine which is driving which. Do spacecraft
developers push for heavier spacecraft when faced with increased lift capability available? Or do
the spacecraft developers drive the launch industry larger and larger vehicles to satisfy the
spacecraft world's hunger for more lift capability? It is most likely the latter.
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4.2.2 Impact of Lift Capacity on Spacecraft Design
One of the most fundamental effects of lift capacity on spacecraft design is the strong drive to
reduce or minimize spacecraft weight. This process of weight-based optimization has been
practiced since the first satellites were launched in the late 1950's. As demonstrated in the
previous section, substantial increases in the lift capacity of launch vehicles, has occurred
steadily over the last 40 years. The substantial cost of space access pushes satellite developers to
maximize spacecraft capabilities. Given a specific weight restriction, they will attempt to use all
available mass up to and, in many instances, exceeding the limit. Available lift capacity
combined with high launch costs induces spacecraft weight optimization.
What compounds the weight optimization problem is the fact that while the spacecraft can easily
grow or shrink by a kilogram or 10, the launch vehicle cannot. Lift capacity follows a standard
step-function characteristic with each rung separated by hundreds if not thousands of kilograms.
Similar to the weight classes of spacecraft shown in Table 4-1, launch vehicles also can be
divided into particular weight divisions that mirror the spacecraft divides. Figure 4-4 shows the
lift capacities for all active and soon to be active launch vehicles in the United States' two
primary expendable launch vehicle families. The average difference between each step is 2,548
kilograms, with the largest being a difference of 6,450 kilograms. Unlike spacecraft, launch
vehicles do not have the ability to easily grow capacity on the scale of less than 100 kilograms.
The possibility does exist to boost weight ceilings with the addition of solid, strap-on motors.
However, the addition of solid rockets to a mainly liquid rocket system brings increased
complexity, cost, and risk. Unlike liquid rocket engines, solids cannot be shut-down once ignited
even if serious problems arise. Thus, the step-function nature of launch vehicles lift capability
further entrenches the push for weight optimization.
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Spacecraft designers face the very difficult dilemma of either jumping to a larger launch vehicle
or staying within the lift capacity of the selected vehicle. The consequences of either action are
costly. If the designer decides to upgrade to a larger vehicle, the spacecraft will most likely face
substantial excess capacity. The spacecraft might end up only 50 kilograms overweight, but the
next launch vehicle size up will offer 500 to 1000 kilograms of additional capacity. Thus, the
spacecraft developer must pay for the extra 500 kilogram even if only 50 kilograms are needed.
Continuing along this path, the designer will realize that to be cost effective it is necessary to
utilize all available capacity (weight optimization) and the spacecraft will grow in turn to fill-up
the excess capacity, or an extra 450 kg. As the spacecraft grows in size, its cost can also inflate
leaving the design with a more expensive spacecraft and a more expensive launch vehicle.
Ironically, as the additional capacity is utilized, there is always the inherent risk that the
redesigned, larger spacecraft might actually overrun the lift capacity of the larger vehicle
triggering the problem to start all over.
In most cases, the designer does not make the choice above, but instead elects to try to remove
weight from the spacecraft. However, this choice d6es not come without penalties. Trying to
downscale an overweight satellite entails design changes and initiating a "witch hunt" for where
mass can be removed or expendable components or mechanisms can be abandoned. This
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requires that either lighter components must substituted and integrated into the current design or
that the current components must be redesigned. Both cases result in additional costs and
increases in program schedule. One example from a military communications satellite program,
when faced with a 20 kilogram overrun, elected to replace every stainless screw on the spacecraft
with a lighter, yet more expensive titanium screw. In total, over 400 screws were replaced to
maintain the weight budget. The redesign route does not offer a much better option. In general,
industry estimates that re-designing and re-qualifying a component for a small, simple change
normally increases the cost of that component by a factor of two. One manager in a commercial
program cited an example where it was calculated that the cost to remove each kilogram of
additional weight from a spacecraft late in the design phase reached an estimated $250,000 per
kilogram.[19] In comparison to launch costs at a rate of $10,000 per kilogram, it seems
impractical to spend $250,000 to save $10,000 per kilogram. However, it is important to keep in
mind the step-function problem discussed previously. While it might only cost $10,000 per
kilogram to deliver to orbit, it is not possible to buy lift capacity in 1 kilogram units making this
trade more complicated than it might seem to be.
The weight optimization problem also influences the use of commercial off-the-shelf parts or
COTS. COTS include components that are sold to more traditional, terrestrial-based applications
and components that have been designed and used on previous space missions. Components
used on previous missions carry the advantage of already being space qualified. Space
qualification means involves a series of tests demonstrating that they will work as expected in
the harsh space environment. Qualifying parts for space is an expensive task. Parts that already
have this designation or have been shown to work in space on a previous mission are coveted for
cost and performance reasons. Additionally, COTS parts are already designed and can cut time
off the program design schedule. While using COTS can bring significant cost and time savings,
these benefits come at a price. COTS components tend to be larger than the state-of-the-art
systems since their designs are typically several years old. Likewise, commercial components,
ones used for terrestrial applications, also must be space qualified and because weight constraints
are not as important on Earth, they too tend to be larger than space available. In one example, a
hardware element off the shelf with full traceability and space qualification cost roughly
$100,000. For weight and volume related issues, a decision was made to design a completely
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new component where the final cost fell in the $1-2 million range. Because spacecraft are so
weight optimized, COTS systems present designers with difficult choices - pick a cheaper,
qualified, but heavier component versus a lighter, more compact, more expensive, newly
designed component.
To cope with these problems, spacecraft developers initially set a rough estimate for the weight
of their vehicle and then add in margin, or unused weight, to compensate for weight growth
during design. Most programs start with weight margins in the 10-20% range and quickly
consume all of it. One science mission in the NASA Discovery-class program experimented
with even larger initial margins (>25%) only to have overrun these two to three times as quickly
as previous programs. Two weeks into the design the margin went from over 25 percent to zero.
The primary science instrument alone grew by 30 percent in weight. The loss in margin and
weight growth forced a major re-design that led to substantial changes to the spacecraft structure.
Instead of using the rebuild of a previously used aluminum structure from another Discovery-
class mission, the team moved to a more expensive, yet lighter graphite composite structure
substantially reducing the structural weight. Engineers cited the knowledge of more available
weight led designers to make assumptions and decisions based on the knowledge of additional
capacity. When a single designer does this, there are few problems. When every subsystem
designer makes this assumption and over-designs, the spacecraft grows very rapidly. Thus,
starting off with too much margin can lead to a dangerous situation where it is difficult to stop
adding extras beyond what is needed.
Lift capacity constraints also affect system redundancy issues. Because of the high costs of
failure discussed earlier for space systems, there is always a drive for high reliability. This high
reliability can be achieved by two methods. One method involves designing-in component
reliability through robust designs and high levels of testing to ensure against failure. Several
designers expressed their concern over the high cost and extensive timescales associated with
this method. The other option for high reliability is through the use of redundancy. Redundancy
involves including one or more back-up systems that assume responsibilities when the primary
component or system fails. This option can save significant amounts of time and money,
however, not without a price. Several commercial satellite programs acknowledged that in many
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of their spacecraft, greater than 50 percent of active payload weight is redundant systems and
never actually used. This is the weight price of reliability. Adding redundant systems adds
significant weight to the spacecraft, opposing the weight minimization and optimization
philosophy. In limiting the availability of redundant systems, weight restrictions coupled with
cost and time constraints can curtail system reliability and in some cases force single string
systems with no back-up for critical systems. The extremely successful Lunar Prospector
mission to the Moon in 1998 was designed without redundancy for the majority of its critical
subsystems because of launch vehicle-related weight and budget constraints.
Another result of mass minimization is the uneven burden placed on the spacecraft payload. In
general, the mass fraction of most payload systems varies from 30 to 60 percent of the total
spacecraft mass. The remainder is consumed by the spacecraft bus systems and propellant.
However, mass minimization does not equally affect each of these systems. In most commercial
missions, the payload is sized to fit a pre-designed, generic bus. A generic bus saves design time
and reduces the bus cost by taking advantage of larger production lot sizes and amortizing the
initial development costs over multiple spacecraft. The consequence of using a generic bus is
that there is substantial resistance to making any alterations to the bus that would lead to re-
designing or re-qualifying all or part of the spacecraft bus. Industries' motto is "fit the payload
on the smallest bus possible and make it work." Moving to a generic bus has led to a factor of
four to five times improvement in cost effectiveness in one commercial companies spacecraft
line. While cost and schedules decrease for generic buses, payload performance suffers. With
the spacecraft bus labeled "untouchable," all mass trades and mass reductions to stay within the
lift capacity of the selected launch vehicle usually falls on the payload.
In contrast to the generic spacecraft buses used in the commercial world, military and scientific
missions tend to favor more customized buses and payloads. But this is the engineering trade-off
between cost and performance. From a life-cycle value standpoint, more data is required to
determine which design philosophy leads to higher value-per-cost incurred.
Weight restrictions also have a significant effect on component selection. In many cases, the
drive to reduce satellite weight and the desire to minimize the launch costs leads to utilizing
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expensive, lightweight materials with high packaging densities. 201 The end result is a spacecraft
that is smaller and lighter, but usually more complex and more expensive. These choices affect
all subsystems at all levels of the spacecraft design. Table 4-2 shows example subsystems and
the heavier versus lighter trades available.
TABLE 4-2 WEIGHT IMPACTED DESIGN OPTIONS
Subsystem Choices
Heavier versus Lighter
Structures AluminumAlloys Graphitecomposites
Solar Arrays Silicon cells GaAr cells
Power Storage Nickel-Cadmium Nickel-Hydrogen
By driving component selection, weight restrictions directly affect component sizes and
consequently spacecraft performance parameters. For communications satellites, performance
depends to a large degree on power available to the spacecraft's communications subsystem,
with higher power levels enabling greater throughput capacity and signal strength. Substantial
power is also necessary to run all of the other subsystems that support the payload. However,
power generation and storage systems such as solar arrays, batteries, distribution cables,
switches, and converters consume an average of 30 percent of the spacecraft's total dry weight.
The weight versus power trade-off is fundamental to spacecraft design and realistically translates
into a weight versus capability/performance trade-off.
Another significant trade-off exists between spacecraft weight and spacecraft lifetime, another
key spacecraft performance parameter. Mass constraints dictate the amount of propellant
available to maintain correct attitude and orbital positioning. One commercial communications
program surveyed cited that its geostationary satellites consumed approximately 27 kilograms of
fuel per year for a total of 410 kilograms over its 15-year lifetime. This was the equivalent to 15
percent of its final in-orbit operational weight. Thus, the weight versus propellant trade-off
translates into a weight versus lifetime or capability trade-off. It should also be noted that
component failures, system degradation from the space environment and debris impacts, and
operator errors also contribute to limiting spacecraft lifetimes. Lifetime factors will be discussed
in greater detail in Chapter 8.
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4.2.3 Summary of Lift Capability Impacts
Lift capacity affects spacecraft design and development in various ways ultimately impacting
program cost, schedule, and system performance. Mass boundaries induce weight minimization
philosophies which, in the iterative spacecraft design process, can lead to expensive late-design
phase weight reduction practices. Weight restrictions also influence component and materials
selection, sub-system redundancy and reliability strategies, and propellant levels that ultimately
drove spacecraft lifetime. The increased use of generic, 'untouchable' spacecraft buses has
significant influences on payload capabilities as weight reduction practices generally affect the
payload. Figure 4-5 provides a summary of the major design influence of launch vehicle weight
restrictions on space system design:
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Weight Reduction Mass
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FIGURE 4-5 IMPACT OF MASS-BASED DESIGN CHOICES
4.3 Fairing Volume
4.3.1 Constraint Definition
Chapter 2 presented a brief overview of the primary launch vehicle systems and components.
The payload sits atop the final stage of the launch vehicle protected from the harsh ascent
environment by the launch fairing. The fairing is designed to absorb both the extreme heating
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from atmospheric friction as well as the aerodynamic loads created during ascent at speeds in
excess of 30,000 kilometers per hour. For its own protection, the spacecraft is encapsulated
inside the launch vehicle fairing which is composed of two halves called shrouds that are
separated in orbit by explosive event that frees the spacecraft and sends the shrouds out away
from the spacecraft. This separation normally occurs before the spacecraft reaches it final
destination as a secondary engine on the spacecraft called the apogee assist motor propels the
spacecraft into its appropriate orbit.
0
FIGURE 4-6 SPACECRAFT ENCAPSULATED INSIDE THE LAUNCH FAIRING [21]
The most important aspects of the launch fairing are its diameter, its total height, and its
maximum cylindrical height. Most launch vehicles offer a selection of launch fairings allowing
some flexibility in design. Traditionally, fairing diameters have been offered in 3, 4, and 5
meters. It is important to note that while the fairing might have a 4-meter diameter, not all of
this space is usable. In order to protect the spacecraft from heat and loads, the fairing is lined
with acoustic blankets and thermal insulation which consume space. When designing a
spacecraft, the dimension that should be considered is the usable geometric dimensions also
labeled as the envelope. Additionally, the top of the launch vehicle, or the nose cone, is shaped
toward a point to optimize aerodynamic performance. The uniqueness of each vehicle leads to a
situation where nose cones vary significantly in heights and nose cone curvature angles. Trying
to accurately determine the exact useable space is a complicated task. Figure 4-7 shows a launch
vehicle fairing setup for Boeing's Delta IV launch vehicle family with the envelope, nose cone,
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and insulation/support labeled. Top measurements are in millimeters and bottom measurements
are in inches.
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FIGURE 4-7 EXAMPLE EXPENDABLE VEHICLE FAIRING [22]
In the 5-meter diameter case, the difference between the launch fairing diameter and the
envelope diameter is close to one-half a meter. This is an important aspect. While the outside
diameter of most launch vehicles conforms to the standard 3, 4 or-5 meter length, the critical
measurement is actually the outside diameter of the envelope. Since each vehicle adds different
amount of insulation, structural support, and acoustic blankets, the actual diameter that satellites
design for is not as standard as one might assume. Additionally, while the 3, 4, and 5 meters are
standard, some vehicles design with these standards as the outside diameter (mostly US) and
some design with the standards as the inside diameter (mostly Russian). For example, the
Russian made Zenit rocket has an outside fairing diameter of 4.15 meters and an inside diameter
of 3.9 meters whereas the US Delta III has an outside diameter of exactly 4 meters and an inside
diameter of 3.75 meters. Table 4-3 shows the range of available launch fairings geometric
dimensions for several foreign and domestic launch vehicles.
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TABLE 4-3 RANGE OF AVAILABLE FAIRING DIAMETERS (IN MILLIMETERS) [16]
Volume
Vehicle Maximum Payload Diameter Maximum Cylinder Length
Ariane 40 3650 6460
Ariane 5 4570 9822
Athena I 2057 2294
Atlas I[AS 2921 4100
Atlas 1111 3650 5015
Atlas V 400 3650 5015
Atlas V 500 4572 7631
Delta Il 7320's 2540 2004
Delta I 7920's 2743 2004
Delta 1I1 3750 4365
Delta IV Med + 3750 5281
Delta IV Heavy 4572 7246
H-I1 4600 5800
Kosmos 2200 1809
Long March 2E 3800 3105
Long March 3B 3650 4610
Pegasus 1168 1110
Proton K 4100 9047
Proton M 3800 6010
PSLV & GSLV 2900 3000
Soyuz 3000 3018
Molniya 3435 2364
Space Shuttle 4570 18300
Taurus 2048 3310
Titan IVB 4570 18850
Zenit (Sea Launch) 3750 4937
4.3.2 Impact of Volume Restrictions on Spacecraft Design
While the launch fairing does provide necessary protection for the payload (the payload would
have to be much larger and heavier if it had to protect itself), it also "defines the usable volume"
of the spacecraft and sets limits on the geometry of the payload. In determining the maximum
height and diameter of the satellite, the rigid walls of the fairing also influence design choices for
the spacecraft. Because of the complex geometries, especially those related to the cone section,
the volume constraint is more difficult to address than mass constraints. While the spacecraft
can be weighed to determine if it exceeds or is below the mass limit, many times it is necessary
to do fit check rehearsals with dummy payloads to be certain that the spacecraft and any
appendages actually fit into the launch vehicle envelope.
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One of the most significant impacts of volume constraints on a spacecraft system is to the size of
the spacecraft antenna. The majority of spacecraft missions focus on the collection and
transmission of information. The need to collect and distribute data is the primary goal of the
spacecraft and drives most of the design. The ability to collect and distribute data depends on
several subsystems. These subsystems are generally involved with two sets of functions: keeping
the spacecraft in good health and helping it perform its mission, collection and transmission.
The second function, collection and transmission of data, is carried out mainly by the interaction
of three major subsystems. The attitude control subsystem adjusts the pointing direction of the
spacecraft, the power and electrical subsystem provides power to receive, amplify, and transmit
the signal, and the communications subsystem actually carries out the receiving and transmitting
functions. The spacecraft antenna is one of the key components of the satellite communications
system. The spacecraft retransmits signals it receives by way of a transponder, a receiver-
transmitter combination.
Volume restrictions place limitations on the size of the antenna, ultimately affecting the
performance of the spacecraft in its receiving and transmitting duties. Smaller volumes
necessitate smaller antennas (and batteries for power) leading to reduced performance. The
performance of the communications subsystem is generally determined according to the link
budget equation which defines the signal-to-noise ratio. This ratio is essentially a measure of the
strength of the signal and is determined by the power of the signal and the amount of noise or
distortion to this signal. The governing link budget equation.
Eb PLiGLsLaG,
No kTR [3-4
The signal-to-noise ratio is a function of the transmitter power P, the data rate R, the system
noise temperature Ts, the Boltzmann constant k, the transmitter gain Gt, the receiver gain Gr, and
the line, space and path loses L1, Ls, and La respectively. Both the transmitter and receiver gains
are significant drivers of the signal-to-noise ration and are functions of antenna diameters. Trades
between large power in space and large power required on the ground effects coverage,
frequencies, and the size of the required ground-based receiver.
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One trade recently explored on a new military communications program looked at using a phased
array versus a gimbled dish. The phased array required more power, had similar performance
characteristics, and was a less mature technology yet was ultimately selected because it was
substantially smaller and more dense.
Not only does the volume of the fairing restrict the size of the antenna, but also the number of
antennas that can be included. In the last few years, the market has changed from satellite
service providers wanting to serve one or two large markets with a few wide spot beams, to the
"direct-to-home market" requiring a greater number of smaller spot beams. In the past, two to
four antenna horns were sufficient. Now, the market is moving towards 25 to 50. More spot
beams allow frequency reuse but also require more antenna aperatures meaning more antennas
and volume. Thus, volume restrictions place a limit on the number of antennas and the
competitive performance of the spacecraft. Recent market dynamics have led to an increased
attention to antenna packaging schemes and a push for moving from 4 to 5 meter fairings.
The fairing volume limits the size of the power producing and power storage devices. To
produce power, spacecraft use solar arrays. Solar cells on solar arrays typically have efficiencies
in the 15 to 25 percent range. The amount of power generated by the solar arrays is function of
their efficiency and their collection area. Holding efficiency constant, to generate more power
requires more solar cells, hence larger surface area. To store this power requires high capacity
primary and secondary batteries, where the battery capacity is a function technology and size,
usually in terms of both weight and volume. Similar to mass constraints, volume constraints also
force technology and component trades between the desire for as much power generation and
storage capability as possible and the available volume. Demand for small, low cost terminals on
the ground requires high power, high gain systems to be placed in space. The result is a push for
more power in orbit and thus larger spacecraft.
Another effect of limited volume is the drive to deployable mechanisms that allow components
to be collapsed and compacted during launch to fit inside the vehicle envelope and then unfurled
once released from the fairing in orbit. The move to deployable structures, while enabling larger
antennas and solar arrays, also adds a great deal of complexity to the system design. Systems that
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have to be deployed or unfurled require mechanisms to mechanically deploy them. The
possibility that one of these mechanisms does not work could render the spacecraft partially or
completely useless should the power generating array or antenna not unfurl or unfurl in the
wrong way. The potential for vibrational loads and oscillations during deployment also presents
potential dangers for the spacecraft. Volume restrictions force the spacecraft designer to utilize
folding, furling, and telescoping appendages for various systems such as solar arrays,
communications antennas, and scientific instruments adding to the complexity and vulnerability
of the payload.
To save on launch costs and take advantage of economies of scale, spacecraft developers have
started to put more than one spacecraft on each launch vehicle. This is mainly due to the fact
that the larger launch vehicles have historically been able to offer much lower prices than the
small launchers (Pegasus' 443 kg at $30,474/kg versus Ariane V's 18,000 kg at $9,167/kg). For
example, developers of the large LEO constellation Iridium were faced with the challenge of
launching more than 70 spacecraft into orbit. Instead of purchasing 70 launch vehicles, the
Iridium program looked to multiple manifesting launches to deploy its constellation using a
minimum number of launches. However, not wanting to launch all on the same launch vehicle,
the Iridium program instituted a design policy whereby one of the main requirements for the
spacecraft design was that the seven spacecraft could fit on a Proton, five on a Delta III, and
three on the Long March. This decision was also driven by political motivations since the
Iridium system was trying to compete on the global marketplace and by giving launches (local
work/money) to multiple countries these countries would be more friendly and open to
purchasing the communications service. The desire to fit more than one spacecraft on a launch
vehicle is constrained by volume limits and forces innovative stacking or bundling designs.
Additionally, changing from one fairing to another for stacking purposes has an impact on the
spacecraft by affecting dimensions as well as potential design changes to move the center of
gravity. Figure 4-8 shows an example of a dual manifest with multiple spacecraft inside the
fairing.
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FIGURE 4-8 CONFIGURATION FOR MULTIPLE PAYLOADS [23]
4.3.3 Summary of Fairing Volume Impacts
The vehicle fairing places a volume limit on the maximum available spacecraft size based on
height and diameter. Volume restrictions affect the geometry of key spacecraft sub-systems such
as the size and number of antennas and available power based on the sizing of solar arrays and
batteries. Limited volume also encourage complicated stacking designs for multi-manifest
launches and complex deployable mechanisms allowing components to be compressed during
ascent and unfurled once in orbit.
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FIGURE 4-9 VOLUME IMPACTS
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4.4 Launch Loads and Environments
4.4.1 Constraint Definition
The essential task of the launch system is to change the energy state of the spacecraft. The
spacecraft starts off with essentially zero potential energy (height) and no kinetic energy (speed)
from the inertial reference point of the Earth's surface. Through the combustion of volatile
materials, the launch vehicle transmits potential and kinetic energy to the spacecraft in order to
deliver the spacecraft to a height of over 300 kilometers and a speed of greater than 30,000
kilometers per hour. However, this great energy transfer does not come without a price and the
spacecraft is exposed to harsh physical forces and environments.
The best way to understand the influence of launch loads is to become familiar with the different
phases of the launch cycle. The launch cycle can be broken down into eight major phases
according to when load events occur. These are during:
e Ground Transport
e Integration and Testing
e Main Engine Ignition
* Lift-off
e Main Engine Cut-off
" Stage Separations
e Stage Ignitions
e Deployment and Orbital Insertion
During each phases the launch vehicle exerts unique forces on the spacecraft that belong to one
of three classes:
* Vibration (Structural and Acoustical) Loads
e Acceleration (Steady-State) Loads
e Shock Loads
Vibration loads are due to forces created by the launch vehicles rocket engines and aerodynamic
forces against the launch fairing. Random vibrations are generated by mechanical parts moving
in turbo pumps, combustion phenomena, or structural elements excited by the acoustic
environment. 2 41 Acoustic vibrations are generated by engine noise and aerodynamic noise
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causing serious problems for thin structures.[241 Additional loads occur during pre-flight testing
and during handling and stacking of the spacecraft onto the launch vehicle.
There are two maximums levels of vibration loads that occur at lift-off and during transonic
flight. When the main launch engines are initially ignited, forces from the combustion coupled
with forces from the exhaust products reflecting off the ground create a maximum vibration load
that peaks at the point of release, once the vehicle officially leaves the pad. Vibration loads then
taper-off during normal ascent but do not go to zero. Forces from the engine combined with
aerodynamic forces excite the launch shroud generating an additional source of vibrational loads.
A second spike in vibration loads occurs when the launch vehicle transitions from sub-sonic to
supersonic flight crossing over the Mach 1 level. While the spacecraft experiences two main
peaks in vibration intensity, it is also important to note that vibration loads occur across a broad
spectrum. Table 4-4 shows the maximum acoustical levels for several vehicles while Figure
4-10 shows the vibration loads over the range of frequencies in the applicable spectrum.
TABLE 4-4 COMPARISON OF ACOUSTICAL LOADS FOR VARIOUS VEHICLES [16]
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Acoustical Loads
Vehicle Max Acoustic Level Sound Pressure
Ariane 40 139 dB at 2000-4000Hz 142 dB
Athena II 133.2 dB 140.5 dB
Atlas IlAS 131 dB at 200 Hz 140.5 dB
Atlas lilB 132 dB at 200 Hz 140.8 dB
Atlas V 400 131 dB at 200 Hz 140.5 dB
Atlas V 500 126 dB at 125 Hz 136.3 dB
Delta Il 7320's 140.5 dB 139.8 dB
Delta Il 7920's 140.5 dB 139.8 dB
Delta l1l 130 dB 140 dB
Delta IV Med + 130 dB at 125 Hz 140 dB
Delta IV Heavy 133 dB at 125 Hz 142. 7 dB
H-Il 133 dB at 250 Hz 137.5 dB
Kosmos 128 dB at 100 Hz 137.5 dB
Long March3B 136 dB at 500 Hz 141 dB
Pegasus 119 dB at 800 Hz 124.8 dB
Proton K 132.4 dB at 100 Hz 141.4 dB
Proton M 132.4 dB at 100 Hz 141.4 dB
PSLV & GSLV 137 dB at 500 Hz 143 dB
Soyuz 140dB at90 Hz 144dB
Molniya 140 dB at 90 Hz 144 dB
Zenit (Sea Launch) 134 dB at 250 Hz 142 dB
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FIGURE 4-10 ACOUSTICAL SPECTRUM FOR DELTA II VEHICLE [17]
In order to achieve final orbital velocity, which can be anywhere from 6 to 10 kilometers per
second (21,000 to 36,000 kilometers per hour), the vehicle must accelerate from zero to the final
velocity. During this acceleration, the payload is exposed to high steady-state loads. These can
range anywhere from 4 to 14 g's depending on the type of vehicle. These loads are applied
along two geometric dimensions, both axially (along the flight path of the vehicle) and laterally
(radiating out from the centerline of the vehicle). Typically the axial loads are substantially
higher than the lateral loads. Generally, low-mass vehicles, sounding rockets, and ballistic
missiles have much higher peak g-levels while large payload and manned vehicles have lower
peak g-levels to protect the payload or crew. Table 4-5 below shows the range of values for the
acceleration loads in both the axial and lateral directions.
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TABLE 4-5 ACCELERATION LOADS IN LATERAL AND AXIAL DIRECTIONS [16'
Acceleration Loads
Vehicle Maximum Axial (g) Maximum Lateral (+/-g)
Ariane 40 4.5 0.2
Ariane 5 4.25 0.25
Athena I 8.1 1.8
Athena II 8 1.8
Atlas IIA 6 2
Atlas 111B 6 2
Atlas V 500 6 2
Delta 11 7320's 6.65 2
Delta II 7920's 6 2
Delta Il1 3.75 2
Delta IV Med + 6.5 2
Delta IV Heavy 6 2.5
H-I 4 1.8
Kosmos 6.9 1.4
Long March 2C 7.9 1
Long March 3B 6.1 1.5
Pegasus 11 4.7
Proton K 4.3 2.3
Proton M 4.3 1.35
PSLV & GSLV 6.4 1.1
Soyuz 4.8 1
Molniya 4.8 1
Space Shuttle 3.2 2.5
Taurus 8 2.5
Titan IVB 5 1.5
Zenit (Sea Launch) 4.5 2
Acceleration loads are time-based and increase and decrease according to vehicle staging.
Acceleration peaks as each stage maximizes the energy it transfers to the spacecraft. These
peaks coincide with the end of the each stages' bum and separation. The number of peaks is
therefore determined by the number of stages, engines, and changes over the flight history of the
vehicle.
Shock Loads are instantaneous events that impart extremely high accelerations for extremely
short periods of time often only fractions of a second. These are experienced during ignition,
staging, fairing-jettison, and payload separation due to ordinance detonation and engine start.
Shock load magnitudes can vary from 500 to well over 8,000 g.
68 CHAPTER 4: DIsCUSSION OF PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS
MIT LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE JUNE 2001
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION OF PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS
From lift-off through orbital injection, the surrounding environment of the spacecraft differs
dramatically from the production and on-orbit environments. The environmental changes fall
under one of the following three categories:
Thermal Gradients: If not protected by the launch shroud, the payload would
experience significant temperatures extremes during lift-off. Frictional forces during
ascent through the atmosphere at high speeds causes high temperatures on the launch
shroud. The payload is somewhat protected inside the fairing, but still experiences
temperature gradients as some heat is transferred inside through conduction and radiation.
The gradient experienced by the payload depends on the insulation material, the fairing
shape, and the ascent angel of the vehicle.
Pressure gradients: Ambient atmospheric pressure declines as the launch vehicle
ascends. The rate of depressurization is dependent on the venting system installed in the
launch vehicle shroud and the location of venting ports. During ascent, vehicles provide
conditioned air and minimize any effects of rapid depressurization. Maximum pressure
gradients faced by spacecraft during ascent can vary between 1.5 to 7 kilopascals per
second.
Cleanliness: Cleanliness refers to the degree of contamination within the launch shroud.
Each vehicle has a rated clean room factor determined by the number of foreign particles
per cubic meter. Vehicles typically rank from 5,000 to 100,000 parts per million.
4.4.2 Impact of Loads and Environments on Spacecraft Design
The most significant impact of launch loads and environments falls on the spacecraft structure.
Spacecraft structures serve three primary purposes: to absorb dynamic and static loads, to protect
the payload from launch and on-orbit environmental factors such as debris, radiation, and
temperature gradients, and to serve as an attachment interface for mounting the bus and payload
subsystems and connecting to the launch vehicle upper stage. Spacecraft typically have two sets
of structures that divide these tasks. The primary structure carries the majority of the dynamic
and static loads, connects to the launch vehicle, and has some environmental responsibilities. The
secondary structure serves mostly the on-orbit mission of protection and support.10 ]
While the maximum launch loads and environments were specified above, in most cases the
structural design includes additional margins of safety to ensure that the spacecraft will survive
in the event of abnormal loads. Factors of safety typically range form 25 to 40 percent above
expected loads. Launch vehicle loads are also responsible for a large part of the expensive and
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extensive testing that spacecraft must go endure to ensure that they survive ascent and orbital
injection. Launch loads necessitate the "shake" environment tests: shock, acoustic, and
vibration.
4.4.3 Summary of Loads and Environments Impacts
Loads impact spacecraft structural designs, requiring high margins of safety and driving
structures to consume a high fraction of the spacecraft's dry weight (15 to 25%). Excessive
loads are also the primary driver for expensive spacecraft "shake" testing environments including
vibration, acoustic, and shock analysis. The forces experienced during launch are so severe, that
calibration of spacecraft instruments and systems must be done in-orbit versus on the ground. To
compensate for these forces and environments, special damping and insulation systems must be
developed consuming already limited mass and volume resources. The spacecraft designer must
also perform complex coupled loads analyses and be keenly aware of avoiding launch vehicle
natural vibration frequencies and modes.
Structures Consume High
Mass Fraction (15 to 25%
dry weight)
High Safety Margins on Natural Frequency and
Structural Elements Modes Analysis
Primary Cause for "Shake" Vel cLe Loads
Testing Environments: Vibratior E Coupled Loads
Acoustic, and Shock Environments Analysis
Special Dampig ulti-axial Loads
Systems Analysis
Forces Ca ibration Specia Insulation
On-Orbit Material
FIGURE 4-11 LOADS AND ENVIRONMENTS IMPACTS
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4.5 System Interfaces
4.5.1 Constraint Definition
System interfaces refer to the structural and electrical connections between the spacecraft and the
launch vehicle. System interfaces are important to consider for keeping the spacecraft and
launch vehicle properly connected as well an insuring successful separation following ascent.
The main structural connections are through the payload adapter. The payload adaptor serve as
the physical connection between the spacecraft and the launcher and as a conduit for electrical
connections. While most vehicles come with a standard adapter, many spacecraft require either
design changes to this adapter or additional support structures beyond that of the main adapter.
Beyond connections to the spacecraft bus and payload, launch adapters also serve as attachment
points for orbital transfer motors that enable the payload to move to higher altitudes following
separation and house separation systems responsible for detaching the payload from the launch
vehicle once in orbit.
While there is some thread of standardization in interface sizes there is still a wide array of
adapter dimensions that spacecraft must consider. Newer vehicles have moved to more standard
dimensions, especially among vehicles from the same country. Table 4-6 shows the range of
adapter dimensions, measured in millimeters. Each vehicle typically has several standard
interfaces and will produce customized interfaces if the customer is willing to spend more on the
vehicle.
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TABLE 4-6 ADAPTER DIMENSIONS
Launch vehicle firms provide all the necessary specifications dealing with vehicle connections in
the launch user manual. This guide explains the physical, electrical, radio frequency, and optical
access to the spacecraft during and after integration. The launch vehicle provides electrical and
RF interfaces for the spacecraft to supply power to spacecraft while on the ground and when in-
flight. The RF window provides communication access to payload while on ground and in-flight
to help monitor the payload's condition.
4.5.2 Impact of System Interfaces on Spacecraft Design
Perhaps the most important impact of the system interfaces (especially structural) is that they
take away mass and volume that could otherwise be available for the payload. As previous
Adapter
Vehicle Payload Adapter Interface Diameters
Ariane 40 937, 1194, 1497, 1666
Ariane 5 937, 1194, 1666, 2624
Athena 1 591, 944, 986, 1215, 1676
Athena II 591, 944, 986, 1215, 1676
Atlas 11AS 937, 1147, 1666
Atlas lIlA 937, 1147, 1666
Atlas Il1B 937, 1147, 1666
Atlas V 500 1215, 1666
Delta Il 7320's 940, 1524
Delta 11 7920's 940, 1524
Delta 1I1 1194, 1666
Delta IV Med + 1194, 1666
Delta IV Heavy 1194, 1666
H-Il 937, 1194, 1666, 2360
Kosmos 1060
Long March 2C 937, 1194
Long March 2E 1627, 1728, 3114
Long March 3B 937, 1194, 1666
Pegasus 985.8
Proton K 937, 1194, 1666
Proton M 937, 1194, 1666
PSLV & GSLV 937
Soyuz Mission Specific
Molniya Mission Specific
Space Shuttle Mission Unique
Taurus 986, 944
Titan IVB 1426
Zenit 2 3620
Zenit (Sea Launch) 937, 1194, 1663
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION OF PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS72
MIT LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE JUNE 2001
MIT LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE JUJNE 2001l
sections discussed, available mass and volume are already design drivers. The size and weight
of structural interfaces depend primarily on the vehicle selected and must be factored into the
spacecraft weight budget. In one military program, the decision to fly a medium-sized spacecraft
on one of the heavy-lift Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) led designers to develop
a fairly sizable and heavy payload adapter weighing approximately 2,000 pounds. Following a
program restructuring, the payload was switched to one of the medium EELV's with
substantially less lift capability. Based on the weight of the spacecraft, the designers ultimately
only had 500 pounds to allocate to the adaptor and ended up not only re-designing the adaptor
but also parts of the spacecraft triggering a substantial performance cut.
The lack of standardization among many launch vehicles, especially between foreign countries,
forces the spacecraft designer to make a choice between designing the payload to be compatible
with multiple launch vehicle interfaces or spending more time and money on the adapter system
from the launch side. Allocating weight to the adapter directly consumes weight resources that
could be available to the spacecraft. However, designing a more generic and multi-vehicle
compatible spacecraft requires design trades which limit spacecraft design and consume cost and
time.
The characteristics of both the launch vehicle fairing and the launch interface adapter have a
impact spacecraft accessibility following integration. After the spacecraft and the launch vehicle
have been structurally mated, various tests are run on all connections to ensure that the spacecraft
can communicate with the launch system and to make sure that the spacecraft is functioning
properly following the substantial handling involved with the integration activities. Ensuring
compatibility with the launch vehicle, both physically and electrically, is a significant design
impact on the payload.
The decision to launch with additional spacecraft, or multi-manifest, adds complexity to the
integration process and interface requirements. Connectivity for each spacecraft to the launch
vehicle as well as connectivity between the spacecraft must be considered. This equates to extra
wire harnesses and bundles that must run along the side of lower spacecraft in the stacking order
and extra structures to separate each spacecraft. These extra attachments can consume 10-15
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percent of the vehicle's lift capability. The potential also exists for each spacecraft to exert
additional loads on each along with those from the launch vehicle.
The final task of the launch vehicle interface is payload separation. Orienting and deploying the
spacecraft in the correct direction is imperative to ensuring that it will reach its desired orbital
location. In some cases, special tip-off or separation mechanisms can add an additional 5 to 20
percent cost increase depending on the complexity of the required maneuver. In the case of dual
manifested spacecraft, the possibility that the top spacecraft of a multiple spacecraft stack does
not deploy correctly is a contingency that must be planned and designed for.
Other interface issues involve special precautions taken for a crewed (human-rated) launch
vehicle such as the space shuttle or the Pegasus vehicle. The Pegasus vehicle is considered to
semi-man-rated because it is initially lifted to an altitude of 40,000 feet by a piloted L 1011
aircraft. For these vehicles, extra safety measures are employed to make sure that the crew is not
put in danger. In one NASA program, solid block hydrogen was going to be included on the
payload to cool the science instruments for an astronomy mission. The potential dangers of the
hydrogen in this form to the crew required additional equipment and safety procedures that
added extensive costs to the mission.
Other Industry Examples of Interface Issues
Interface Compatibility: Choice between using all optical communications system
desired by spacecraft versus RF which is common in launch vehicles
Coordination of Communications Architectures: Potential jamming of a military
payload initially using same the telemetry/communications frequency as launcher
Data Transmission Conflicts: Disagreement over using copper wires and not fiber
optics for data transmission in a new launch system
Software Compatibility: ETA versus standard C++.
Special Equipment: Desire to monitor a spacecraft throughout the launch phase using
a Pegasus vehicle required special racks to be installed on the L 1011 to handle the
spacecraft-aircraft interface in addition to the normal launch vehicle-aircraft
communications.
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4.5.3 Summary of System Interface Impacts
System interfaces deal with physical and electrical connections between the spacecraft and the
launch vehicle to handle communication and stabilization of the two systems. Systems interfaces
require special coordination between the spacecraft designer and the launch firm to make sure
communications are secure. Locations of access ports determine what areas of the spacecraft
will be available following encapsulation and where integration testing connections must be
located. Lack of standards across many vehicles leads to mission-unique support and connection
structures that consume valuable mass and volume. Multi-manifested launches also require
design coordination between associated spacecraft.
Mission-Unique
Communications Hardware
Coordination: Jamming Specialized
Issues Separation Systems
Crew-Related
Location of Payload Test Integration Safety
Ports: Match Vehicle I ce Issues
Access Ports interface
Mu ti-manifest Spacecraft
Connections & Loads
Spacecraft in-flight
monitoring systems
Weight, olume, & Cost
Standardization Penalties from Additional/Extra
Issues. Support Structures
FIGURE 4-12 INTERFACES IMPACTS
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION OF OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
5.1 Overview of Operational Constraints
Operational launch constraints impact not only the design of spacecraft systems, but also the
deployment and operation of spacecraft systems. The following operational constraints were
identified to have a major impact on space system design:
Schedules: Timetable limits for finalizing launch vehicle procurement, arranging launch
dates, and securing range equipment. Also includes schedule dependability or the
probability of launching on the scheduled date.
Availability: Refers to adequate supply of vehicle hardware to meet demand and
operational status of vehicle program (online versus offline).
Reliability: Probability of successfully completing the mission with failures defined as
in-flight explosions and delivering a payload to the incorrect orbital altitude and
inclination.
The following sections will introduce the each of the three major operational constraints that
must be considered in the design and development of spacecraft systems. It is important to note
that while they are discussed on an individual basis, many of the constraints are highly coupled
further complicating the design process. This coupling forces more complex trade analysis and is
evidence of the need to fully understand how launch constraints impact the spacecraft system.
5.2 Launch Schedules
5.2.1 Constraint Definition
Launch vehicle scheduling constraints impose temporal restrictions on the design and
deployment of spacecraft systems. The process of procuring a launch vehicle requires drafting
extensive contractual documents and reserving launch range equipment and personnel time.
Vehicle procurement contracts can take months to negotiate and are typically initiated anywhere
from 10 to 60 months in advance of the necessary launch date. The current Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle program sponsored by the Air Force requires ordering the largest lift capacity
vehicles 24 months in advance. Lengthy contract timelines are driven by vehicle processing
cycles and the necessity to reserve limited range resources. Current vehicle processing schedules
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(time to integrate and launch) are measured in weeks with the fastest spanning 4 to 5 weeks and
the longest well over 20 weeks.
Complex processes give rise to complex problems. The probability of actually launching at the
scheduled time and date specified in the initial contract is defined by the vehicle schedule
dependability. Delays in launching on schedule are a normal occurrence which must be planned
for. Launch delays can be caused be a range of factors including weather, technical problems
with the launcher or the payload following integration, shortages of vehicle hardware, failure of
previous missions requiring investigation, and damage to the launch range.
5.2.2 Impact of Launch Schedules on Spacecraft Design
By forcing firms to procure launch vehicles so far in advance, the spacecraft developers are
driven to select and contract a vehicle prior to completing the final spacecraft design. With a
vehicle already purchased, the launch constraints explained in Chapter 4 are put into place and
must be designed around. Long contract timelines pressure quick vehicle selection and reduce
the potential for design trades between the vehicle and the spacecraft.
Schedule delays caused by weather, technical problems, vehicle failures, production shortages,
or range-related problems can have a significant impact on the success of a spacecraft systems.
When a launch vehicle does not lift-off on time, it directly delays the start of spacecraft
operations. In the case of a commercial satellite that is deriving revenues from its operations,
every day that the spacecraft spends on the ground is another day that it is not functioning and
not generating revenue. With annual transponder lease rates hovering between $1 million to $2.5
million per year, every day spent on the launch pad equates to hundreds of thousands of lost
revenue dollars. For military spacecraft, delays can affect national security mission success and
increase defense vulnerability.
In the realm of new commercial applications, time to market can be crucial. Usually, new
markets start off small but have high growth rates. The first firm to offer access has a
competitive, first-mover advantage and the potential of capturing the burgeoning market and
gaining momentum as the market expands. Many of the smaller space markets are only able to
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support one, perhaps two firms. If the first firm captures enough market share, it can build an
effective barrier to newcomers. One example of a new space market that might be in this
category is the competition for the satellite radio market. Two firms, XM Radio and Sirius, are
vying for positions in the nationwide, direct-to-car radio service market. A delayed launch of
one of XM Radio's two service satellites jeopardizes its chance of gaining market share. In the
event of a significant time delay, by the time the new service is up and running, the competitor
(Sirius) may have already seized the majority of the market leaving the delayed company with
few new customers to pay off start-up costs.
The capability to schedule and launch quickly has been labeled Launch-on-Demand or LOD.
While the capability to launch under extreme time pressures has some commercial and scientific
importance, it's primary benefit is for military purposes. LOD provides assured access to space
and space assets deemed crucial for national security. A military capabilities review which
declared that "the ability to provide information and communication in fast, flexible manner is
currently deficient" led to a study by the Department of Defense Space Architect and the
National Reconnaissance Office to asses the impact of LOD capabilities on the management of
satellite constellations [251 The report concluded that "extended timetables and system
operational inflexibility were major limiting factors for potentially basing other defense systems
in space." [261 Faced with lengthy schedule times, spacecraft developers are either forced to
design spacecraft with excess capabilities to handle both routine mission functions and sporadic,
possibly unnecessary mission functions or to design spacecraft for only routine mission functions
and remain vulnerable to potential capability deficiencies. In the future, launching spacecraft to
perform a specific duty on short notice will be crucial to replacing spacecraft that have
malfunctioned or have been destroyed (by accident or on purpose) and to quickly augment
existing systems in the event of unforeseen crises.
Launch delays can also completely ruin a science mission. Due to the complex motion of the
planets around the sun, there are times when the alignment is such that launching during a
particular "window" is essential to successful complete the mission. Missing a crucial launch
window, such as the one that opens up for Mars missions every 26 months means either a
complete spacecraft re-design or waiting another 26 months.
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5.2.3 Summary of Launch Schedule Impacts
Schedule constraints place timetable limits for finalizing launch vehicle procurement, arranging
launch dates, and securing range equipment. Additionally, schedule dependability is a vital factor
affecting the probability of launching at the scheduled time and date. Schedule delays can result
in lost revenue and potential market share to competitors, national security vulnerability for
quickly replacing damaged or destroyed spacecraft, and missing narrow launch windows for
interplanetary science missions. Lengthy contracting schedules force early vehicle selection and
procurement to reserve spots on vehicle and range manifests. This reduces the amount of design
trades that can be made between the spacecraft and launch vehicle. Finally, lack of "launch-on-
demand" capabilities leads to designs with excess capabilities to handle both routine mission
functions and sporadic, possibly unnecessary mission functions versus designs for routine
mission functions only producing vulnerability and potential capability deficiencies.
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FIGURE 5-1 LAUNCH VEHICLE SCHEDULE IMPACTS
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5.3 Vehicle Availability
5.3.1 Constraint Definition
The concept of launch vehicle availability deals not only with the issue of adequate supply of
vehicle hardware to meet demand but more importantly with the functioning status of the
vehicle. Following a full or partial launch failure, launch vehicles are said to be "offline."
During this stand-down time, the cause of the failure is investigated and appropriate steps are
then taken to bring the vehicle back "online." The length of time that a vehicle is "offline"
varies depending on the type and severity of the failure as well as the type of vehicle. Increased
downtimes are usually associated with successive failures, inability to detect the root cause, or
design flaws to critical systems which require extensive re-design, testing and re-qualification.
Table 5-1 shows the downtime resulting from several vehicles latest failures as well as the
average downtime these vehicles have experienced over the life of the program. Primary
availability drivers include operational status (online:offline), supply of launch vehicles (flight
rate/processing timeline), and government regulation.
TABLE 5-1 LAUNCH SYSTEMS AVAILABILITIES [10]
While problem severity plays a significant role in the length of the downtime, the vehicle type
also has a significant effect. Man-rated systems like the space shuttle are prone to extremely
long timelines because of the fact that human lives are at stake.
The second part of launch availability relates to the ability of vehicle supply to meet demand.
There are two critical numbers associated with the vehicle supply, the flight rate and the surge
Launch Vehicle Downtime After Last Average Downtime
Failure (Months) (Months)
Space Shuttle 32 32
Titan IV 6 6
Atlas 8 10
Delta 4 4
Ariane 4 5 9
Ariane 5 17 17
Proton 4 3
Long March 1 12
Zenit 14 14
Pegasus 9 9
Tsyklon 5 6
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capacity. The flight rate is the average number of launches that can be performed in a given time
period, usually a year. The majority of launch vehicles have flight rates in the 5 to 10 range.
Performing a larger number of launches beyond the established flight rate deals with the surge
capacity of the vehicle, or under heavy demand conditions, how many more flights above
average can be performed. Surge rates can vary anywhere from 10 to 50 percent of the expected
flight rate meaning that a vehicle that normally performs 10 missions a year might be able to
perform 1 to 5 additional missions under special circumstances.
Limitations on the flight rate are related to several key factors. One of the most important and
often over-looked is the availability of ground infrastructure. In the United States, the majority
of launches occur at one of two locations the Eastern Range at Cape Canaveral in Florida and the
Western Range at Vandenburg Air Force Base north of Los Angeles. Each of these facilities has
a limited set of equipment to support launches such as the number of launch pads, the tracking
and communications equipment, and skilled personnel. The Eastern Range in Florida can only
handle a single active mission at a time and must dedicate its equipment and communications
network to a single mission with a minimum change-over time of 45 hours. [271 Each range has a
several launch pads meaning that multiple launch vehicles can be processed at the same time
both on-site and off-site, however, only a single mission can be active at a time.
Other limiting factors for the flight rate deal with the processing of the launch vehicle, the
processing of the payload, and the integration of the two vehicles. In the past, many vehicles
were actually built stage by stage out on the launch pad, consuming this valuable, scarce
resource. Processing timelines of two to four months was the norm. The new trend, following
the example of the Russian launch processing method, is to process the vehicle horizontally off
the pad and then erect the vehicle and integrate the payload on the pad only several days before
launch. Processing timelines have been decreasing over time, coming down from a standard 60
to 70 plus days to less than 20 for the new generation of launch systems. Decreases in launch
processing timelines as well as increased capacity to process multiple vehicles off-site (off the
pad) have led to the capability of higher flight rates and greater vehicle availability. However,
range equipment constraints will eventually limit these rates until the ranges can be updated.
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Finally, the speed at which the payload can be integrated with vehicle also plays a role in
determining how fast the launch can be processed and thus the vehicles flight rate.
A final aspect of vehicle availability is due to regulation and government policy. The potential
for governments to deem certain vehicles from other countries "off limits" or to limit the number
of satellites that can be launched on them is a serious factor. Chapter 7 will discuss the role of
government regulations impact on space systems and this type of vehicle availability limits.
5.3.2 Impact of Launch Vehicle Availability on Spacecraft Design
In January 1986, tragedy struck NASA's space shuttle program with the loss of the Challenger
STS-51 mission. The policy decision to have all US payloads fly on the shuttle had enormous
consequences for the spacecraft community when the shuttle went offline in 1986. As a man-
rated system, failures claimed more than just the payload and the vehicle. The death of seven
astronauts was a crushing blow to the US space program, one that it would not let happen again.
The failure investigation, generation of recommendations for safing the rest of the shuttle fleet,
and implementation of the "back to flight" plan consumed 32 months. After ramping up from
two flights in 1981 to nine in 1985, the shuttle program was brought back online in September
1988 with a flight rate cap of seven mission per year. With the prospect of reaching the initial
program goals of 10 day turn-around times and 60 flights per year deemed impossible, the shuttle
no longer could serve its intended role as the sole space transport vehicle. Prior to the
Challenger accident, the shuttle system had been making strides toward its objective of carrying
all commercial, military, and civil missions. In the process, NASA was cornering the US launch
market and essentially driving commercial players out of the market. The US learned a costly,
but valuable lesson about relying on a single machine for access to a crucial space property.
Following the accident, vehicles that had been on the path to retirement had to be rapidly brought
back into service. The revival process required a great deal of time and money and former
expendable vehicles were not completely back online and able to handle the industry demand
until the early 1990's, more than five years after the shuttle disaster.
The occurrence of a Challenger-like incident illustrates the severe impacts that launch vehicle
availability has on the design and development of spacecraft systems. When the shuttle went
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offline, the schedule for every spacecraft that was slated to not only fly on the Challenger, but
also the rest of the shuttle fleet was instantly delayed by at least a year. As mentioned in section
4.2, the impact of schedule delays can be enormous in terms of operations loses: loss of revenue,
loss of market share, and loss of essential capabilities such as communications or defense
functionality. The national security impacts of impaired or non-existent access to space were
enormous in the late 1980's with the US and the USSR still engaged in the Cold War. The
military, as well as commercial companies, vowed to not let this happen again. The most
significant impact of vehicle availability on space system design is psychological.
Spacecraft designed in the 1990's were approached with a much different design philosophy than
in the 1980's. The notion of designing for a single vehicle was eliminated from developers
minds. The new design philosophy focused on multiple vehicle compatibility. While a primary
launch vehicle was selected and optimized for, a secondary vehicle was also identified for the
event of the primary vehicle going offline. Designing spacecraft to be compatible with multiple
vehicles led to additional, sometimes unnecessary, equipment to enable the spacecraft to conform
to multiple vehicle specifications such as loads, temperatures and pressures, adapter sizes, and
communication frequencies among others. Compatibility consumed already limited mass and
volume resources in addition to time and money.
Another impact of availability is the spacecraft communities' acceptance of using new vehicles.
Offering improved capabilities does not equate to spacecraft developers utilizing such
capabilities. Risk aversion leads designers to hold-off on developing spacecraft for new
vehicles without a potential back-up with similar capabilities. One example of this involves the
initial introduction of the Ariane 5 vehicle. The Ariane 5 offered substantially greater lift
capability (over 6,800 kilograms to GTO) than any other vehicle, however, it is the only vehicle
currently able to lift such large payloads (besides the Shuttle which is off limits to commercial
payloads). Designers have shied away from using the Ariane 5 until another option in the 6,800
kilogram plus category is online. Fear of a vehicle going offline will stop spacecraft designers
from utilizing new capabilities until secondary options are available.
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In the event that a vehicle does go offline, the consequences for the spacecraft can be severe.
Short delays simply result in a schedule push-back with the impacts summarized in the preceding
schedules section. However, as Table 8 illustrates, some programs can be offline for significant
periods of time exceeding 12 months. In these situations, time pressures and uncertainty about
the future of the vehicle may lead developers to select another vehicle. In most cases, moving to
another vehicle means costly design changes to ensure compatibility with the new vehicle. One
program that definitely felt the effects of this was the US Air Forces' Milstar program. When the
shuttle went offline, the Milstar program decided to abandon the shuttle in favor of the Titan IV
vehicle. In doing so, the billion dollar program went through a several hundred million dollar
redesign to comply with Titan IV characteristics.
5.3.3 Summary of Vehicle Availability Impacts
Concerns over vehicle availability drive spacecraft designs to multiple vehicle compatibility,
lead to expensive re-designs following a vehicle going "offline," and create a conservative
spacecraft community where developers resist designing for new vehicles with superior
capabilities until a potential replacement vehicle is also available.
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FIGURE 5-2 AVAILABILITY IMPACTS
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5.4 Vehicle Reliability
5.4.1 Constraint Definition
The reliability of a launch vehicle expresses the probability of successfully completing the
mission. Failure to complete the mission can result from in-flight accidental or self-destruct
explosions or from delivering the payload to the incorrect orbital altitude and inclination. The
second classification of a failure can also be labeled as a partial success if the spacecraft can
achieve its intended orbital position through its own maneuvering system. However, such
maneuvers consume vital propellant and reduce the spacecraft's operating life. In other
situations, the spacecraft may not be able to reach its desired position, but can still be used to
perform part of the mission in a degraded state or can be reprogrammed to complete an entirely
new mission. Finally, there are instances where the spacecraft cannot reach its desired orbit and
is therefore unable to complete any of its intended or secondary missions and it is ruled as a
complete mission failure.
Launch reliabilities vary from vehicle to vehicle although typically average around 85 percent.
Historically, vehicles that have been in operation for several years and have completed more than
10 launches have had much higher average reliabilities as time and experience increase.
Heritage vehicles that are based on previous launch systems or represent incremental
improvements over existing systems tend to have better reliabilities although there are
exceptions. Standard reliabilities are simply determined by calculating the number of successful
flights over the total number of flights attempted. However, other measures of reliability which
discount the first several flights as "tests" are also used in industry. Vehicles with long series of
successes are typically viewed more favorably than vehicles with only several attempts even if
the more experienced vehicle has a lower absolute reliability. Figure 5-3 shows the current
reliabilities for many of the world's launch vehicles.
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5.4.2 Impact of Vehicle Reliability on Spacecraft Design
On September 9, 1998, a Ukrainian Zenit 2 rocket carrying 12 Globalstar mobile
telecommunications satellites lost control 272 seconds into its flight when the main rocket
motors suddenly shutdown sending all 12 spacecraft smashing down to Earth. Globalstar had
planned to conduct three more missions with the Zenit vehicle to deploy 36 of the 48 spacecraft
in its low Earth orbit communications constellation. The Zenit loss had a significant impact on
Globalstar's constellation deployment strategy affecting the composition and the number of
launches required to deliver the entire constellation to orbit. With eight spacecraft already
successfully launched aboard two Delta II's, Globalstar decided to launch the remaining
spacecraft in groups of four aboard a mix of Delta II's and Russian Soyuz'. Instead of the initial
six planned launches, Globalstar required a total of 14 launches lasting through February 2000
and the constellation was eventually activated in October 1999 behind schedule and with only 40
spacecraft in orbit.
Vehicle failures that destroy critical spacecraft or large numbers of a constellation also have
psychological affects. One company reported a $2 billion decrease in market cap following the
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loss of an important spacecraft. Additionally, in the case of a new system like Globalstar's, the
company's success depends on signing up millions of subscribers. With the cost of satellite
mobile phones averaging over $1000 per unit, highly publicized loses of spacecraft hurt the
companies' image and could dissuade potential subscribers from purchasing the expensive
handset and signing up for service until they are sure that the service will be around for awhile.
Beyond impacts from complete failures and spectacular explosions, launch vehicle reliability can
have many other affects on space systems. On Christmas Day 1997, a spacecraft known as
AsiaSat-3 lifted-off aboard a Russian Proton launch vehicle. After settling into a support orbit,
the Proton's fourth stage ignited six hours and 18 minutes into the mission in order to transfer the
spacecraft from the parking orbit to geostationary orbit. One second into the planned 110 second
burn, the Proton fourth stage shut-off prematurely after ignition sending the communications and
television spacecraft owned by Asia Satellite Telecommunications Company into an unusable,
highly elliptical and inclined orbit. Even though the spacecraft was completely functional,
AsiaSat filed an insurance claim and the insurers declared the satellite a total loss. In March
1998, AsiaSat ordered a replacement satellite from Hughes which was lifted into orbit one year
later in March 1999 aboard another Proton vehicle, 15 months after anticipated. Although
AsiaSat-3 was supposed to replace AsiaSat-1 which had been in orbit since 1990, the 15 month
delay postponed the rollout of new capabilities for its customers, potentially influencing
company revenues and market share. Additionally, AsiaSat's telecommunications license related
to the spectrum allocated for its mission was revoked in June 1998.
In April of 1998, Hughes Global Services reached an agreement with the insurers to attempt a
rescue mission to salvage the AsiaSat spacecraft agreeing to share any profits with the insurers.
Renamed HGS-1, engineers as Hughes and the Aerospace Corporation devised an unique plan to
use a gravity assist around the Moon to flatten and circularize the spacecraft's orbit. During the
process of two lunar flyby's, the spacecraft was able to be stabilize the spacecraft's orbit. While
the spacecraft will produce some revenues for Hughes and the insurers through selling limited
communications services the spacecraft will also have an extremely short life to generate these
revenues based on the fuel expended during the correction bums.
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For the period between 1997 and 2000, the insurance sector was forced to payout, on average,
over $400 million per year for launch vehicle related failures. The effect numerous failures in
the launch industry directly translates into increased spacecraft insurance rates already averaging
15 percent to 30 percent of the launch costs. Besides adding absolute cost, insurance premiums
vary from vehicle to vehicle depending on the insurance companies assessment of the vehicle's
operational reliability. Thus, differences in insurance rates can influence vehicle selection.
Future insurance problems are seen on the horizon as more unproven vehicles come onto the
market in the heavy-lift category capable of lifting multiple spacecraft or larger, complex and
expensive spacecraft. By 2002, there will be "five launch vehicles capable of carrying payloads
worth more than half the value of total annual insurance industry premiums."[281
Relatively low vehicle reliabilities (compared to other transportation systems) have also
contributed to the high degree of risk aversion among spacecraft customers. Conservative
customers drive spacecraft designs by refusing to use new technologies and components.
Customers want the benefits of the new technology but are unwilling to be the first to "try it
out." The probability that they will lose a spacecraft during launch or once in orbit fuels this
tendency towards conservative designs and implies that the commercial will take an evolutionary
approach towards new designs.
Vehicle reliability is intimately linked the impacts discussed in the previous section on
availability. Conservative customers are unwilling to limit spacecraft designs to a single vehicle
option even if it offers superior performance or lower cost. This contributes to a slow acceptance
of new launch capabilities. Thus, vehicle reliability fuels concerns over vehicle availability and
ultimately affects spacecraft development.
5.4.3 Summary of Reliability Impacts
Launch vehicle reliability defines the probability of successfully completing the space
transportation mission with failures including in-flight explosions and delivering a payload to the
incorrect orbital altitude or inclination. The potential for losing a spacecraft during transport
leads to high insurance premiums, production of back-up hardware and spares, and distributing
constellation spacecraft across several launch vehicle families (requiring compatibility designs).
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Additionally, spacecraft placed into incorrect orbits must consume crucial propellant during
special trajectory corrections burns which reduce spacecraft operational life.
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION OF COST CONSTRAINTS
6.1 Constraint Definition
The most influential and often cited launch constraint is cost. Compared to any other mode of
transportation, launching objects into space is by far the most expensive. The costs associated
with space access and payload delivery varies significantly depending primarily on the payload
size and the orbital destination. It is also important to note that the exact launch costs for a
particular vehicle will vary slightly from launch to launch depending on mission-specific
equipment. These costs, also known as "drive-away" costs (reference to auto extras), include
add-ons and extra features that are not included in the base vehicle price and cover equipment
and operations such as special payload adapters, thrust augmentation to increase lift capacity,
unique separation procedures or telemetry requirements and among many others.
6.2 Cost Breakdown
Launch costs are typically measured by two methods, vehicle procurement price and price per
unit mass. The vehicle procurement price is the absolute cost of purchasing the launch vehicle
for a single payload. For current vehicles, costs are roughly a function of the lift capacity of the
launch vehicle with cost increasing at a fairly linear rate as shown in Figure 6-1. The two
rightmost points identify the US Space Shuttle (the only reusable launch vehicle) and the Titan
IV which is being retired in 2002.
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FIGURE 6-1 LAUNCH PRICES BY VEHICLE [16]
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Launch vehicle costs range from the least expensive Orbital Sciences Pegasus vehicle at $15
million per flight up to the most expensive Lockheed Martin Titan IV vehicle at $400 million.
Another cost measurement that is often quoted is the price per kilogram. For low Earth orbit
launches, the average price is $9,800 per kilogram while the average price to geostationary orbit
is $26,500 per kilogram.
The cost of space access has remarkably remained relatively flat since the early 1970's.[29] The
lowest US space transportation costs were achieved by the Saturn V booster which delivered the
Apollo astronauts to the Moon and has been retired from service for over 25 years. Compared to
today's costs, the Saturn V was able to deliver hardware to space for an estimated $8,400 per
kilogram. Of course, the Saturn V was also able to lift 127,00 kilograms to low Earth orbit or
more than 5 times the largest lift capacity available today. The Saturn V launch vehicle was an
outlier in the lift capacity historical trend as economies of scale significantly contributed to such
a low cost. Following retirement of the Saturn V, prices returned to their previous levels and
remained constant until the early 1990's. Increased international competition helped to drive US
launch prices down. Figure 6-2 shows the history of launch costs since the early 1960's.
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FIGURE 6-2 HISTORICAL LAUNCH PRICES [29]
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As was mentioned in Chapter 2, there are several ways to divide up the total life-cycle costs of a
space program. Dividing costs among the different architecture segments varies depending on
the type and duration of each mission. Typically, however, the launch segment will consume
roughly 30 to 40 percent of the program costs but can range anywhere from 15 to 75 percent in
extreme cases. On average, when launch insurance is included, the launch process consumes 50
percent of the total program budget. Although spacecraft are expensive to design and
manufacture, revolutionary changes in how satellites are designed and produced has been
demonstrated by companies such as Iridium and Globalstar. These companies have shown that
production and deployment cycle times and per unit costs can be driven down by utilizing radical
design, test, and production methodologies. According to commercial industry officials, the
percentage of the total budget that launch consumes is growing to more than 50 percent as
satellites have seen a 4 to 5 times improvement in cost efficiency over the last 10 years.
6.3 Launch Cost Drivers
There are many factors which contribute to high launch costs. Launch costs can be divided
between recurring and non-recurring costs. For expendable vehicles, recurring costs include
production of all major hardware (engines, structure, electronics, etc), propellant, insurance, and
labor costs. Non-recurring covers initial research and development and infrastructure
development costs. For reusable vehicles the bulk of recurring costs are in the labor necessary
for maintenance and preparation as well as for propellant and insurance. Non-recurring costs
include research and development, vehicle production, and infrastructure costs. However, the
primary reason for high launch costs is the low flight rates. Multi-billion dollar upfront
development costs are difficult to recoup when a vehicle flies only 10 times per year. Paying of
research and development and infrastructure costs can take decades, without even starting to pay
off interest on debt or making a profit. Figure 6-3 shows the relationship between the flight rate
and the cost per kilogram to orbit. Clearly the best way to reduce launch costs is to push the
flight rate up past 1,000 flight per year. However, high flight rates require high demand.
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6.4 Impact of Launch Costs on Spacecraft Design
The high cost of launch has several significant effects on space projects. One of the most explicit
examples of this is the limitation of the quantity and scope of a new space missions. With
average launch costs around $75 million per mission, an organization with a $500 million budget
is automatically limited to at most seven missions, without even considering the cost of building
and operating the spacecraft. With the least expensive launch vehicle costing around $14 million
per mission, the impact of launch costs is felt most strongly by small, inexpensive spacecraft
systems. In these cases, the cost of launch can consume greater than 50 percent of the program
budget and has an enormous influence on the potential scope of the mission. Furthermore,
several innovative programs over the past 20 years have been able to reduce the cost of
developing spacecraft systems while transportation costs have roughly remained flat or slightly
increased (Figure 6-2).
Several studies have looked at the potential increase in the quantity and scope of spacecraft
missions resulting from significantly reduced launch costs. The "Future Spacelift Requirements
Study " prepared by the Aerospace Corporation looked a wide range of new space market
opportunities that low launch costs could enable. The study identified 76 new space initiatives
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that could come to market within the next two decades. Each of the 76 projects identified was
also evaluated to determine what level of cost reduction would be necessary for market
plausibility. The results showed that a 3x reduction in costs enabled 14 percent of these
missions, a 10x reduction enabled 21 percent of these missions and a 100x reduction enabled 80
percent of these missions. [31] Figure 6-4 shows the increase in scope illustrated by the projected
number of new spacecraft missions.
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FIGuRE 6-4 THE IMPACT OF LAUNCH COST REDUCTION ON NEW MISSIONS [31]
Beyond scope increases, reduced launch costs also have the potential to increase the actual
quantity of spacecraft developed and deployed. Studies such as the "Future Spacelift
Requirements Study" suggest that the price elasticity of demand for launch services follows a
kinked function curve. Under this scenario, demand for a larger number of missions will
increase very slightly for price reductions between the current $10,000 per kilogram and $1,000
per kilogram. In this region, the price elasticity of demand is near zero (inelastic) and significant
price decreases have little to no effect on the quantity demanded. Once below $1,000 per
kilogram, the demand curve begins to become more elastic with each unit price decrease
generating an increase in demand. Part of the small increase is due to lower launch costs helping
to close the business case of new missions that currently do not quite show positive net present
values. A further order of magnitude reduction to around $100 per kilogram suggests that the
market becomes increasingly elastic with smaller price reductions generating larger increases in
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demand. Figure 6-5 shows the kinked price elasticity of demand curve for launch services. This
scenarios, while somewhat speculative, is typical of markets with high initial costs and
characterizes the early aviation industry.
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One of the most important impacts of launch costs is the vicious cycle discussed in Chapter 1
where spacecraft missions need low transportation costs in order to be viable and more
numerous, yet launch systems need more missions (higher flight rate) to reduce per flight costs
and encourage additional funding for ftirther improvements. In addition to suppressing demand,
high launch costs also create the "high cost of failure" paradigm.
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FIGURE 6-6 THE SPACECRAFT - LAUNCH VEHICLE VICIOUS CIRCLE [2]
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The "high cost of failure" paradigm has secondary effects which also influence spacecraft system
development. The high cost of failure mindset combined with lengthy vehicle procurement
timelines and the inability to perform maintenance or servicing on-orbit drives high spacecraft
reliability and high spacecraft functionality. Achieving high reliability requires extensive testing
and qualifying processes which add significant costs and time to spacecraft development. It also
suppresses the desire to insert many new technologies that have not yet been proven.
Along with high reliability, spacecraft designers faced with limited number of missions are
pushed to stretch the functionality of each mission. Stretching mission functionality increases
spacecraft system complexity and ultimately cost. In this context, system complexity refers to an
index based on multiple measurable factors (number of mission objectives, number of parts, lines
of code, degree of system inputs/outputs, etc). The actual relationship between complexity and
cost has been found to follow the traditional exponential growth pattern, where small increases in
complexity produce large increases in cost.[32 ]
Referring back to the vicious cycle, high launch costs limit the number of missions that can be
funded leading to limits in vehicle and subsystem production volumes. Low production volumes
eliminate the benefits of spreading non-recurring or fixed costs (R&D, equipment, etc) over
multiple spacecraft system units. The potential cost reduction enabled through the transition to
large production runs has been documented in the automobile and aircraft industries and most
recently in the case of Iridium. [331 Additionally, switching to a automobile-style production
system has also demonstrated the ability to improve product quality by emphasizing the process
and design while minimizing end-stage testing. The largest obstacle to applying this rationale to
spacecraft systems is that the demand for large quantities of the same spacecraft does not exist.
Low lot sizes have also discouraged many suppliers from entering the market and driven many
out of it. The electronics industry has been fighting aerospace's small quantity, high requirement
parts for years by driving prices up to push space companies towards using COTS parts. In one
example, an electronic part that cost less than $1 to produce and retailed for around $2.00, was
sold at a price exceeding $1,500 because of extreme requirements for loads testing, radiation
hardening, and other obscure spacecraft requirements. Additionally, many times even if more
than one unit is purchased it is done over several years. One industry designer provided an
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example of a situation where a set of six components were purchased at a rate of one per year for
six years at a cost of $2 million per component. Because of the cost of setup and tooling the
purchase price could have been reduced by 50 percent to $1 million each had all of the
components been purchased at once.
High launch costs impact companies replenishment strategies by driving spacecraft towards
longer design lifetimes to avoid spending additional funds launching replacement satellites.
There is also an arbitrage-like characteristic to launch prices involving differences between costs
for delivery to LEO versus delivery to GEO. Several industry officials quoted that using a
launch vehicle to get to GEO is twice as expensive as including a special boost stage on the
spacecraft to make the final orbital altitude increase by itself. This forces spacecraft designers to
address orbital transfer issues and in the process reduces available volume and mass when the
boost stage is included.
6.5 Summary of Cost Impacts
Cost constraints result from the exorbitant price of purchasing a launch vehicle and are further
amplified by insurance costs, range fees, and "drive-away" costs associated with mission-unique
hardware. Excessive costs limit the number and scope of space missions, impede new market
applications, and create a general "high cost of failure" mentality. The high cost of failure
mindset discourages technology insertion, pushes high spacecraft reliabilities and testing, and
causes developers to stretch spacecraft functionality. High launch costs also affect replenishment
strategies pushing longer spacecraft lifetimes to avoid spend additional funds launching a
replacement satellite. The summation of these cost impacts creates a vicious cycle for the space
industry where spacecraft missions need low transportation costs in order to be viable and more
numerous, yet launch systems need more missions (higher flight rate) to reduce per flight costs
and encourage additional funding for further improvements.
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7.1 Overview of Policy Constraints
While spacecraft developers are notorious for innovative and creative solutions to the very
tangible technical, operational, and cost constraints they encounter, some of the most difficult
constraints to manage exist in an intangible form and come through the launch vehicle from the
realm of policy. What makes these policy constraints so difficult to address is that in contrast to
technical and operational constraints, policy issues tend to be abstract and difficult to precisely
define. Unlike engineering solutions where a "correct" or "optimal" solution can be verified by
data and equations, policy solutions are rarely as straightforward and are virtually impossible to
determine as being "correct." Policy constraints in the form of government regulations, national
policy platforms, and strategic planning roadmaps for research and development can influence
spacecraft system design. Ironically, current policy regarding future launch vehicle development
is primarily responsible for determining the future technical, operational, and cost constraints.
This chapter focuses on how US national space transportation policy can influence the design
and development of spacecraft systems. In contrast to the three previous chapters, this chapter
takes a slightly approach to addressing the impact of policy constraints on spacecraft design. The
chapter layout is shown in Figure 7-1. To better understand the role that policy plays in the
design of spacecraft systems, it is first necessary to define the policy goals and the key players
responsible for creating and implementing these polices. With the policy stage set, three policy
topics are individually introduced each providing a historical synopsis of the major issues, a
discussion of the current situation, and an analysis of how the existing policies impact spacecraft
design. The three policy constraints that are addressed are:
Launch Quotas: Limits on the number and pricing of foreign vehicles used to launch US
payloads
Launch Vehicle Selection: Mandated, pre-design choices of launch vehicles and
prohibited use of foreign launch vehicles for US military and science missions
New Vehicle Development: Decisions on future launch vehicle technologies and
capabilities that will be available to the spacecraft community
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FIGURE 7-1 OUTLINE OF POLICY CHAPTER
The following overview of the US space transportation goals and the discussion of the cast of
characters involved in the space transportation market serves to provide traceability and rationale
for current policies. An understanding of the objectives that motivated the development of a
particular space transportation policy puts the policy's impact on spacecraft development into
perspective. Additionally, identifying the cast of characters, their roles, and their policy
positions provides context for their policy reactions.
7.2 US National Space Transportation Policy Goals
The current space transportation policy was formulated by the National Science and Technology
Council under the Clinton Administration. The National Space Transportation Policy released in
August 1994 and the National Space Policy released in September 1996 highlight the objectives
and implementation guidelines for achieving the United States' principal mission in space:
"to maintain a leadership role in space by supporting a strong, stable and balanced national
space program that serves our goals in national security, foreign policy, economic growth,
environmental stewardship, and scientific and technical excellence." 34]
Drawing on these two recent policy documents, the key government objectives for the US space
transportation industry are to:[35,36]
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1) Sustain and modernize the existing space transportation infrastructure, capabilities, and
the technology base to provide reliable and cost effective launch vehicle production and
operational capabilities to meet national security, civil, and commercial requirements.
2) Develop new technologies through efficient investment of R&D resources to support
future decisions on the development of next generation space transportation systems that
greatly reduce the cost of space access while improving their reliability, operability,
responsiveness, and safety.
3) Leverage commercial sector capabilities by encouraging the cost-effective use of
commercially provided US products and services that meet government mission
requirements, expanding the private sector role in federal space transportation R&D
decisions, and supporting state and private sector investments in and use of space
technologies to expand space markets and applications.
4) Promote international cooperation by opening US markets to the use of foreign launch
systems, endorsing joint ventures that capitalize on foreign technologies and processes
without becoming dependent on them, and maintaining stable and friendly political and
trade-relations with partners and allies.
5) Control ICBM proliferation by limiting the use and spread of missile technologies and
ensuring that launch technologies are used for peaceful space launch purposes.
6) Foster commercial sector competitiveness by preventing the adverse impacts of using
excess US ballistic missile assets on the commercial sector, protecting US firms from non-
market-based economies offering irrationally discounted launch prices, and considering
commercial needs and in the formulation of US space transportation policies.
7.3 Key Stakeholders in the Space Transportation Industry
The development of the US space transportation policy involves a wide array of stakeholders.
These stakeholders each play unique roles in the policy process from formulation through
implementation of the policy plan. Four key roles can be identified: decision makers, influence
brokers, implementers, and the affected. In this situation, the term affected refers organizations
whose daily activities are affected (either positively or negatively) by the policy implementation.
Organizations can and do play multiple roles throughout the policy process. The formulation of
the policy plan occurs during an iterative dialogue between the influence brokers and the
decision makers. Influence brokers provide both unbiased and biased information and options in
an attempt to move policy in a particular direction. The role of the decision maker is to sift
through this information to determine the final policy direction and the parties responsible for
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implementation. Table 7-1 outlines the different organizations involved, their objectives and
responsibilities (related to launch), and their role(s) in the policy process.
TABLE 7-1 CAST OF CHARACTERS IN THE SPACE TRANSPORTATION MARKET
Stakeholder Objectives/ Policy
Responsibilities Role(s)
Department of Defense Objective: Maintain national security & control of space Influencer
- Improvement & evolution of current US expendable launch Implementer
vehicle fleet Affected
- Maintain capability to operate systems, infrastructure
National Aeronautics and Objective: Conduct human exploration of space Influencer
Space Administration - Provide improvement & operation of space shuttle system Implementer
- Lead agency for technology develop for next generation RLV Affected
Department of Objective: Promote competitive commercial launch capability Influencer
Transportation and - Identifying & promoting innovative types of arrangements
Commerce between government & private sector
US Launch Service Objective: Maximize shareholder value; Profit Affected
Providers (prime - Production of vehicle components & systems Influencer
contractors & suppliers) - Delivery of the customer's payload to desired orbit
US Spacecraft Developers Objective: Maximize shareholder value; Profit Affected
(prime contractors & - Production of spacecraft & payload Influencer
suppliers) - Manage until routine on-orbit operations & customer handoff
US Spacecraft Operators Objective: Maximize shareholder value; Profit Affected
(Customers: scientists, - Operation of spacecraft & offer services to end users Influencer
military, commercial)
US Congress: OMB Objective: Serve US public & government interests Decision
- Allocation of funds for science & technology development Maker
White House Advisors: Objective: Provide scientific & technological analysis & Decision
Office of Science & judgment for the President Maker
Technology Policy; - Develop & implement sound science & technology policies & Influencer
National Science & budgets
Technology Council - Work with the private sector to ensure Federal investments in
science & technology contribute to economic prosperity,
environmental quality, & national security
Federal Aviation Objective: Safe, secure, & efficient aerospace system for US Decision
Administration - Certification, regulation, & surveillance Maker
- Accident prevention Implementer
- Safety Information Sharing & Analysis: Develop partnerships
with the aviation community to share data & information
supporting safe, secure aviation.
Insurance Community Objective: Maximize shareholder value; Profit Affected
- Provide financial protection for launch & spacecraft developers Influencer
& payload customer in the event of an accident
Launch Range Operators Objective: Safe operation of launch range; Profit Affected
(Government & - Operate & maintain range equipment & facilities Influencer
Commercial) - Develop new range operations technologies
Foreign Launch & Objective: Maximize shareholder value; Profit Affected
Spacecraft Providers & - Produce, launch, & operate spacecraft systems
Operators
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Formulating a set of policies that will completely satisfy the objectives of every stakeholder is
highly unlikely. Thus, difficult trades and compromises must be made. Ultimately, the resulting
policy will have impacts on all stakeholders, some positive and some negative. The essence of
the space transportation policy focuses on the achieving the goals outlined in Section 7.2.
However, in satisfying these goals of the launch segment, there are ramifications for other parts
of the aerospace industry, mainly the spacecraft segment. The following sections discuss three
policy issues that were formulated to achieve space transportation objectives yet have an adverse
impact on spacecraft systems and are therefore deemed constraints.
7.4 Government Regulation: Launch Quotas
7.4.1 Constraint Definition
Launch quotas are government mandated limitations on the purchase of foreign launch vehicles
be US spacecraft firms. As an instrument of foreign trade policy, quotas establish non-tariff
barriers to international commerce in that they do not directly levy a tax or tariff on the foreign
good. Instead, launch quotas place a limit on the number of US satellites that can be launched on
foreign vehicles during a specified period and the price at which these vehicles are procured.
The goal of these quotas is to protect US launch firms from unfair international market practices,
consistent with goals number 1 and 6 in Section 7.2.
7.4.2 Historical Perspectives
With the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's came increased concern over the possibility
of non-economic-based launch systems entering the global commercial market. Russia and the
Ukraine had a stable of launch vehicles that were eager to transform themselves into for-profit
entities when Soviet government funding started to dry up. Throughout history, Russia has
pursued a different approach to launch than the rest of the rest of the world. While US
companies consumed precious launch pad time on the order of months by vertically erecting
their vehicles right on the launch stand, Russia pioneered horizontal vehicle integration.
Completed Russian rockets were rolled up to the launch stand via railroad, quickly erected, and
launched within a matter of days. Russia also focused on achieving much higher flight rates,
trading economies-of-scale cost reductions for slightly lower reliabilities. From 1970 through
1990, the Soviet Union averaged 90 plus launches a year compared to only 25 for the United
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States. In fact, over the first 40 years of the space era, the Soviet Union performed 2,822
launches compared to the US's 979 and Europe's 211.[16] This difference in philosophy caused
problems for US launch firms when the Soviet Union fell and the former government launch
companies were free to turn to the private markets. Steady growth in the geostationary
commercial launch services market combined with a growing trend towards LEO satellite
constellations each requiring tens of launches could not alleviate US launch companies' concerns
over Russia's market entrance. Many US firms worried that not only would the Russian launch
companies be able to charge a lower price and capture significant market share, but they would
also be easily able to handle the large number of new launches without having to build up
additional production facilities (one of the factors that could slow a cheaper competitor from
gaining greater market share).
Faced with growing concerns, the two largest launch companies at the time, McDonnell Douglas
with its line of Delta vehicles and General Dynamics with its Atlas line, approached the US
Congress for support. The result was a set of agreements with the governments of Russia, China,
and the Ukraine that would set a limit on the number of launches each country could conduct for
US customers to geostationary orbit. US launch companies were still recovering from the wild
fluctuations in the mid 1980's when they were initially pushed out of business by the space
shuttle only to be quickly revamped and brought back online following the Challenger disaster.
The launch quotas were aimed at helping US companies regain their footing and compete on the
global playing field. Additionally, national security concerns over maintaining a strong and
reliable launch capability motivated Congress' actions.
The first agreement, signed into law in September 1993, granted Russia the right to launch eight
US spacecraft to geostationary orbit during the period of 1994 through the end of the year 2000.
Additionally, the agreement specified that the Russian launch companies could not charge a price
more than 7.5 percent lower than the prevailing US launch prices for similar services. Roughly a
year and a half later, a similar agreement was reached with the People's Republic of China
granting a total of eleven launches to GEO from the date of signing through December 2001.
However, increased demand for launches to geostationary orbit led lawmakers to insert a clause
in the Chinese agreement allowing an additional 11 launches in the event that US demand for
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GEO launches exceeded 20 per year. A similar extension was granted to the Russians in January
1996 which increased their quota to 15 launches and increased the price limit to 15 percent
below prevailing US prices. Two additional agreements were signed with the Ukraine allowing
five launches to wholly-owned Ukrainian companies and an additional 11 for the Sea Launch
international joint venture whose members include the US based Boeing Company, the
Ukrainian-based Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash, and the Russian-based RSC Energia. [37]
7.4.3 Current Scenario
In 1998, 15 spacecraft and launch vehicle corporations came together to form the Satellite
Industry Association (SIA) and delivered a letter to Vice President Al Gore requesting that the
launch quotas be dropped but the price limits remain. In June 2000, President Clinton
announced the end of the trade agreement with Ukraine effectively lifting all quotas on
Ukrainian vehicles. As stated by President Clinton, "this decision eliminates launch quotas and
gives US firms greater opportunity to enter into commercial space launch joint ventures with
Ukrainian partners without limit."381 It is interesting to note that this policy decision was not
based on a burgeoning GEO satellite market or the adverse impact that quotas had on US
spacecraft markets. With demand for Ukrainian vehicles well below quota limits, the final
decision by the Clinton administration was essentially symbolic in showing support for the
Ukraine's positive steps in missile non-proliferation, fostering closer ties between US and
Ukrainian firms, and enabling important rocket technology transfer back to the US.
In December of 2000, the launch quotas for Russia were allowed to expire without an extension
to the initial agreement. While many US and foreign firms were pleased with this result, some
firms still lobbied for the quotas to be extended. US rocket makers such as Pratt and Whitney and
Aerojet were concerned over the practice of using Russian and Ukrainian rocket engines on US
vehicles such as the new Lockheed Martin Atlas V. US engine firms saw the quotas as the only
method of protecting themselves from the superior and less expensive foreign rivals. With the
expiration of launch quotas for both Russia and the Ukraine, both countries were free to sell as
many vehicles as they wanted and at prices that they determined. At present, the Chinese quotas
are set to expire in December 2001.
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7.4.4 Impact of Quotas on Spacecraft Design
There are two key instruments to the US policy on the use of foreign launch vehicles: 1) the limit
on the number of US satellites that can be launched on foreign vehicles and 2) the price at which
these vehicles can be procured. While the initial policy was developed in an effort to make sure
the US launch industry stayed healthy and could compete in the world market, the policy takes a
very one-sided view of the US space market trading benefits for the launch vehicle companies
against benefits for the spacecraft sector. Both the quota and the price restriction, essentially a
non-tariff trade barrier, have a significant influence on the space system development.
The impact of price control is fairly straightforward. Drawing on economics theory, the
government essentially setup price supports or price floors for launch services available to US
customers. The effect is that prices are held above their equilibrium levels. The end result of
such price floors is a combination of excess supply and reduced demand shown in Figure 7-2 at
point 1. The global launch market experienced excess supply with more companies interested to
launching payloads than payloads for them to launch. The spacecraft developers' demand also
was lower than its equilibrium levels because of the artificially held-up prices. In most economic
scenarios involving government price fixing, the excess supply from such a government
instituted policy is absorbed by the government agency. This is typical of price supports in
industries that are considered of national importance such as agriculture. However, this did not
happen because the excess supply was existed in the foreign market. While many US launch
companies were able to book orders, the Russian, Ukrainian, and Chinese companies were forced
to deal with the excess capacity and eventually agreed to the quotas and higher prices to sell their
vehicles.
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FIGURE 7-2 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LAUNCH QUOTAS IN THE MARKET[13]
More important, from a US standpoint, than the excess supply of foreign vehicles is the influence
of the price floors on spacecraft demand. Had the foreign launch companies been allowed to
offer their services at much lower prices, it is highly likely that demand for these services would
have increased, moving from point 1 to point 2 in Figure 7-2. The increase in demand, while
difficult to predict an actual number, is extremely probably given the significant portion of
program costs that launch consumes and the likely discount in the price of foreign vehicles.
With some programs spending more than 50 percent of their budget on launch services, the
availability of lower launch costs would have enabled missions which under existing US prices
the business case did not close. In the long run, some of this increased demand would have been
diverted back to US vehicles. Additionally, the increase in the spacecraft market could have been
substantial if the discounted foreign prices came in below the critical threshold described in
Chapter 6 where the elasticity of demand changes from being almost completely inelastic to
being very elastic. Lawmakers attempting to protect the US launch industry actually hurt the
spacecraft industry.
The US government's desire to try to protect its launch industry from potential dumping
practices by foreign, non-economic-based launch companies does make economic sense.
Without any restrictions, foreign companies could charge extremely low prices to capture
significant amounts of the US and world market. The end result would be huge loses for US
launch companies and a likely decrease in the US launch capabilities, sparking concerns over US
national security issues. However, the consequence of this price floor is that it does not give any
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incentive to the US companies to attempt to lower their prices over the long term. US launch
companies have a difficult choice to make. On the one hand, if they reduce prices to match the
foreign competitors, the foreign competitors can continue to lower their prices 15 percent below
the US prices. Taking this route could lead to a vicious price reduction spiral which would
benefit the spacecraft community but probably destroy the US launch industry. The other option
is to offer a better service to lure customers with higher reliability or performance. While the
benefits of this are obvious, the drawback is that prices remain high. So the end result of the
price controls is a likely increase in service without immediate or long-term price relief. While
performance, reliability, and other service attributes are important, as mentioned above, cost can
be a deciding factor in closing the business case for a new market opportunity.
Beyond price impacts for spacecraft developers, the quotas also affected the selection of vehicles
available to US customers. In the late 1980's, prior to the initial agreement with the Russians,
the average annual launch rate for US commercial payloads to GEO was eight. Forecasts
predicted 56 spacecraft would be launched during the agreement period from 1993 through 2000.
Thus, 1 -of-8 US spacecraft would be able to purchase a Russian vehicle if they wanted to. This
represents a significant limitation on selection and creates an auction-like environment for
Russian vehicles. However, the initial estimates were too low and in the mid 1990's the number
of launches to GEO grew significantly. In 1999 alone, 21 commercial communications satellites
(28 total) were launched into geostationary orbit with the total between 1989 and 1999 at 182
spacecraft. The ratio of US spacecraft allowed to be launched on Russian vehicles would have
been reduced to 1-of-23 without the quota extension but instead was closer to 1-of-17 with the
extension. Similar scenarios can be worked through for Russian and Ukrainian vehicles. Taking
all of the quota limits combined, US payloads had access to 35 foreign vehicles before
extensions and a total of 53 with extensions. This means that somewhere between 1-of-3 and 1-
of-5 US spacecraft could use a foreign vehicle. Yet, not all vehicles are the same and some are
more desired than others. The end result in any case is a limitation on selection.
While the quotas on the number of foreign rockets available for purchase affected the price and
selection available for US spacecraft developers (with all of the technical ramifications) it also
had the potential to create a much more dangerous situation. Prior to the late 1990's, the US
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spacecraft industry was significantly ahead of foreign spacecraft producers. This forced most US
and foreign service providers to purchase US spacecraft which had better performance
capabilities and were less expensive. The US spacecraft industry enjoyed a near monopoly in
securing contracts for large geosynchronous spacecrafts. In the late 1990's, however, other
countries' spacecraft designers started to catch-up. This provided additional options for foreign
countries interested in avoiding the US government-imposed launch constraints and securing less
expensive launches. Limits on the number of US satellites that could go on Russian rockets
meant that a foreign service provider, in an attempt to reduce overall costs, might choose a more
expensive foreign-made spacecraft and launch it on a cheaper Russian rocket. This would allow
them to completely circumnavigate the quota issue as well as other US imposed technology
transfer regulations.
Another major development was the increase in popularity of using LEO orbits to perform some
of the same GEO missions. The initial launch agreements only handled payloads headed for
geosynchronous orbits and not low Earth orbits. As the LEO markets rapidly grew with the
arrival of massive constellations such as Iridium's 66 satellite constellation and Globalstar's 52
satellite constellation, US launchers began to worry that Russian and Ukrainian stockpiles of
ICBM's could be put into service, severely undercutting US prices and capturing a significant
portion of the un-quota-protected LEO market. In response, US companies initiated international
joint venture partnerships pairing US and Russian/Ukrainian launch companies. This further
complicated the GEO quota-regulated situation by blurring the categorization of companies as
being foreign versus domestic. US firms seized the opportunity to utilize and learn from superior
Russian and Ukrainian rocket technology yet were stung by their own previously lobbied for
quota protection system.
7.4.5 Summary of Launch Quotas Impacts
Government regulations can have both positive and negative impacts on the space system market
usually as a trade-off between the launch industry and the spacecraft industry. It is tough to
completely satisfy organizations from both sectors. The impacts discussed above show how
policy geared towards the launch industry can ultimately have a substantial impact on spacecraft
systems. Equally true is the possibility of spacecraft focused policy affecting the launch industry.
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In defining the future policy, emphasis should be placed on proactive versus reactive policies.
Launch quotas and price controls are reactive policies which were put in place to protect US
markets. The mere fact that the US markets needed to be protected pointed to a more profound
problem that should be addressed. The fact that Russia has much better rocket technology begs
the question why? The answer is simple. In the last 30 years (up until 1999), Russia has
developed 45 different rocket engines while the US has developed only one, the Space Shuttle
Main Engine. E391 While the potential prices that Russia, Ukraine, and China might have charged
without quotas and price controls in place would probably be considered too low, or below the
appropriate market equilibrium, it is also likely that the US prices were probably too high, or
above market equilibrium and should come down over time. This is further supported by the
discussion in Chapter 6 of the stagnating launch prices in the US from 1975 through 1993 when
foreign competition entered the picture. The primary space system impacts of the US
governments launch quota regulations:
Reduced
Spacecraft Demand
Higher Long-term Prices:
reduced LV incentives to Higher Near-term
lower prices Prices
Loss of Market Share Launc Limited Vehici
to Foreign Suppliers4 Quotas Selection
Stiffled New Price Floors
Applications
Improved US Increased Spacecaft
Launch Services Competition
FIGURE 7-3 IMPACT OF LAUNCH QUOTA POLICY ON SPACE SYSTEMS
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7.5 Vehicle Selection
7.5.1 Constraint Definition
The process used to select a launch vehicle for a specific spacecraft mission involves a wide
array of technical, operational, and political parameters. While technical and operational
parameters initially define the trade space for applicable vehicles narrowing the selection
possibilities, the final verdict relies on a policy decision. Mission type and the managing
organization play a significant role in this process. While the number of launch vehicles
available is not countless, there are enough vehicles so that the majority of missions have
several options.
During the selection process, different attributes, or constraints, of the launch vehicle are
considered over time. For example, initial factors considered might include lift capacity or
volume available. Using these attributes, it is possible for the spacecraft designer to define the
trade-space and identify how many vehicles might fit the spacecraft systems specifications. A
second set of attributes such as cost, reliability or country of origin then helps contrast the
remaining candidates. The diversity of most space missions combined with the complex
interactions/ coupling of launch constraints make each vehicle selection a unique process.
While there is no formal selection process that can be applied across all missions, the
discriminating factors/constraints can be broken down into three categories depending on their
degree of influence and level of rigidity, as specified in Chapter 3. First tier factors have
substantial design impacts and are either impossible or extremely difficult to trade-off. Second
tier constraints also have significant design impacts, usually can be traded, and are the most
influential in making the final choice from the suitable vehicles. The third tier factors usually do
not have a large influence on the selection decision but can be traded and do impact the
spacecraft design following selection. As previously mentioned, diversity across space missions
and requirements can alter which tier a constraint falls under. For example, while loads and
environments are traditionally a third tier factor, there are cases where certain launch vehicles
have substantially different physical environments that the loads become a second tier factor and
can be principally responsible for a selection decision. Table 7-2 shows the typical
characteristics/constraints that are considered in selecting a vehicle by tier.
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TABLE 7-2 TIERED STRUCTURE OF LAUNCH VEHICLE SELECTION CRITERIA
Tier # 1 Tier # 2 Tier # 3
Government Regulations Cost Loads
Availability Reliability Environments
Lift Capacity Partnerships Schedule
Volume Available Insurance Launch location
Orbital Location Interfaces
7.5.1.1 First Tier Constraints
For Tier 1 constraints, most cannot be traded. Government regulations might stipulate that only a
US vehicle can be used or quotas can eliminate the potential of using a foreign vehicle.
Availability is also a firm, non-tradable constraint. Even if a vehicle's characteristics, cost,
loads, etc, perfectly match a spacecraft, if the vehicle is offline for some reason, it is simply not
possible to order or procure (at least not in near term). Mass and volume limits can also be fixed
constraints if the approximate weight of the spacecraft is known early in the design selection
phase. A spacecraft forecast to weigh at least 2,000 kilograms and measure 4 meters in diameter
simply cannot fit on a vehicle designed to lift 500 kilograms with a fairing only 3 meters across.
Finally, some vehicles because of launch location or performance specifications cannot deliver
payloads into certain orbits such as polar or geostationary.
7.5.1.2 Second Tier Constraints
Second tier constraints have some flexibility. While programs do have limited budgets, it is
possible to spend less on other aspects such as the spacecraft or operations in order to spend
more on launch or vice versa. Many times spacecraft developers set a minimum reliability level
or the amount of risk they are willing to take based on the value and importance of the space
mission. However, the firmness of this threshold depends on the risk profile of the space
mission. While the loss of a spacecraft is a considerable financial blow to all programs, a special
spacecraft requiring ten years of development and bound for Jupiter has a different risk profile
from a simple LEO communications spacecraft. To save costs or move up a launch date, some
programs will make a trade with reliability.
Vehicle reliabilities can also be subjective. A vehicle that failed during its first three flights but
has since achieved 20 successful flights is not viewed the same as a vehicle who made 20
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successful flights but lost the last three even though they have the same mathematical reliability
record. Ownership also plays a substantial role as a spacecraft owner might see reliability as tier
I (only accepting vehicles with reliabilities above 99 percent) while the spacecraft designer
would see launch reliability as second tier constraint. Insurance costs are also flexible, depending
on the value of the spacecraft and the reliability of the vehicle selected. Partnership constraints
refer to situations involving international joint ventures or consortia that might initially agree to
launch a specified number of spacecraft on a vehicle from each country. This type of agreement
is also flexible and can be traded.
7.5.1.3 Third Tier Constraints
Although third tier constraints can influence the final decision, they are usually the ones that
designers accommodate or "live with." Third tier factors do not drive selection, instead they
come into play as cost adjustments and design drivers. Industry tends to address these in an
attempt to satisfy and encourage repeat customers. While there are physical differences among
launch providers, it is rare to see vehicle parameters too far off the average for risk of losing
customers. Thus, things like loads, interfaces, and environments which could be deciding factors
are usually not because vehicles tend to migrate toward a central standard. Launch locations
refers to the launcher country of origin. If a spacecraft is allowed to launch on a foreign vehicle,
technology transfer regulations dictate specific procedures and technology protection
mechanisms which must be put into place affecting the vehicle design. Additional costs are also
incurred to pay travel, accommodations, and service fees for the required US Air Force Lt Col
escort responsible for overseeing all domestic payloads launched on foreign vehicles. Finally,
although launch manifests fill up years in advance, the ability to negotiate schedule changes or
possibly changing dates with another payload allow some schedule flexibility.
7.5.2 Historical Perspectives
Following the extremely successful Apollo program, NASA embarked on a quest to develop an
aircraft-like launch system offering complete reusablility, low operations costs, high reliability,
and quick launch schedules. Belief in the prospects of the new system were so high that space
transportation policy was set to eventually transition all US payloads, both government and
commercial, to the US Space Transportation System (STS), or the Space Shuttle Fleet. As the
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shuttle was set to enter service 1981, the three primary US expendable launch vehicle systems
prepared to close down operations. Figure 7-4 shows the significant decline between 1975 and
1985 from 26 launches per year to 7. During the same period, the space shuttle came online and
began to ramp up its flight rate from 2 in 1981 to 9 in 1985 (Figure 7-5).
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A strategy requiring all spacecraft to fly on a single launch system is inherently risky. The loss
of space shuttle Challenger in January 1986 is ample proof of the significant flaws in this policy.
In the wake of the Challenger accident, non-government payloads were restricted from using the
shuttle. With the shuttle program offline for over 32 months, both government and commercial
payloads were forced to look for alternative routes into space. Foreign launch vehicles such as
the Ariane gained market share while the US commercial expendables took several years to
regain normal operations. When the shuttle came back online, the majority of flights served the
science community as the military decided to adopt a policy of maintaining a wider selection of
expendable vehicles.
7.5.3 Current Scenario
Currently, all US military missions are restricted to using US domestically owned, produced, and
operated expendable launch vehicles. The rationale for this policy (consistent with goals 1 and 5
in Section 7.2) involves maintaining complete control over military assets and operations,
supporting assured strategic launch capabilities, and denying foreign access to advanced military
technologies to both allies and rivals in order to sustain US military superiority and protect
national security. Military programs traditionally provide what industry labels Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE). Government Furnished Equipment refers to situations where the
military program office responsible for running a particular mission will approach a spacecraft
developer with a launch vehicle already procured or on contract. Potential to trade vehicles is
low even if less expensive opportunities arise. Recent examples of this include advanced
procurement of a precise number of launches on each of the Boeing Delta IV and the Lockheed
Martin Atlas V Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV). Well in advance of design
requirements, specific missions were committed to either of the vehicles. In one mission
requiring three launches, designers were forced to design for both vehicles with two satellites
manifested on one vehicle and one on the other. This adds costs in that they must design the
spacecraft to accommodate the constraints of both vehicles which are unique enough to affect
program costs an schedule.
Non-military government missions flown by NASA, NOAA, and other civil organizations are
also usually restricted to using US vehicles. These missions typically have slightly more
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flexibility to select among available US options although GFE issues also occur. For
international scientific collaboration funded by multiple countries, mission planners have more
flexibility to select foreign launchers. Several joint NASA-ESA Mars missions have looked into
options of using US vehicles or flying piggyback on the large ESA Ariane vehicle. Hardware,
supplies, and personnel launches aboard both the US shuttle and the Russian Soyuz rocket for the
International Space Station exemplifies the selection flexibility offered to science missions.
In the commercial world, companies have much more freedom in selecting either US or foreign
vehicles, although as outlined in the previous section, there can be limits on the number of
vehicles that may be used from a particular foreign country. Flexibility in commercial selections
follows a wide range of scenarios. Selection can be completely flexible in the case of turn-key
solution requests. In this situation the customer waives any selection authority and simply asks
for a capability and the spacecraft developer arranges everything from launch through
operations. Other times commercial ventures may stipulate that they would like to purchase
vehicle 'X' because they have used it in the past and were comfortable with its performance. Or
a company may specify a particular vehicle that they refuse to use as Globalstar did for the Zenit
2 vehicle after losing 12 spacecraft on a single launch (discussed in Section 5.4.2). Finally, there
are situations where a company is part of an international consortium and as part of a business
agreement or contract, they have specified that so many spacecraft would be launched on a
vehicle from each country. This is typical of large communications constellations that also hope
to capture customers in various countries. A US built spacecraft for an international
communications company that wants to place a ground station and offer service in China might
decide to launch several elements of its constellation on a Long March vehicle as part of
negotiations for market access and to improve local publicity. Commercial launch companies
also sometimes start joint ventures with spacecraft firms where the launch service provider
invests in the spacecraft system provided it is launched on one of its rockets. Finally, in some
cases the spacecraft developer, the launch vehicle, and the end operator are all owned by a single
entity and the company's vehicle selection is dictated by a policy to use its own assets.
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7.5.4 Impact of Selection Policy on Spacecraft Design
Prior to selection of a vehicle, the ability to make design trades is high. At this point, the
spacecraft system has an incredible degree of flexibility. For an individual spacecraft, the system
can grow, shrink, or change in a myriad of ways to meet initial or altered mission requirements.
For a constellation of spacecraft, architectural decisions can change from deploying 10 small
spacecraft equally distributing mission functionality to single mothership approach with one
large spacecraft coordinating functionality across 2 or 3 daughter satellites. The ability to make
trades at the system level opens up a range of possibilities that might enable meeting mission
requirements for lower costs, shorter schedules, or with improved system characteristics. Figure
7-6 demonstrates how a space system architecture might change from design iteration A through
D as different launch attributes are weighed and considered and traded across system boundaries.
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FIGURE 7-6 LAUNCH VEHICLE SELECTION PROCESS
Once the vehicle is selected (design E), the vehicle constraints become fixed and it is not
possible to make trades between launch and the spacecraft. Thus, changes to the spacecraft,
moving from E to E* represents sub-system changes within launch constraint limits (some slight
changes can be made such as damping loads with special adapters, etc but not without penalties).
Design trades and optimization can only occur between the spacecraft bus elements and the
payload. As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, with semi-generic spacecraft buses, the payload is
usually affected most reducing performance capabilities. The interaction changes from a
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dynamic system with feedback loops between the spacecraft and the launch vehicle to a one-way
flow of launch constraints imposed on the spacecraft system design, represented in Figure.7-7.
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FIGURE 7-7 LAUNCH - SPACECRAFT INFLUENCE CHANGES FOLLOWING SELECTION
In the early space shuttle era circa 1985, the selection line in Figure 7-6 was located at the
extreme left for all commercial, civil, and military missions. Following the Challenger accident,
the military relaxed to some extent moving the line slightly to the right. However, most military
programs are still far to the left, dictating which vehicles will be used among a limited set of
choices. Figure 7-8 shows a comparison of today's military, civil, and commercial vehicle
selection policy compared to that under the shuttle program.
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FIGURE 7-8 SELECTION FLEXIBILITY SCALE
The selection of the launch vehicle has some unique impacts on spacecraft system design. In the
case of a military or science mission that is told what vehicle will be procured for the program,
the selection defines the physical constraints imposed by the vehicle. At this point, the designers
face the following situation: "we have x kilograms to use, how shall we budget between
subsystems?" This approach to spacecraft design, although very common, is quite backward.
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The user needs and utility profile should lead to a process where spacecraft architecture, launch
strategies, and on-orbit operations are traded to maximize customer utility/value for an agreed
upon cost and schedule. However, forced into a launch system does not allow the designer to
perform these trades.
Altering a selection decision far into a program can also have significant design impacts.
Choosing to switch launch vehicles because of a recent launch failure or political pressures (such
as forced trade sanctions reflecting political conflicts) can have enormous design consequences,
especially since most spacecraft are optimized for a single vehicle. Changing vehicles obviously
involves potential mass, volume, and loads parameters differences. However, even if another
vehicle is found that meets these requirements, other factors such the need to change the
spacecraft center of mass to balance one the new vehicle or structural changes related to where
the spacecraft fits in the fairing can also must be addressed. One recent example is the NASA
LAPSE program which was required from day one to be designed for use on an Orbital Sciences'
Pegasus vehicle. As the loads impact discussion in Chapter 3 laid out, the unique horizontal
integration and horizontal launch regime for the Pegasus vehicle leads to very specific design
choices. Moving the LAPSE mission to another vehicle, one that is processed and launched
vertically, leads to a significant design changes to parts the spacecraft structural system.
In the commercial communications world, use of a generic spacecraft buses continues to gain
acceptance. Most firms develop a set of two to four spacecraft buses that are designed to each
capture a distinct parts of the market. Customers approach the designer with a required capability
and through a series of discussions, the two sides determine which pre-designed bus will fit the
mission. This may mean the customer accepts slightly less capability to use a smaller bus or
slightly more capability for a larger bus. This move to a more modular approach can reduce
design and manufacturing costs while fixing a large portion of the spacecraft design upfront. As
mentioned in Chapter 3, using a fixed, pre-designed bus does transfers the burden of weight and
volume reductions to the payload in the event that the spacecraft overshoots design limits. Thus,
the risks of losing spacecraft capability must be weighed against the lower cost of generic buses.
Generic buses are not as widely for military and science missions due to unique mission
requirements.
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However, the most important aspect of generic commercial buses related to launch is that they
are designed to be compliant with a range of vehicles. New buses are designed to fit a range of
vehicle envelopes, weight classes, and loads environments. As newer launch vehicles move
closer to common standards, this will continue to benefit generic bus systems. For example, the
oldest active Boeing spacecraft bus, the 376, is configured to fit on a Delta II or as a dual
manifest on the Ariane IV and the newer Boeing 601 fits on an Atlas II, Delta III, or a dual
manifest Ariane V. The newest Boeing spacecraft, 702, was designed to fit on a Delta III, a Delta
IV, an Atlas III, and an Atlas V. Thus, in the commercial world, spacecraft owners can actually
purchase the launch vehicle much later in the program (although they must be concerned with
getting on the launch manifest). In a commercial market environment, this flexibility is
extremely important to manage dynamic market changes.
7.5.5 Summary Vehicle Selection Impacts
The policy used to select the launch vehicle as well as the actual selection has significant affects
on spacecraft system design and development. Selection policies set to maintain launch
capabilities or to lower program costs many times have unintended or unforeseen consequences.
In contrast, the ramifications of some policies, such as forcing all spacecraft onto a single
vehicle, have clear impacts but were ignored for lack of sound judgment. The primary space
system impacts of launch selection and selection policy:
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7.6 Government Future Space Transportation Policy
7.6.1 Overview of R&D Policy
The current set of launch constraints owe their existence to past research and development
policy. Vehicles currently online today trace their history back to both commercial and
government decisions at least 10 years ago, some much more. Market conditions and future
forecasts drove policy decisions determining what modifications to make to existing vehicles,
what functionality would be necessary for future vehicles, and what new technology would be
necessary to invest in. Timelines and budgets are then coordinated to attain the determined
goals. In this manner, R&D and strategic planning policy have a significant impact on technical
and operational launch vehicle characteristics and thus, constraints. Looking forward, current
R&D policy decisions will ultimately have a significant impact on future spacecraft systems.
In order to understand how future launch vehicle constraints will impact spacecraft system
design and development, it is necessary to fathom the direction that launch vehicles themselves
are taking and utilize this understanding to look ahead at the possible ramifications for future
spacecraft systems. The following discussion assesses the US government's space transportation
research and development policy examining previous federal programs to stimulate advanced
vehicle development, the current policy, and its potential impact on future spacecraft systems.
7.6.2 Historical Perspectives
Space transportation policy in the US can be broken down into three clear periods of policy
direction. From the beginning of the space era in 1957 through the end of Apollo, space
transportation policy followed as an extension of military ballistic missile programs. From 1972
through 1986, the prevailing policy focused on developing a single vehicle to meet all space
access needs through the US Space Transportation System (STS) or the space shuttle. Work on
expendables gradually declined as it was believed that reusable launch vehicles were the future.
Following the Challenger accident in 1986, this policy was replaced with a diversification
strategy focused on bringing expendable vehicles back online for commercial and military
programs and reserving the reusable shuttle for science missions. This final period, lasting up
through 2001, could be labeled the "period of policy confusion" with space transportation policy
lacking consistency. Over the last 15 years, policy changes have led to a continual migration
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from program to program in an attempt to offer a range of options but also seeking the elusive
"holy grail" of space access: the low cost, high reliability, fully reusable Single Stage to Orbit
(SSTO) vehicle. NASA's Space Launch Initiative launched in early 2001 represents the newest
chapter in the "policy confusion" period.
7.6.2.1 US Space Policy Historical Perspectives: 1960 to 1972
The first launch vehicle programs grew out of the shadow of the military's ballistic missile
programs from the 1940's and 1950's. Te first set of vehicles used in the late 1950's and early
1960's were actually converted Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's). The first real
rocket development occurred during the build-up for the Apollo program which resulted in the
mammoth Saturn series of vehicle which eventually delivered the Apollo astronauts to the Moon.
7.6.2.2 US Space Policy Historical Perspectives: 1972 to 1986
Towards the end of the highly successful Apollo program, NASA began to structure a new set of
goals aimed at the continued human exploration of space. Eager to maintain a consistent budget,
NASA realized that a new large-scale program was necessary to fill the gap when the Apollo
program came to a close. The prevailing opinion supported the development of a space station in
low earth orbit to enable long duration stays in space and to pave the way for future space
colonization of the Moon and eventually Mars and beyond. In order to accomplish these goals,
the first logical step was the development of a robust and cost-effective means for reaching orbit
for personnel and extremely large amounts of cargo. Thus, the idea of a space taxi was
conceived and the Space Transportation System (STS) or the space shuttle program was born.
Requirements for the space shuttle were derived from its potential missions to the space station.
Additionally, NASA envisioned a vehicle so advanced that it would be able to handle military as
well as commercial needs for space access.
Amid budgetary pressures and requirements arguments, the space shuttle morphed from a
completely reusable system to a partially reusable system. When the initial $5 billion budget
proved to be too low, the US Congress held firm forcing NASA to live within its specified
funding profile. As a result, NASA backed away from a completely reusable vehicle and re-
designed the program around a reusable orbiter supported by an external fuel tank and two solid
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rockets. Without previous experience in reusable system design, the forecasts for performance
and cost were based on numerous questionable assumptions. Additionally, in trying to meet the
wide range of military, civil, and commercial missions, the vehicle suffered from divergent
requirements. NASA's desire for a man-rated vehicle required substantial amounts of
certification and safety checks in direct conflict with the military and commercial's need for
inexpensive and quick access to space. Without having built a vehicle for operation in the past,
NASA managers placed the majority of emphasis on the technical performance believing that the
operations specifications would not pose a significant challenge compared to the performance
parameters. These assumptions proved to be vastly incorrect. Table 7-3 shows the expected and
actual performance and operational goals of the STS program. All performance requirements
were met within 10 percent of specifications, while all operational parameters were off by more
than an order of magnitude.
TABLE 7-3 COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED TO ACTUAL STS CHARACTERISTICS
Expected Actual
Performance Goals
* Payload 65,000 lbs 60,000 lbs
e Cross Range 1100-1500 mi 1265 mi
e SSME Isp 455 sec 455 sec
* SSME Thrust 470,000 lbs (Vacuum) 470,000 lbs (Vacuum)
Operational Goals
e Turn-around Time 10 days 80-100 Days
e Launch Rate 60 per year 6-8 year
e Cost/Flight ( 1970 $'s) $10.5 million $160- 180 mil
*Adapted from internal study by The Aerospace Corporation, 1995.
These numbers started to become clear in the mid 1980's as NASA realized how difficult it
would be for the shuttle to ever reach its specified operational characteristics. The loss of the
Challenger made this hope impossible as NASA began to focus much more keenly on shuttle
safety. Following the Challenger failure, NASA, the military, and the commercial sector quickly
realized the mistake of relying on a single vehicle and set a new policy for the future. Clearly
performance is important. However, the impact of other system constraints must not be
completely sacrificed for performance. The end result was that even though the shuttle was a
technological marvel, it was not able to complete its mission and achieve its key cost and
schedule goals.
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7.6.2.3 US Space Policy Historical Perspectives: 1986 to Present
Following the Space Shuttle accident, the US entered an extended period of space transportation
policy confusion that was characterized by the formulation and destruction of program after
program without clear objectives and a constant changing of responsibilities. Not wanting to
revisit the time when the US had only one option for space access, many of the old expendable
launch systems were brought back online to handle both the commercial and military space
access needs. The shuttle system was restricted from flying commercial missions, flew very few
military ones, and became the workhorse for scientific missions and eventually space station
construction. Ironically, it has ended up finally fulfilling one of its intended tasks, only 20 years
after commencement.
With the old expendables up and running to support the commercial and military markets, the
government once again turned to the quest for the elusive aircraft-like launch system. The most
ambitious of these was the National Aerospace Plane (NASP). Originally a classified Air Force
vehicle under the designation X-30, the NASP program grew out of an Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) project called Copper Canyon running from 1982 to 1985. Under the
Reagan administration, the program was publicized as a commercial civilian program to succeed
the shuttle and gained fame as "an Orient Express that could take off from Dulles Airport and
accelerate up to twenty-five times the speed of sound, attaining low earth orbit or flying to
Tokyo within two hours." 401 Initial plans called for a $3.1 billion program becoming operational
in 1993.
The NASP program focused on the marriage of aircraft and rocket technologies to create a
vehicle that could take-off and land like and airplane, yet also exit the atmosphere and operate in
space for extended periods of time. The ambitious program hinged on the development of a
highly advanced propulsion system combining a hypersonic airbreathing engine for atmospheric
flight with a more traditional rocket engine for orbital insertion. The technical difficulties of
developing the NASP vehicle, from the high temperature materials to the mach 10 plus
ramjet/scramjet engine, proved to be insurmountable as the program crumbled beneath its own
budget and technology weight. The program was finally cancelled in late 1993 after more than a
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decade of work when final cost projections topped $17 billion and the first flight date was
pushed back to 2001.
Around the same time frame as NASP, two new expendable launch vehicles programs also were
established called the American Launch System (ALS) and the National Launch System (NLS).
The ALS was initiated by the Air Force in an attempt to develop a highly reliable, high flight
rate, heavy-lift launch (50,000 to 100,000 kilogram range) vehicle able to reduce costs by a
factor of 10. This lift capability was justified for "launching elements of a ballistic missile
defense system and to alleviate payload design weight constraints.r41 Additionally, ALS was
viewed as a potential "space truck" for heavy commercial satellites and sending bulk supplies to
a space station. The program started in 1987 with seven contractors receiving small multi-million
dollar awards ($5 million) to draft conceptual designs to meet the Air Forces mission
requirements with operational capabilities expected by 1998. A changing climate toward the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the decision to use US commercial vehicles for the majority
of the military's launch needs, and a $15 billion price tag killed the program in early 1990.
The NLS began in 1991 with the recommendation from the president's National Space Council
for "a joint DOD/NASA program to develop and procure a family of launch vehicles and
supporting infrastructure to meet civil, commercial, and national security needs by providing
NASA and the DOD with a capability to deliver a wide range of payloads to low-Earth orbit at a
low cost and with improved reliability." [411 Military leaders were adamant about relying on a
single system and questioned the "combat readiness, sustainability, and force structure" of the
US's current fleet of vehicles. Key program objectives included developing a family of launch
vehicles based on common building blocks/modules that could be combined into different
vehicles without changing subsystems or redoing major qualification tests, making critical
subsystems such as the propulsion system multi-use and recoverable, and achieving high
reliability (98 percent plus), high launch-on-schedule rate (95 percent plus), high vehicle
availability (90 percent plus), 30 day or less launch response time, a surge capability that will
accommodate seven payloads within a five-day period, and significantly reducing operating
costs. [421 With an estimated cost of $10.5 billion, the program was never able to get off the
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ground as decision makers in congress shied away from the high development cost of a new
system in favor of maintaining the status quo.
Following the NASP, ALS, and NLS programs, the National Space Transportation Policy was
drafted in 1994 taking a slightly different approach by pushing more development work towards
the commercial sector and separating responsibilities for expendables and reusables between the
military and NASA, respectively. The military was charged with assisting commercial
companies in developing the next generation of expendable vehicles that could be used for
military and commercial purposes and offered slightly lower costs (25 percent improvement) and
higher reliabilities (97 percent plus). The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program
arose in 1995 with the goal of an operational vehicle by 2001. The fear of having only a single
new vehicle forced the decision to support two programs, awarding 75 percent of future military
launches to Boeing Delta IV and the remaining 25 percent of launches to Lockheed Martin's
Atlas V program. The EELV program shared much in common with the NLS. The notion of
developing a vehicle family for varying weight classes, using common modules among these
vehicles, and pushing schedule and operational performance characteristics pulled almost
directly from the NLS design philosophy.
NASA was tasked with developing an advanced reusable vehicle to replace the aging shuttle and
once again pursue aircraft-like operations. With three main contractors vying for the $1 billion
program award, NASA choose to pursue the most radical design and focused on making the leap
to single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO). Lockheed Martin won the X-33 competition with its sub-scale
prototype SSTO liftingbody design utilizing a revolutionary aerospike engine which unlike
traditional bell nozzles for rockets uses atmospheric pressure to contain exhaust plume and is
able to optimize the exit nozzle area for various flight regimes. Program goals called for order of
magnitude reductions in costs and schedule, two orders of magnitude improvement in reliability,
and first flight by the end of the 1990's. Based on a successful test program, Lockheed proposed
the commercial development of a full-scale vehicle called the Venturestar. Plagued with
schedule overruns and technical problems, mostly with avant-garde all composite fuel tank, the
program ran out of funds in early 2001 and was not extended additional financing.
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In addition to the X-33, NASA also initiated several other smaller RLV programs to demonstrate
key reusable system technologies such as automated guidance and navigation, high temperature
materials, rapid ground processing techniques, and integrated vehicle health monitoring systems.
Orbital Sciences won the X-34 contract for a set of three key technology demonstrator flight test
vehicles and the development of a crew escape vehicle (X-38) to replace the Russian Soyuz
capsules as the lifeboat for the International Space Station. Remnants of the NASP high-speed
airbreathing propulsion systems development were transitioned to the X-43 Hyper X program
run by the NASA Langley Research Center to demonstrate key hypersonic flight technologies.
along with another test vehicle program (X-40) run by Boeing and the Air Force to validate re-
entry technologies.
7.6.3 Current Scenario: Space Launch Initiative
In June of 2000, NASA announced the formation of new program, the Space Launch Initiative
(SLI). Few details were initially released including the program budget of $4.5 billion spread
over five years and the program objectives: lowering costs, improving reliability, and reducing
schedules. The Space Launch Initiative was initially sold to Congress as a cornerstone program
to develop a safe, reliable, and inexpensive space transportation system for the benefit of civil,
commercial, and military space organizations. Each of these entities perform extremely
important missions, yet their missions are very unique. While they all share common primary
goals such as reliable and inexpensive space access, their secondary goals diverge considerably.
Managing this divergence, the failure of previous programs, is the key to SLI success. Space
transportation is a complex undertaking and trying to develop a vehicle that can be all things to
all people only leads to greater complexity, greater cost, and a reduced probability of meeting
key objectives.
Initial reactions concluded that SLI actually would end up as a shuttle upgrade program and a
bail-out plan for the current cost overrun family of X-vehicles. Official cancellation of the X-33,
X-34, and X-38 programs in February 2001 along with statements assuring these programs
would not receive SLI funding quelled these rumors. but also raised a more important question:
How can SLI succeed where the seven previous programs failed?
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7.6.4 Impacts of Space Transportation Policy on Spacecraft Design
A complete analysis of the Space Launch Initiative is not possible at this point because key
features beyond budget and timeframe have not yet been released. However, based on its initial
mission statement, it is possible to explore how different paths and outcomes of SLI will impact
spacecraft development. For the Space Launch Initiative to succeed it must fight several very
severe problems in the launch industry. The method used to attack these problems and the
success in solving them will ultimately determine the launch constraints that future spacecraft
must design within.
Several of the most difficult problems involve tackling the launch constraints that have been
discussed in-depth in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Issues such as foreign competition (dumping from
non-economic-based companies), extremely high development costs, high-profile spacecraft
market failures, and very uncertain markets for space systems pose significant obstacles. Perhaps
the most crucial challenge is technology. The NASP and X-33 programs clearly demonstrated
that the technical capability to build an inexpensive SSTO vehicle is neither currently available
nor achievable for less than $10 billion, if not more. Initial policy statements from the SLI
program have pointed to NASA's desire to take a step back from SSTO and first accomplish
inexpensive and reliable Two Stage To Orbit (TSTO) vehicles. While these issues are obvious
and have been understood for the last two decades, there are several other less tangible issues
that must be addressed.
The most substantial impact that SLI can have on future spacecraft development is the future
launch environment that it creates. One possible future is a government-dominated launch
market. Prior to the 1990's, the majority of activity in space was government-based.
Commercial companies did produce hardware, however, they rarely were in the position of buyer
or owner. This situation has changed dramatically in the last ten years where in 1997,
commercial expenditures on space exceeded government spending for the first time. Space has
evolved from the government-focused, two member Cold War contest into a multi-country,
multi-organization market. SLI must address this change in market composition and address the
question of the appropriate role for government space transportation. If SLI results in a
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government- dominated launch market, this will let government launch criteria drive future
vehicle capabilities and limit vehicle choices for spacecraft developers and will.
With NASA in charge of SLI, it is more likely that the program will be run in favor of meeting
NASA-specific objectives and requirements. NASA's current objectives focus on improved
human spaceflight with unique requirements that call for "the ability to return payloads from
low-Earth orbit, support and servicing of complex space platforms, rendezvous and dock with
the space station, conduct an emergency crew rescue mission within two days of an incident,
support 5-7 crew members in orbit for seven days with EVA capability, and support 3-7 crew
members for 5-15 days to conduct station-like research." E43] While both the military and the
commercial world would not object to having such capabilities, they would clearly rather spend
time and money on achieving significant improvements in cost, reliability, and schedule
dependability than on these type of capabilities. Commercial and military missions require a
commercially competitive, low-cost, reliable launcher for unmanned spacecraft. Human-rating a
launch vehicle requires an extensive certification safety process that will overwhelm cost savings
even if best practices and lessons learned shuttle are implemented. By focusing SLI's risk
reduction on meeting NASA post-shuttle human spaceflight objectives the program will be
pulled in opposing directions.E431 The danger of this is a move to incremental changes. A vehicle
that can safely fly humans will only be able to achieve incremental improvements in costs and
reliability. Thus, in additional to providing crew capabilities, launch would move from $10,000
per kilogram costs, 80 days schedules, and 98 percent reliability to $1,000 per kilogram, 10 days
schedules, and 99.9 percent reliability. But one order of magnitude improvements may not be
enough to spark changes in commercial spacecraft markets or address key military objectives.
Another pressing concern is the incumbent issue. The power of large incumbents in the launch
market limit the entrance of new vehicles offering better capabilities and more selection options
for spacecraft developers. The military has gone to great lengths to maintain a launch capability
for national security reasons. In maintaining this capability, they have also helped to reinforce
the market position of two commercial launch companies. Faced with stable market shares and
long-term military contracts, there is little incentive to pursue revolutionary, expensive R&D
programs to capture a small and uncertain additional market share. Content with the status quo
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and concerned with next quarters financial performance, the risk reward scenario does not justify
pending billions of dollars on a new vehicle (does not make economic sense). Many start-up
space transportation firms have openly accused the government of suppressing commercial
vehicle development through funding large government programs that will unfairly complete in
the commercial market. With the government involved in developing vehicles, these firms have
found it difficult to raise financing in the capital markets. The inability of these firms to compete
and survive ultimately limits the selection available to spacecraft developers.
A second incumbent issue involves the shuttle. Once the shuttle has finished its space station
construction duties, besides crew and station cargo transport, it will no longer have a clear
secondary mission to justify its high operational costs. With NASA claming it can fly the shuttle
until 2030, the issue of competition with commercial vehicles will eventually arise. One of the
main problems going forward is the shuttle flight rate issue. With shuttle operations consuming
$3 billion a year irregardless of flight rate, pressure to fill the shuttle manifest will mount.
Should the shuttle stay operational past 2010, the possibility that it could steal missions for the
other commercial vehicles thereby limiting their ability to compete and ultimately affecting the
spacecraft market.
Another issue plaguing new vehicle development and restraining significantly improved launch
capabilities available to spacecraft is the high degree of risk aversion now prevalent in the
aerospace industry. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the high cost of failure also impacts the
launch development business. With billions of dollars required to develop technology, start
production, and operation many firms are simply not willing to take the risk. The risk aversion
on the commercial side is understandable. However, the risk aversion on the government's side
detrimental to new technology development and the ability to achieve multiple orders of
magnitude improvement in launch capabilities. With high profile failures such as the billion
dollar Mars Observer in 1992 and the Mars Climate Surveyor in 1999, NASA has lost sight of
the risk reward equation. Some of the greatest strides made in space transportation back in the
1960's came amid numerous rocket failures. The Orbital Sciences led X-34 program mentioned
in section 7.6.2 to demonstrate new RLV operational technologies is a perfect example of the
current risk aversion in NASA. Understanding program risk, Orbital Sciences developed three
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separate vehicles for the event that one or even two were lost. However, following the Mars
mission loses, NASA headquarters decided it could not afford another widely publicized failure.
Thus, 80 percent of the way into the program, NASA decided to change the requirements for the
vehicles and demanded extra safety and reliability additions. The result was an obvious cost and
schedule overrun for the program. NASA then canceled the program for the same cost and
schedule overruns that it created. Success or failure of one or more of the vehicles would have
most likely yielded significant technical return and lessons learned.
In order for the new US space transportation policy to be effective, it needs to address not only
the technical issues, but also the policy issues discussed above. In addressing its key challenges:
e Extremely high development costs
* Uncertain markets
e Immature technology
e Foreign competition (dumping from non-economic-based companies),
* Uncertain government role, inconsistent policy, agency leader
* Capital fundraising raising problems
e Incumbent issues: lack of revolutionary change incentives
e Risk aversion: magnified fear of failure
e Shuttle competition for payloads and resources
The Space Launch Initiative cannot loose sight of the reason behind developing new launch
systems, to provide better capabilities for unmanned and manned spacecraft systems. The path
and success of this program will ultimately define the new launch constraints that spacecraft
designers in the future must manage.
7.6.5 Summary of Space Transportation Policy Impacts
Future launch vehicle improvement strategies are responsible for determining the future physical,
operational, and cost constraints. New vehicle development which does not address the change
in market composition from a government-dominated space environment to one where
government and commercial coexist favors government requirements and limits new vehicle
entrants/selection options. Figure 7-10 outlines the impacts of new space transportation R&D
policy on the future of spacecraft development.
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FIGURE 7-10 R&D IMPACTS ON SPACECRAFT DESIGN
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CHAPTER 8 IMPLICATIONS OF RELAXED CONSTRAINTS
8.1 Overview of Implications
The notion of a "paradigm shift" was first introduced by Thomas Kuhn in his famous work titled
"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions." Kuhn's work demonstrated how the majority of
significant scientific breakthroughs occurred when scientists and engineers ignored history and
traditional manners of thinking and approached an existing problem from a new vantage point or
frame-of-reference. Today, the word paradigm is synonymous with other frame-of-reference
terms such as model, theory, perception, and assumption. One of the best examples of adopting a
unique paradigm was the highly regarded Lockheed Skunk Works. From the 1940's through the
1970's, the Skunk Works produced astonishing technological breakthroughs in aircraft
development in record time by approaching each project with the philosophy that traditional
rules should be forgotten.
The introduction of a significantly improved launch vehicle represents a disruptive technology
that has the potential to instigate a paradigm shift in the development and deployment of space
systems unlike any innovation since the early 1960's. The reason behind this shift will not only
be technical, but also philosophical. The importance of lower costs launchers is secondary to
what improved space access enables. Space systems are expensive because spacecraft are
expensive, launchers are expensive, operations are expensive, and technology development is
expensive. Reducing the cost one aspect, while important, will not solve the deeper problem. As
this research has demonstrated, there is a significant link between the launcher and the
spacecraft. Launch vehicles have significant design and development impacts on space systems.
Thus, changes in one element have profound impacts on the other that when reinforced create a
positive feedback loop which counters the vicious cycle explained in Chapter 1.
This chapter explores the implications of relaxing launch vehicle constraints on spacecraft
system architecture and subsystem design. A range of architecture options that are currently
constrained by launch constraints are identified and a simple mathematical model exploring the
potential impact of reduced launch constraints on one of the outlined architecture options is
presented.
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8.2 Historical Perspectives for Change
Throughout the first four decades of space travel, venturing into orbit was viewed as only the
realm of large governments and big projects. The exorbitant costs associated with R&D and
transportation limited space to organizations with deep pockets. Even as commercial companies
began to alter their view of space from the role of supporter, simply developing hardware sell to
the government, to the role of operator and profiteer, the notion that space was still a government
endeavor was very entrenched. Over the last five years, this viewpoint has started to change as
companies like Iridium, Globalstar, and DirectTV began testing the waters of completely
commercial ventures and taking there business case direct to consumers. While many of these
ventures failed or have struggled to compete with terrestrial alternatives, the arrival of
significantly improved launch systems will not only enable better and cheaper access to space,
but will also allow spacecraft developers to alter their approach to the design and development of
spacecraft systems. Pushing for larger, 15 year plus lifetime, single spacecraft may yield to
small, serviceable spacecraft that function in distributed teams and can quickly be configured to
meet changing market conditions.
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Until recently, there have been few challenges and changes to methodology behind space
systems development. The dominant design philosophies for both spacecraft and launch vehicles
established circa 1960 have remained intact with minor, incremental alterations. Launch
vehicles are still based on ballistic missile technology and the basic design of spacecraft,
although much larger and heavier, strongly resemble the first artificial satellites launch by the US
and the USSR in the late 1950's.
8.3 Changes Under Relaxed Constraints
In combination with other forces at work in the spacecraft community including the growth of
commercial markets, the miniaturization of components (nanotechnology), and adoption of lean
production principles, improved launch capabilities will be a key enabler to implement radical
spacecraft design philosophies which up until this point did not make economic sense. Thus,
improved launch will be part of a set of disruptive technologies that forever change the frame of
reference for how we design and develop space systems. Up to this point, emphasis has been
placed on elucidating the current set of launch constraints and their impact on space systems.
With this background, it is possible to look ahead instead of behind and start to consider what
changes to these constraints mean for space systems.
Table 8-1 outlines several potential spacecraft system architectures presenting the benefits
associated with these architectures and the launch constraints that currently either restrict or
obstruct their use. The list is not meant to be exhaustive. For example,
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TABLE 8-1 ARCHITECTURE OPTIONS
Architecture Description/ Benefits Launch Constraint Barriers
Option
Modular Spacecraft Standardized pre-designed subsystems & - Volume limitations
"LegoSat" components - Costs
- Reduced development time - Interfaces: standardized connections
- Leverage testing: only qualify once, pre- - Mass: Cannot weight minimize
test all possible configurations
- Reduced parts & design costs: larger lot
sizes, scale economics
- Multiple configurations
Serviceable Replacement of on-board consumables - Cost
Spacecraft - In-orbit maintenance to repair or replace - Vehicle performance: rendezvous &
"RenewSat" failed components autonomous robotic ops
- Replenish fuel or other consumables - Vehicle schedules: LOD & service
- Servicing to upgrade capabilities at irregular times
- Availability: going offline strands
spacecraft
Reusable Spacecraft Carry out mission, return from space, re- - Cost
"SalvageSat" configure & re-launch - Vehicle performance: rendezvous,
- Save design time capture, & re-entry
- Save design cost: reuse expensive - Reentry loads & thermal environment
hardware - Government regulation
- Perform same or different mission - Mass
- Volume
Recurrent Reduced desig lifetimes & faster. -Costs
Replenishment replenishment scenarios -Mass
Spacecraft - More capability on-orbit sooner me
"SwapSat"- - Vehle schedules: LO bil
Satellite-Level High system reliability through numerous - Costs
Redundancy Systems on-orbit spares to replace failed s/c - Volume: multiple-manifesting
"SparesSat" - Cost savings through high production - Vehicle schedules many & frequent
volumes launches
- Schedule savings in design, test,
qualifying
- Ability to use extensive COTS, single
string designs
Short Life/Short Launch with little notice, perform - Costs
Notice Space Systems intended mission, & then disposed - Vehicle schedules: LOD & ability to
"SuccinctSat" - Quick initial capabilities service at set & irregular times
- Quick augmentation
Heavier-than- Use additional mass to lower component - Mass: cannot mass minimize/optimize
Required Spacecraft costs not increase capability - Volume
"FatSat" - Lower costs, non-optimized, previously - Cost
developed components, COTS
- Reduced testing, previously space
qualified
- Reduced development time
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8.4 Recurrent Replenishment Spacecraft: Case Study of SwapSat
"The worst thing you can do is have to leave offpropellant, this kills lifetime"
Industry Spacecraft Developer Quote, January 2001
This is the current industry philosophy. The first satellites launched in the late 1950's had
lifetimes measured in days. Explorer I, lofted on January 31, 1958, had a maximum useful life of
105 days. As satellite technology and design improved, the push for longer and longer operating
lifetimes has grown tremendously to the point that today's geosynchronous spacecraft are
expected to last at least 15 years. The initial GOES-1 spacecraft, launched in 1977, was just
recently retired after 24 years of service. Previous sections outlined the wide range of possible
impacts that improved launch capability might have on the design and development of future
space systems. Trying to model all of these possibilities is outside the scope of this research.
However, in an attempt to provide a more definitive answer to the second primary thesis
question, a simple model was created to consider the impact of reduced launch constraints on the
statement presented above. The primary objective of the model is not to answer what will
definitely occur, but to explore what is possible.
The model is based on a simple question: Under different launch conditions, would it make sense
to not maximize spacecraft lifetime and instead trade spacecraft lifetime for greater initial
capabilities. A typical geosynchronous spacecraft program was used as a baseline case where a
trade was made between the amount of propellant on board (primary lifetime determinant) and
the number of communications transponders (primary revenue generation determinant). Under
one scenario, a spacecraft placed into orbit for 15 years generates a constant stream of revenue.
The second scenario involves designing a spacecraft with a shorter lifespan, but containing a
larger number of transponders capable of generating a larger revenue stream. However, in order
to complete the same mission, the shorter lifetime spacecraft must be replaced one or more
times, depending on design lifespan. Thus, one program exhibits low recurring cost /low
recurring revenue while the other exhibits higher recurring cost/higher recurring revenue.
1) Long lifetime spacecraft/ fewer transponders
2) Shorter lifetime spacecraft/ more transponders
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8.4.1 Rationale and Limits for Spacecraft Lifetimes
As mentioned previously, spacecraft lifetimes have been increasing for the last 40 years and
now, depending on the mission vary from 1 year to 15 years. The standard that most customers
demand for geostationary spacecraft is a 15-year minimum. It was reported that rarely do
customers demand more than 15 years but also rarely will they accept less. The desire to design
spacecraft for such long lifetimes is motivated by launch constraints such as high cost, long
schedules, and low reliability. With a high percentage of spacecraft failures occurring during the
first year of operation and then tailoring-off until the end of design lifetimes, it makes sense that
spacecraft developers would want to avoid continually going through the risky and expensive
launch process. By designing spacecraft to last for upwards of 15 years, the impact of launch
vehicle costs and schedules on the spacecraft program can be minimized.
Several factors determine the expected lifetime of a satellite. The most significant driver for
current systems is the amount of propellant supply included Spacecraft lifetime is primarily
determined by the supply of propellant. Once a spacecraft depletes its fuel source it is
impossible to control and position the satellite for performing its mission, even if all other
systems are functioning properly. Other features that can limit lifetime include failures of
critical mechanisms such as reaction wheels and degradation of power generation, power storage,
and thermal protection capabilities. The harsh space environment subjects spacecraft to extreme
temperature fluctuations, radiation, and debris impacts that wear spacecraft surfaces and
components.
8.4.2 Model Basics
The model created is based on a geostationary communication satellite completing a 30-year
mission. Two unique spacecraft systems were considered. The first is the traditional, long-life
spacecraft program. The second spacecraft is designed to perform the same mission but is
designed to be replaced on a more frequent basis with design lifetimes for each spacecraft varied
from 1 to 15 years. Table 8-2 presents the details of the two spacecraft designs.
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TABLE 8-2 SPACECRAFT MODEL BASICS
Attribute Spacecraft #1 Spacecraft #2
Lifetime 15 years 1 to 15 years
Ku Transponders 32 32 to 84
# of Replacements 2 2 to 30
Operations Costs 5 % Non-recurring 8 % Non-recurring
Per Spacecraft Cost $150 million 90 % Learning curve
The key difference between these spacecraft is that spacecraft #2 has a larger number of
transponders than spacecraft #1. Assuming that each spacecraft is limited to the same final
weight, the inclusion of these additional transponders and their supporting equipment is enabled
by reducing the amount of propellant on the spacecraft, thereby limiting lifetime.
Model Parameters
* Discount rate: 10 %
e Revenue per transponder: $900,000 per year
e Add some reduction for buying in bulk or more frequent buys
e Tradable Mass: 1,376 pounds
* Fuel Use Rate: 60 pounds of fuel per year
e Spacecraft Dry Weight: 6,424 pounds (without communications payload)
Assumptions
e Each spacecraft has the same launch mass
e Volume restrictions for adding additional transponders are waived
For each spacecraft design, the Net Present Value return was calculated. The NPV measures the
time-weighted difference between the revenues and costs according to the following equation:
nV(Cost(t),Re .ing + Cost(t)NonrecurringNPV = $
,=1 (I+r)
In this case, r is the discount rate, t is the mission lifetime, recurring costs includes operations,
and nonrecurring includes spacecraft production and launch. Figure 8-2 shows the financial
inflows and outflows for the two spacecraft programs assuming spacecraft #2 is designed with a
five-year lifetime and must be replaced every fifth year. The key aspect of this figure is that
spacecraft #1 only has substantial costs in years 1 and 16 to replace the spacecraft. In contrast,
spacecraft #2 has substantial outflows in years 1, 6, 11, 16, 21, and 26. The difference, however,
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is that the revenue for spacecraft #2 is substantially higher than for spacecraft #1 reflecting that
the addition of 40 additional revenue producing transponders. These transponders were enabled
by reducing the amount of propellant on-board.
Spacecraft #1
Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Revenue
Time
Ops Costs
Production/Launch
Spacecraft #2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 12131415 16 1718
Time
FIGuRE 8-2 NET PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS
In running the model, two parameters were varied across a defined range. The lifetime of
spacecraft #2 was varied from 1 year through 15 years and the launch costs were varied from
$50,000 per kilogram down to $10 per kilogram.
8.4.3 Model Results
The initial results of the model are shown in Figure 8-3. Each curve corresponds to a specific
launch cost on a dollar per kilogram basis ranging from $50,000 per kilogram (lowest curve) to
$10 per kilogram (highest curve). For each launch cost level, the NPV of the communications
spacecraft mission is plotted as a function of the spacecraft lifetime. For example, for the
$25,000 per kilogram curve (second lowest), the highest NPV results when the spacecraft is
designed with an eight-year intended lifetime. It was found that as the price of launch decreases,
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the optimal spacecraft design lifetime for maximizing NPV also decreases. Based on current
launch prices in the $25,000 per kilogram range to geostationary orbit, the optimal design
lifetime of eight years suggests that today's GEO spacecraft which are designed for 15 years
might be over-designed in terms of life expectancy and could yield a higher return, according to
NPV, by trading lifetime for additional transponders. As launch prices continue to fall, it makes
sense to replace spacecraft more frequently with higher initial and sustained revenues covering
additional spacecraft production and launch costs.
600
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200 -
4,
0.
0
200
400
600
FIGURE 8-3
-$50,000 /kg -25,000 -10,000 -5,000 -1,000 -100 -10
OPTIMAL SPACECRAFT DESIGN LIFE BASED ON VARIABLE LAUNCH COSTS
As the launch price comes down, it is also important to note that their relative weight of launch
costs as a portion of the total cost drops significantly. As the fraction of the total cost spent on
launch decreases, weight minimization and other costly design practices may not drive spacecraft
design decisions and additional trades between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft are enabled.
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FIGURE 8-4 LAUNCH COSTS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL COSTS
8.4.4 Benefits of Recurrent Replenishment Spacecraft: SwapSat
The are several advantages to implementing a reduced lifetime (higher replacement rate) satellite
system. The following benefits are identified:
System Obsolescence and Improvements for Back Compatibility: The necessity to
interact with older existing systems can drive design choices for current systems limiting
the capability of the new system. Longer life spacecraft mean that the technology in use
is much older than new. Moving to shorter lifetimes and more frequent replacements
means these technology/compatibility gaps will be reduced and can be planned for more
effectively. Dealing with parts obsceneness is also a major concern. With longer life
spacecraft replacement of a 15 year-old spacecraft requires almost a complete redesign
and qualification. Many the parts supplier or developer no longer exists or the expertise is
gone.
New Technology: Shorter lifetime spacecraft also encourage more rapid technology
insertion. Previously, technology on-orbit could be extremely old. Two to four years in
development plus 15 on orbit equates to 20-year old technology in operation. Compared
to the high technology computer industry, this would be the equivalent of using a PC with
a X-286 chip running at 10 MHz with less than 1 meg of storage.
Managing Dynamic Market: Shorter lifetime spacecraft allow flexibility to adapt or
alter spacecraft finctionality and capabilities to cope with dynamic and changing
marketplaces. Recent examples of failed satellite communications programs like Iridium
and Globalstar were attributed to not be able to quickly address changing market
conditions and the rapid rise of the cellular phone industry.
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Employee Benefits: More rapid replacement of spacecraft also increases
employee/designer knowledge and experience. An engineer is able to work on five to ten
spacecraft designs programs over a career versus one or two. An environment of constant
changes, new spacecraft development, and new missions also enables increased
excitement and is more alluring for younger engineers now in great demand in the
aerospace industry.
8.4.5 Barriers to Recurrent Replenishment Spacecraft
While there are some definite advantages to shorter lifetime spacecraft, enabling these benefits
requires significant changes to launch vehicle and spacecraft capabilities. The following launch
vehicle constraints represent the most significant barriers to enabling such a design architecture.
Launch Costs: Current launch costs are too high to make frequent replenishment a
feasible strategy. As shown in Figure 8-3, as the price of launch decreases and launch
consumes a smaller percentage of program costs, designing for a shorter expected
lifetime begins to become economically viable.
Vehicle Schedules: Frequent replenishment of spacecraft will require launch vehicles
that can not only launch more frequently, but also launch on shorter notice.
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CHAPTER 9 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Thesis Overview
The primary goal of the thesis was to explore the symbiotic relationship between launch systems
and space systems. A myriad of launch constraints were identified and explained which spanned
across technical, operational, budgetary, and policy themes. The impact of each constraint on
space system design and development, both by itself and coupled with other constraints, was
substantiated and supported by historical examples from military, commercial, and civil space
missions. Finally, through a set of rudimentary models and simple thought experiments, potential
changes to space system design and development in the wake of launch systems improvements
were proposed. This final chapter seeks to highlight the key findings of this work, present a
summary of conclusions, and describe potential future work to build upon this research and
further explore the launch - spacecraft interface.
9.2 Conclusions
9.2.1 Summary of Impacts
Four constraints themes were identified: physical, operational, cost, and policy. Each theme
contained several types of specific launch vehicle constraints which each had a range of impacts
on the design and development of spacecraft systems. These impacts are summarized below.
9.2.1.1 Physical Constraint Impacts
Physical constraints deal primarily with limitations based on physics and the laws of nature. The
following sections highlight the key spacecraft design and development impacts resulting from
lift capacity, fairing volume, loads and environments, and system interface constraints.
Lift Capacity: Mass boundaries induce weight minimization philosophies which, in the
iterative spacecraft design process, can lead to expensive late-design phase weight
reduction practices. Weight restrictions also influence component and materials selection,
sub-system redundancy and reliability strategies, and propellant levels that ultimately
drove spacecraft lifetime. The increased use of generic, 'untouchable' spacecraft buses
has significant influences on payload capabilities as weight reduction practices generally
affect the payload.
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Fairing Volume: Volume restrictions affect the geometry of key spacecraft sub-systems
such as the size and number of antennas and available power based on the sizing of solar
arrays and batteries. Limited volume also encourage complicated stacking designs for
multi-manifest launches and complex deployable mechanisms allowing components to be
compressed during ascent and unfurled once in orbit.
Launch Loads and Environments: Loads impact spacecraft structural designs,
requiring high margins of safety and driving structures to consume a high fraction of the
spacecraft's dry weight (15 to 25%). Excessive loads are also the primary driver for
expensive spacecraft "shake" testing environments including vibration, acoustic, and
shock analysis. The forces experienced during launch are so severe, that calibration of
spacecraft instruments and systems must be done in-orbit versus on the ground. To
compensate for these forces and environments, special damping and insulation systems
must be developed consuming already limited mass and volume resources. The spacecraft
designer must also perform complex coupled loads analyses and be keenly aware of
avoiding launch vehicle natural vibration frequencies and modes.
System Interfaces: Systems interfaces require special coordination between the
spacecraft designer and the launch firm to make sure communications are secure.
Locations of access ports determine what areas of the spacecraft will be available
following encapsulation and where integration testing connections must be located. Lack
of standards across many vehicles leads to mission unique support and connection
structures that consume valuable mass and volume. Multi-manifested launches also
require design coordination between associated spacecraft.
9.2.1.2 Operational Constraint Impacts
Operational launch constraints impact not only the design of space systems, but also the
deployment and operations of space systems. The following sections highlight the key
spacecraft design and development impacts resulting from launch vehicle schedule length and
delays, availability, and reliability constraints.
Schedule Length and Delays: Schedule delays can result in lost revenue and potential
market share to competitors, national security vulnerability for quickly replacing
damaged or destroyed spacecraft, and missing narrow launch windows for interplanetary
science missions. Lengthy contracting schedules force early vehicle selection and
procurement to reserve spots on vehicle and range manifests. This reduces the amount of
design trades that can be made between the spacecraft and launch vehicle. Finally, lack of
"launch-on-demand" capabilities leads to designs with excess capabilities to handle both
routine mission functions and sporadic, possibly unnecessary mission functions versus
designs for routine mission functions only producing vulnerability and potential
capability deficiencies.
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Vehicle Availability: Concerns over vehicle availability drive spacecraft designs to
multiple vehicle compatibility, lead to expensive re-designs following a vehicle going
"offline," and create a conservative spacecraft community where developers resist
designing for new vehicles with superior capabilities until a potential replacement vehicle
is also available.
Launch Vehicle Reliability: The potential for losing a spacecraft during transport leads
to high insurance premiums, production of back-up hardware and spares, and distributing
constellation spacecraft across several launch vehicle families (requiring compatibility
designs). Additionally, spacecraft placed into incorrect orbits must consume crucial
propellant during special trajectory corrections burns which reduce spacecraft operational
life.
9.2.1.3 Cost Constraint Impacts
The high cost of purchasing a launch vehicle is further amplified by insurance costs, range fees,
and "drive-away" costs associated with mission-unique hardware. The following section
highlights the main impacts resulting from launch vehicle cost constraints.
Vehicle Procurement Costs: Excessive costs limit the number and scope of space
missions, impede new market applications, and create a general "high cost of failure"
mentality. The high cost of failure mindset discourages technology insertion, pushes high
spacecraft reliabilities and testing, and causes developers to stretch spacecraft
functionality. High launch costs also affect replenishment strategies pushing longer
spacecraft lifetimes to avoid spend additional funds launching a replacement satellite.
The summation of these cost impacts creates a vicious cycle for the space industry where
spacecraft missions need low transportation costs in order to be viable and more
numerous, yet launch systems need more missions (higher flight rate) to reduce per flight
costs and encourage additional funding for further improvements.
9.2.1.4 Policy Constraint Impacts
Policy constraints affect spacecraft design and deployment through government space
transportation regulations, management practices and procedures, politics and international
relations, and future launch vehicle improvement strategies.
Government Regulations: Launch quotas create price floors which keep both near term
and long-term prices high, limit vehicle selection, allow foreign spacecraft firms to
increase market share at domestic spacecraft firms' expense, and curb new space
applications and demand.
Selection Policies: Forced early vehicle selection limits the ability to perform architecture
trades, limits vehicle choices, transforms flexible constraints into fixed constraints, causes
costly re-design processes, and can lead to offline availability issues.
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R&D Strategy: Future launch vehicle improvement strategies are responsible for
determining the future physical, operational, and cost constraints. New vehicle
development which does not address the change in market composition from a
government-dominated space environment to one where government and commercial
coexist favors government requirements and limits new vehicle entrants/selection options.
9.2.2 Key Findings
9.2.2.1 Architecture versus Subsystem Impacts
In general, it was found that physical constraints had a more direct impact on individual
spacecraft and subsystem design while operational and policy had more influence on the
higher level architectural design decisions. Most design impacts also resulted from the
coupling of two or more launch constraints, further complicating the ability to make
effective design trades.
9.2.2.2 High Cost of Failure Mentality
Launch vehicle constraints are a major contributor to the high cost of failure mentality
prevalent in the spacecraft community. This mindset is the result of the coupling of high
launch costs, low vehicle reliabilities, and lengthy vehicle schedules. Conservative
customers have a strong bias towards vehicles with multiple substitutes and avoid
designing spacecraft for new vehicles even if they offer superior performance or lower
costs. Fear of a vehicle going offline stops spacecraft designers from utilizing the
improved capabilities of a new vehicle until secondary options are available. This slow
acceptance of new capabilities points to a condition that industry change depends on
more than one vehicle offering improved capabilities. Enabling significant changes in the
design of spacecraft systems will require two or more improved vehicles with close to
equal capabilities.
9.2.2.3 Scalability Issues
The current structure of launch lift capabilities and costs creates a step function
characteristic that encourages weight minimization practices and impedes making launch
vehicle versus spacecraft trades. While spacecraft can easily grow or shrink by a
kilogram or 10, the launch vehicle cannot. Lift capacity follows a standard step-function
characteristic with each rung separated by hundreds if not thousands of kilograms. Unlike
spacecraft, launch vehicles do not have the ability to easily grow capacity on the scale of
less than 100 kilograms. The inability to simply choose another vehicle with a slightly
higher lift capability reinforces the necessity to go through costly weight reduction
processes to stay on the initially selected vehicle.
9.2.2.4 Unprepared for New Vehicle Capabilities
Many spacecraft technologies and processes required to effectively utilize new launch
vehicle capabilities do not exist. For example, the ability to utilize launch-on-demand
(LOD) capabilities is limited by the fact that spacecraft typically require months to
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calibrate instruments, perform diagnostics and system checks, and initialize systems for
routine operations, not to mention possible spending months in transit to the final orbital
location. Thus, taking advantage of new capabilities created by relaxing some launch
vehicle constraints (enabling LOD or on-orbit servicing) is inhibited and requires
comparable improvements to spacecraft design technologies and processes.
9.2.2.5 Constraint Priority Depends on Program and Personnel
All of the spacecraft designers interviewed agreed that launch constraints played a role in
spacecraft design. Besides cost and weight, most differed on what they believed were the
most important constraint from adapters, access panel locations, and integration software
to propellant slosh during ascent, fairing shape complaints, and separation mechanisms.
Not surprising is the fact that constraint priorities mirrored spacecraft designer
functionality and meeting unique mission requirements. Structural engineers cited loads
as the most significant constraint while electrical engineers cited communications and
adapter interfaces. Many designers also discussed a disconnect between the top attributes
for selection of the launch vehicle and the most significant design drivers. In many cases,
these were not the same constraints leading to a situation where management's views of
the importance of launch constraints differed from the design engineers.
9.2.2.6 Tier Structure of Launch Constraints
Many designers spoke of an "inequality" of launch constraints, with some holding much
more weight than others. Launch constraints can be loosely separated into three tiers
depending on their degree of influence on launch vehicle selection and level of rigidity.
First tier constraints, such as political restrictions or physical limitations such as lift
capacity or volume, have substantial design impacts and are either impossible or
extremely difficult to trade-off. Second tier constraints have significant design impacts,
usually can be traded, and are the most influential in making the final choice from the
suitable vehicles. The third tier factors do not have a large influence on the selection
decision but can be traded and do impact the spacecraft design following selection.
9.2.2.7 Minimal Inter-Enterprise Trades
Most spacecraft designers pointed to early selection of the launch vehicle (transforming
flexible constraints into fixed constraints) limited the possibility of trades between the
launch vehicle and the spacecraft, amplifying the impact of the constraints. Late stage re-
design to conform to vehicle constraints adds significant cost and leads to unnecessary
customization.
9.3 Future Work
The interface between launch vehicles and spacecraft is an extremely complex and large subject
with a wide array of additional topics that should be explored. Below is a brief list of a few
additional topics requiring research effort.
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Efficient Utilization of New Launch Capabilities: An analysis of the spacecraft
technologies and processes required to effectively utilize new launch vehicle capabilities
would be extremely useful for identifying future technology R&D investment priorities.
Non-Mass Optimized Spacecraft: A model assessing the costs and benefits of a non-
mass optimized spacecraft under reduced launch vehicle cost structure would explore the
possibility of making substantial design trades between the launch vehicle and the
spacecraft system.
Sensitivity of New Markets to Launch Costs: A more detailed market study of the price
elasticity of demand of spacecraft systems in relation to launch costs would provide firm
price targets for launch cost reduction and would enable improved analysis of the
business prospects of new launch vehicle developments.
Launch Infrastructure: A study of the impact of new launch capabilities on the nation's
launch ranges is necessary. This should focus on what ground processing technology,
equipment, and policy will be required to enable the efficient range operations. In
addition, a policy assessment of the range responsibilities should address the role of the
military and commercial firms in the range operation and ownership.
Price Scalability: Development of strategies and technologies that reduce the step
function attributes of launch prices should be pursued. Technologies to assist multiple
payload launches as well as technologies to help the vehicle itself scale with mass and
volume capabilities. The ability to purchase one-half or one quarter of a vehicle's
capacity will help smooth out the price step function. This requires more interface
standardization and a change in design philosophy for more efficient dual manifest
designs.
9.4 Closing
The introduction of a significantly improved launch vehicle will represent a disruptive
technology that has the potential to instigate a paradigm shift in the development and deployment
of space systems unlike any innovation since the early 1960's. Firms that understand how to best
adapt and utilize the new capabilities will thrive while those that do not will loose market share
and their competitive advantage. The reason behind this shift will not only be technical, but also
philosophical. The importance of lower cost launchers is secondary to what improved space
access enables. Space systems are expensive because spacecraft are expensive, launchers are
expensive, operations are expensive, and technology development is expensive. As this research
has demonstrated, there is a symbiotic link between the characteristics of the launcher and the
design and development of the space system. Changes in one element have profound impacts on
the other that when reinforced, create a positive feedback loop which counters the vicious cycle.
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Appendix A: Lean Thinking
The elimination of Muda, the Japanese word for waste, lies at the heart of the Lean Aerospace
Initiative (LAI), a research partnership formed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
LAI was launched in 1993 as a consortium of partners from industry, government, and academia
to apply the "Lean" production concepts pioneered by Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno at the
Toyota Motor Company in the early 1950's to the US aircraft industry. The success of Japan's
automobile industry following World War II is often attributed to the creation and adoption of
"Lean" principles. Over the last decade, many US industries have also begun to adopt these lean
practices in an attempt to become more efficient in creating value for the consumer and
increasing company profits. MIT has established several initiatives for the automobile and
aerospace industries to put these philosophies into practice. Positive results in the automobile
and aircraft sectors sparked LAI to create the Test and Space Operations Group in 1998 in order
to explore the application of lean philosophies to the space sector.
The guiding principles behind Lean were initially introduced to US businesses through The
Machine That Changed the World by Womack, Jones, and Roos.E"' As members of the
International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Womack et al visited automobile plants in Japan, Germany, and the United States in order to
compare and contrast manufacturing strategies. "IMVP applied the word lean to describe a
revolutionary manufacturing approach in contrast to the conventional mass production approach.
Lean included concepts of Total Quality Management, Continuous Improvement, Integrated
Product Development, and Just-in-Time Inventory Control." [61
Principles of Lean
The term Muda is generally used to refer to any activity that uses resources without creating
value. Creating value for the customer drives all phases of design, testing, manufacturing, and
operations. The term "Lean" has been coined to symbolize activities and processes that
minimize waste, are responsive to change, promote continuous improvement, efficiently utilize
system resources, and in short deliver the right thing, to the right place, at the right time. In
contrast to other management techniques, lean is a philosophy for creating value not a step by
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step approach that must be strictly followed. Results from IMVP and LAI have demonstrated
that lean can be effectively applied to different industries and processes when viewed as a way of
thinking and improving processes versus being a process itself.
One of the principle concepts of lean is the identification of the Value Stream. The Value Stream
captures the set of all specific activities required to create a specific product, service, or
combination of the two. Creation of a Value Stream Map helps to graphically represent all
process activities and allows the classification of these activities into three identifiers: 1) steps
which unambiguously create value, 2) steps which create no value but are unavoidable with
current technologies and assets (Type 1 waste), and 3) steps which create no value and are
immediately avoidable (Type 2 waste). Value Stream Analysis is essential for identifying waste
and "seeing" where value is created. [45]
Lean Enterprise Model
The Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) presents the Lean Aerospace Initiative's view of lean and is a
starting point for understanding the lean paradigm. Through Meta-Principles, Enterprise
Principles, Overarching Practices, and Enterprise Metrics, the LEM expresses the fundamental
concepts of lean that apply to the aircraft and space businesses as well as many other industries.
Figure 4 shows a diagram of the LEM.
------- -- Lean Enterprise Model - - -
-------- -s ts.Pr I aipims- --- ---
nsivesstohe Waste Minimization
--- -- Enterprise Principles. --- -----
------------------------ -- Etrrs Pl*fI. -n --
- Right Thing Effective
- Right Place Relationships Continuous Optimal First
- Right Time within the Improvement uivanity
- Right Quantity Value Stream
---------- nvnrnaM a a ing Pai ices
FIGURE 9-1 THE LEAN ENTERPRISE MODEL[46]
For context, the enterprise refers to the broad range of stakeholders that contribute to creating
value for the consumer. The enterprise encompasses organizations or elements spanning from
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design and manufacturing to sales, marketing, and finance. A major tenet of lean is the emphasis
on continuous improvement and striving for perfection. Perfection represents a ideal alignment
of all components of the enterprise to provide maximum value to the consumer and stakeholders
(value is defined in context of receiving entity). While it is realized that absolute perfection is not
achievable, it is the awareness/recognition of the value created by constant advancement/
progress and the journey toward perfection that is important.
Managing Constraints as a Lean Enabler
Understanding the impact of external constraints on product design and development represents a
lean enabler. In reference to the LEM, the research questions addressed in this thesis fall under
the meta principles of waste minimization and responsiveness to change. Additionally, looking
across system boundaries, between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft, exemplifies the system-
level view crucial to integrating the space enterprise.
Enterprise View: Constraints cut across system boundaries and exist at the heart of
interactions between systems and their subsystems. Understanding how one systems'
constraints influence another system (or one organization's constraints impact another)
allows the designer to operate at the higher supersystem or enterprise-level. At this level,
trades can be made across system boundaries striving to bring the enterprise to an
optimum while leaving most subsystems at sub-optimal conditions. Optimizing at the
enterprise level leads to total value maximization.
Waste Minimization: As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, launch
constraints lead to many design decisions that limit value creation. More importantly,
many times launch constraints are responsible for system re-designs and wasteful design
practices that increasing costs and schedule (Type I waste). Understanding constraints is
an enabler to doing more with less, efficiently allocating limited resources, an central
tenet of Lean.
Responsiveness to Change: Analysis of the implications of relaxed launch constraints
on space system design and development looks forward using knowledge of constraint
impacts to form the basis of technology roadmaps. By outlining which technologies and
capabilities will be necessary to effectively utilize the new launch systems quickly once
they become available, these roadmaps help space system designers respond to change
and focus on enabling continuous improvement.
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Appendix B: General Observations from Interviews
9.4.1.2 Tier Structure of Launch Constraints
Launch constraints can be loosely separated into three tiers depending on their degree of
influence on launch vehicle selection and level of rigidity. First tier constraints, such as political
restrictions or physical limitations such as lift capacity or volume, have substantial design
impacts and are either impossible or extremely difficult to trade-off. Second tier constraints also
have significant design impacts, usually can be traded, and are the most influential in making the
final choice from the suitable vehicles. The third tier factors usually do not have a large
influence in the selection decision but can be traded and do impact the spacecraft design
following selection.
9.4.1.3 Minimal Inter-Enterprise Trades
In general, most current spacecraft designers do few trades between the spacecraft and launch
vehicle because early selected vehicles limit the possibility of trades and a dearth of quantitative
tools and applicable methodologies for performing complex trades. Design is extremely
compartmentalized with most spacecraft being design optimized for a specific vehicle.
(spacecraft level versus architecture level optimization) Late stage re-designs to conform to
vehicle constraints adds significant cost and leads to unnecessary customization. shielded from
other elements of the space system enterprise.
9.4.1.4 Policy Driven Early Selection
Military programs have little flexibility in vehicle selection because of a "procure domestic
vehicle only" policy. Additionally, even this little flexibility is removed with pre-design single
vehicle assignment (ie program X will be on a Delta II) Early selection eliminates architecture
trades.
9.4.1.5 Vehicle Standardization
The EELV program has improved standardization among US vehicles for loads and interfaces
especially for the heaviest-lift class. Standardization with foreign vehicles has improved very
little. Customer concern over standard interfaces allowing multiple vehicle options is a driving
force for higher standardization in the commercial market. Vehicles that are too far from the
mean loose customers who do not want to lock into a single vehicle choice. NASA was labeled
as the most likely to have special needs requiring interfaces changes.
9.4.1.6 Capability First - Always
In response to the question "If additional lift capability were available for the same lift cost
would you consider choosing larger, but less expensive components to save spacecraft costs?"
Overwhelming response was no, would push for greater spacecraft capability. Commercial and
military were most adamant about more capability.
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9.4.1.7 Conservative Customers
Current situation with such high per unit costs and long manifest schedules make operator
customers extremely conservative. Customers risk aversion is labeled as key design driver Many
spacecraft developers spoke of clashing with the customer over putting on new technology/
components. Customers wanted benefits of new technology but were not willing to be the first to
"try it out." Strong preference for qualified, pre-flown designs. Prevailing theme: Commercial
will take an evolutionary approach.
9.4.1.8 Single Improved Vehicle -> Slow Acceptance and Capability Utilization
Conservative customers are not willing to limit spacecraft designs to a single vehicle option even
if it offers superior performance or lower cost. Ariane V cited as example of vehicle spacecraft
developers avoid. The Ariane V offers substantial lift capability (over 6,800 kilograms to GTO),
however, it is the only vehicle currently able to lift such large payloads (besides the Shuttle
which is off limits to commercial payloads). Designers have shied away until another option in
the 6,800 kilogram plus category is online. This points to a condition that industry change
depends on more than one vehicle offering improved capabilities. Fear of a vehicle going offline
(STS/Milstar example) will stop spacecraft designers from utilizing new capabilities until
secondary options are available. Best environment for space system market and design changes
needs two or more improved vehicles with close to equal capabilities.
9.4.1.9 Constraint Priority Depends on Program and Personnel
All spacecraft designers agreed that launch constraints played a role in spacecraft design. Besides
cost and weight, most differed on what they believed were the most important constraint from
adapters, access panel locations, and integration software to propellant slosh during ascent,
fairing shape complaints, and separation mechanisms. Constraint priority mirrored spacecraft
designer functionality with structural engineers citing loads as the most significant constraint and
electrical engineers citing communications and adapter interfaces. Also, top attributes for
selection are not always the same as biggest design drivers.
9.4.1.10 Old-Vehicle Bias
Selection preference for older proven systems with records over new systems was widely
mentioned. Need for testing phase similar to aircraft to prove operational status was mentioned
as a desire for new systems.
9.4.1.11 Scalability Issues
The current structure of launch lift capabilities creates a step function characteristic that
encourages weight optimization and minimization. While spacecraft can easily grow or shrink
by a kilogram or 10, the launch vehicle cannot. Lift capacity follows a standard step-function
characteristic with each rung separated by hundreds if not thousands of kilograms. Unlike
spacecraft, launch vehicles do not have the ability to easily grow capacity on the scale of less
than 100 kilograms. The average weight differences between one vehicle and the next size up is
620 kilograms. However, this assumes access/availability to all global vehicles. Considering just
US vehicles raises the average weight step to 1334 kilograms. The inability to simply choose
MIT LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE JUNE 2001l
APPENDICES 157
another vehicle with a slightly higher lift capability reinforces the necessity to go through costly
weight reduction processes.
9.4.1.12 $100 per pound Threshold
Most designers agreed that significant changes in spacecraft design philosophies and new
markets would not change until launch price approached the $100 per pound level. Several
industry studies pegged substantial new market creation in the $300 to $600 per pound range.
9.4.1.13 Vendor Situation
Many designer mentioned parts suppliers problems with vendors reluctantly accepting orders for
small lot sizes with extensive load, environmental, and reliability requirements. Many attempted
to raise prices (up to 1 000x) to drive orders away. Has led to few suppliers for many components
such as 1 or two vendors for Earth sensors. Single, complex spacecraft strategies along with
launch and space environment constraints are responsible.
9.4.1.14 Readiness level
The current industry technology readiness to efficiently utilize improved launch capabilities is
low. Commercial industry was much more near-term focused on vehicles that are currently
available and acknowledge that very few exploratory studies and analysis had been performed to
look at more radical design philosophies or the launch capabilities that would be required to
support them.
9.4.1.15 Weight Based Cost Models
Spacecraft cost models and methodologies are entirely weight based with a positive relationship
between weight and cost. Design trades based on using heavier COTS or previously designed
hardware that is not optimized for the mission under consideration are extremely difficult to
make. Additionally, weight-based cost models reinforce the weight minimization, weight
optimization paradigm.
9.4.1.16 Strong Barriers to Generic Satellites
While they are becoming increasing used in commercial industry, there is some push-back to the
use of generic spacecraft. Designers stressed the need to design for environments and vehicles
that the spacecraft may not see. A struggle exist between highly skilled engineers not wanting to
become assembly line workers. There is a strong personal preference for having some decision
input and more customized work where they can treat the project as their own creation.
Employee Benefits: More current knowledge, happier with more new missions, more dynamic
environment
9.4.1.17 Prepare the Customer for Change
The high cost of failure has created an extremely risk averse customer environment. Spacecraft
developers have a difficult time pushing new technology insertion as the customer drives the
design. Several spacecraft developers mentioned that the customer is "not as technically
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knowledgeable as in the past" and there is more frequent personnel changeover with "managers
coming in mid-project, needing to be educated, and then being reassigned just when they are up
to speed." This limits long range vision and there is "rarely a customer who sees the grand
picture." When changes in launch capabilities reduce the high cost of failure, it will be vital to
prepare the customer for an environment where architectures and new technologies do not carry
the same risk profile.
9.4.1.18 Government Technology Leadership
The high cost of technology development for launch and space systems requires government
involvement. The commercial world will follow evolutionary changes because the risk-reward
scenario for radical technologies is not economically appropriate Evolutionary development by
industry must be supported with revolutionary development by the government. Federal research
funds should be continually focused on the next generation of technologies leaving refinement to
industry.
9.4.1.19 Standardize Interface Policy
Convergence of mechanical and electrical connections standards will allow payloads to be
designed for the mission versus being designed for the vehicle. It also allows easier transition
between vehicles. The key is to standardization success is involving several major players to
adopt these standards so that others wishing to enter the market must also adopt. Standardization
in the EELV program has made progress towards this goal.
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Appendix C: Interview Questionnaire
1. In the programs that you have worked on, what were the main factors (4 - 7) that drove
system costs and program schedule?
- What differences have you observed across commercial, civil, and/or military
programs?
2. What type of studies or design trades have you or your company performed in the past
looking that the relationship between launch systems and spacecraft systems?
3. What drove the selection of the launch vehicle (what process was used) for the
program(s) you worked on?
- Which launch characteristics had the largest influence on the space mission and
system design? Cost, Reliability, Integration or Interfaces, Schedule
Dependability, Performance Capability, Availability, Other
- How does this process differ between commercial versus government programs?
- How does this process differ over single versus constellation architectures?
4. At what point in the program(s) was the final launch vehicle selected and roughly what
percent of the spacecraft design was frozen prior to this selection?
- How did the design evolve after this?
- Were there any substantial changes to the spacecraft or architecture design that
were driven (to a large degree) by the launch system cost or capabilities?
- Any differences between commercial versus government payloads? Leo versus
Geo?
5. Considering primary sub-systems, which tended to:
- Grow or consume the most of weight and volume margins
- Go through the most design iterations, most design changes, or require
alterations to reduce size or mass
- Have the most options to consider, variety of alternatives of different price, size,
reliability, etc
- Overrun cost budget allocation
- Forced you to often pick up the launch vehicle specs
6. Consider a scenario where launch costs are extremely low (say $25/lb), launch on
demand exists, and there is enormous launch mass capability available (greater than
100,000 lbs), what do you think might change in the design of space architecture? Push
on:
- Modular design
- Technology insertion rate, rate of innovation, willingness to try new things
- Expected spacecraft lifetime (replacement rate)
- Spacecraft reliability
- Spacecraft development time
- Spacecraft Sub-systems (weight, volume, etc)
- Reusability & Serviceability
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7. What are your thoughts on?
- Launch on demand
- Designing payloads with shorter lifetimes and replacing them more frequently
What are the primary differences between long/short lifetime S/C?
How do costs change with expected S/C lifetime or development time?
What limits the potential lifetime?
Pros and cons (more technology innovation)
- Using extra mass capability to reduce cost versus improve performance?
What about choosing heavier, less expensive components over light,
expensive?
- Allowing lower reliability but launching more spares?
Mainly for constellations
- Any impact on design of systems in the past decade when mass capability has
increased?
- Using several inexpensive satellites instead of a single expensive one
8. What existing space markets would benefit most from reduced launch costs? Why?
- Commercial versus government
- Single satellite versus constellation
- Leo versus Geo
9. What new markets would open up or what if launch prices decreased? Why?
- What levels of cost, capacity, reliability do you think are necessary to enable
these?
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